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Abstract:
In complex software component systems, it is desirable to verify the correctness of the
composition before deployment. To achieve a trustworthy composition, the behavior of
components is formally described and the composition is verified against communication
errors. Unfortunately, the number of states of a model tends to grow exponentially
with the size of the model’s description — the state explosion problem. Because the
exhaustive verification has to visit all the states of the model, the verification leads to
unacceptable space and time requirements.
In this thesis, we present several approaches to cope with the state explosion problem
in behavior protocols. First, we reduce a size of the specification by enhancing the
specification language by exceptions and, additionally, we reduce the specification by
symbolic manipulations with respect to composition. Then, we present a novel approach
to distributed verification, which involves external storage devices. Finally, we reduce
the number of states, which have to be traversed by identifying representatives in the
state space.
Keywords: symbolic optimizations and manipulations, parallel and distributed model
verification, slicing, partial-order reduction
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, industrial development of large software systems tends to
use software components. While “software component” is a piece of soft-
ware with well-defined communication interfaces [67], a software system is
composed of several software components bound via interfaces. The idea of
software components is inspired by a successful use of circuit elements in hard-
ware manufacturing. Analogous to circuit elements are software components,
connectors to interfaces, and wires to bindings.
It is common to distinguish interfaces required and provided, together with
their static typing information. However, a simple type match is insufficient to
guarantee the correctness of system composition, similarly as a signal voltage
level does not guarantee correct assembly. Therefore, formal methods of
describing software component’s behavior take place.
Formal methods for expressing behavior over component interfaces require
solid mathematical foundations. The developer of a software component is
expected to formally describe its behavior. Then, the system specification is
created by a composition of software component’s behavior specification with
respect to system architecture. Here, because of rapid system development,
formal methods must allow automatic verification of the system specifica-
tion; a proof of correctness in particular. Such a verification tool is often
based on systematic traversing of the state space determined by the system
specification.
1.1 Problem Statement
We can identify several problems in the application of formal methods to
software component.
The size of the state space, which has to be traversed, tends to grow expo-
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nentially with the size of the specification, particularly by employed parallel
activities. The effect of model growing with respect to the specification size is
well know in formal methods and is usually referred to as the state explosion
problem. The state explosion problem is long-standing and one of the main
obstacles in practical use of formal methods in software engineering. There
are two reasons why. First, the required time to traverse the whole state space
becomes unacceptable. Second, because most verification tools have to store
generated states to avoid unnecessary re-exploring, memory requirements are
proportional to the size of the model and set a barrier to the verifiable system
size.
Additionally, a long verification runtime, required to traverse a large state
space, increases the demand on reliability of the computational environment;
often a failure of a single computational node leads to a termination of the
whole verification and a lost of computational time (verification crashes).
Since the most powerful environment relatively easy available in practice —
the network of workstations — is also the least reliable, the verification tools
face to the problem of failure recovery.
When applying formal methods to already existing software systems, soft-
ware designers cope with the problem of insufficient expressive power of the
specification language. While the specification language is suitable in the
bottom-up design, problems raise in the opposite direction: Unbounded con-
structs used in the software do not fit to the formal description and have to
be emulated in an overly complex manner or cannot be captured formally at
all.
1.2 Goals of the Thesis
The goals of the thesis are to mitigate the problems sketched in the previous
section while being partially focused on the Behavior protocols [9] formal
language. In particular to:
1. Reduce the size of the specification with respect to the composition via
symbolic manipulations and enhancing the specification language by
constructs which had to be emulated overly complex otherwise.
2. Reduce time of the verification by aggregating available resources in a
network of non-homogeneous, non-dedicated computers and to investi-
gate options of failure recovery.
3. Identify possibilities for partial-order reductions in order to reduce the
number of states which have to be visited during the verification.
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized in eleven chapters as a collection of published pa-
pers, which represent my key contributions, along with chapters devoted to
background, discussion, and related work.
In Chapter 2, we provide an overall introduction to the SOFA and Frac-
tal component models, basic terminology, syntax and semantics of Behavior
protocols, composition operators, and composition errors.
Then, we present related work in Chapter 3, particularly on process alge-
bras, static and dynamic program slicing, approaches and problems of parallel
and distributed model checking, and a use of high-latency mass storage de-
vices in model checking.
In Chapter 4, we provide an overview and a brief discussion on the contri-
bution of the papers from Chapters 5-10 to show how they address the goals
stated in Sect. 1.2.
Chapter 5 presents an enhancement of Behavior protocols with explicit
exceptions and our experiences with applying exceptions in formal description
of a real-life, non-trivial project SPEEDO. The content of the chapter has
been published as Exceptions in Component Interaction Protocols - necessity,
co-authored with Frantiˇsek Pla´sˇil, published in Architecting Systems with
Trustworthy Components: International Seminar in LNCS [4].
Chapter 6 presents a method of formal specification reduction by sym-
bolic manipulations. A set of reduction rules is described, together with
discussion about their correctness with respect to composition. The paper
has been accepter fro publication as Reducing Component Systems’ Behav-
ior Specification, co-authored with Frantiˇsek Pla´sˇil, in the proceedings of
the XXVI International Conference of the Chilean Computer Science Society
(SCCC 2007) published by IEEE Computer Society [3]. Effects of reductions
on an example formal specification are presented as well.
Chapter 7 describes our basic position on distributed model verification
of generalized interaction protocols. The content of the chapter has been
presented as On Distributed Verification of Generalized Interaction Models
of Software Components at the 20th European Conference on Object-Oriented
Programming (ECOOP 2006) Doctoral Symposium [5].
Chapter 8 discusses problems of traditional approaches to distributed
model verification, describes a new method based on a streamed state space
ordering, and presents internals of the experimental implementation. Experi-
mental results obtained with the method on large state spaces are provided as
well, including the results on multi-processor systems and clusters. The con-
tent of the chapter has been published as Streaming State Space: A Method
of Distributed Model Verification, co-authored with Petr Tu˚ma, in the pro-
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ceedings of the 1st IEEE & IFIP International Symposium on Theoretical
Aspects of Software Engineering (TASE 2007) published by IEEE Computer
Society Press [2].
Chapter 9 presents an on-the-fly algorithm of identifying representatives
in interfering automata. Experimental results on traditional and real-life
examples are provided as well. The content of the chapter has been published
as Identifying Representatives for Interfering Automata in the proceedings
of 1st Digital Communications and Computer Applications (DCCA 2007)
published by the Jordan University of Science and Technology [1].
Chapter 10 describes an implementation of the log-structured file system
developed in the scope of a student software project at Charles University.
The content of the chapter has been published as Implementation of a Linux
Log-Structured File System with a Garbage Collector, co-authored with Mar-
tin Jambor, Toma´sˇ Hruby´, Jan Tausˇ, and Kuba Krcha´k and published in the
Operating Systems Review special issue by ACM Press [8].
Finally, Chapter 11 draws conclusion and future work.
Most of the presented materials are freely accessible on the official Dis-
tributed Systems Research Group’s web pages http://dsrg.mff.cuni.cz/ and
on the web pages of the Object Web Consortium http://www.objectweb.org/.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 SOFA
We illustrate the basic principles of the SOFA (SOFtware Aplliances) com-
ponent model [44]. For elaborated description, we refer the reader to papers
[11, 17, 42, 77].
In short, SOFA allows designing the application using Architecture De-
scription Language, formally specify the behavior of software components,
automatically generate connectors between software components, and dynam-
ically update and distribute the application.
Applications are constructed of hierarchically composed software com-
ponents (Fig. 2.1)). Two types of components are distinguished. Directly
implemented components are called primitive, while those constructed by a
combination of another components are composite.
Components communicate via required or provided interfaces. Implemen-
tation internals are hided to the user (a black-box view), so the published
interfaces are the only connection between components. Bindings among
actually needed. But this solution leads to an escalation of connections and makes the 
whole component architecture blurred (by making the utility features visible to the 
components where they are not actually needed) and consequently error-prone. 
Another typical situati  we faced is that a eferenc  to such a service is to be passed 
among components (e.g., returni g refe n e to a service from a call of a 
registry/naming/trading component). 
For these reasons, we have introduced utility interfaces (the complete meta-model 
is in [8]). The reference to a utility interface can be freely passed among components 
and the connection made using this reference is established orthogonally to the 
architecture hierarchy (Fig. 2). 
DAccess
PService
Logger
DAccess
Logger
WorkerA WorkerB
 
Fig. 2. Utility interface example 
From a high-level view, the introduction of utility interfaces brings into 
component-based models a feature of service-oriented architectures (since Pservice 
can be seen as an external service). Such feature fusing allows to take advantages of 
both these paradigms (e.g., encapsulation and hierarchical components of component 
models and simple dynamic reconfiguration of SOA). 
As a side effect, the introduction of utility interfaces this way consequently means 
that – in a limiting case – the whole application can be built only of components with 
utility interfaces and therefore the component-based application becomes an ordinary 
service-oriented application (inherently dynamically reconfigurable). Thus, service 
oriented architecture becomes a specific case of a component model. 
3 Evaluation and Related Work 
Evaluation: The approach to dynamic reconfiguration in a hierarchical component 
model presented in this paper is based on our experience with not-trivial case studies 
crafted for the SOFA and Fractal component models.  
In principle, our approach to handling dynamic reconfiguration is based on 
combining the features of hierarchical component models and service-oriented 
architecture. From the component models point of the view, we allow just several 
types of dynamic reconfiguration compliant with well-defined patterns. Such a 
prohibition of an arbitrary reconfiguration and allowance of several well-defined 
modifications only is used in the most of component models (as discussed below), 
however none of them tackles the issue of how the component factory concept should 
be integrated into a hierarchical component model. Nevertheless, in addition to 
Figure 2.1: Example of SOFA components [48]
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components are performed via connectors [17] which are first-class entities
like components. Typically, bindings connect required with provided inter-
faces. Additionally, in composite components, bindings delegates between
provided interfaces of a component and required interfaces of its subcompo-
nent.
Recently, an enhanced version of SOFA 2.0 [45, 46, 48] has been developed.
Along other features, it allows to define a component model via a meta-model,
to reconfigure the architecture dynamically, to communicate among interfaces
via connectors in practically any style, and to define and allow to use external
services.
2.2 Fractal
The Fractal component model [39, 40] builds on hierarchically nested compo-
nents (examples from the SPEEDO project [47], Fig. 2.2, 2.3). The Fractal
specification [41] defines four levels of conformance. Each level specifies fea-
tures, which must be provided to satisfy the specification. On level 0, there
are no requirements and thus almost all the classes ale allowed components.
On level 1, the component should provide the basic information about inter-
faces (component introspection). On level 2, the component should provide
interface introspection, including name and type. Finally, on level 3, the
component should provide typing and subtyping information.
Next to traditional required and provided interfaces, Fractal introduces
several other types of interfaces. A role of controller interfaces is to manage
the component. Controllers allow to stop or start a component (life cycle) and
change the internal structure of composite components. Optional interfaces
are not required to be connected. Multiple interfaces specify an array of
interfaces.
Next to traditional (primitive) bindings, Fractal allows composite bind-
ings. A composite binding allows interconnecting an arbitrary number of
interfaces even with different types. It is represented by binding components
referred to as connectors which are implemented as ordinary components. A
unique feature among component models is a concept of shared components.
A shared component is a part of several composite components.
Currently, there are several implementations that conform to the Fractal
specification (not necessarily to the level 3), including SOFA. A reference
implementation in the Java programming language is the open source Julia
framework [43]. Specification of components in Julia has been enhanced by
Behavior protocols as a part of the Component reliability extension for Fractal
Component Model project [12].
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Figure 2.2: Componet model of the SPEEDO project [47]
Figure 2.3: Composite component Transactional Persistence Manager from
Fig. 2.2 [47]
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An interesting achievent is the Fractive [70] implementation which uses
the ProActive middleware [71]. ProActive is an implementation of distributed
objects with asynchronous method calls realized via future references — ref-
erences to return values which have not been obtained yet.
2.3 Behavior Protocols
Behavior protocols [9] have been developed as a specific process algebra de-
scribing behavior of software components. Although originally intended as a
specification language for the SOFA component model (Sect. 2.1), behavior
protocols are also used in the Fractal component model (Sec. 2.2, project with
France Telecom [12]).
Behavior protocols describe the behavior with respect to method calls on
component boundaries (interfaces). Method’s parameters, return values, and
internal computations are abstracted.
2.3.1 Events and Protocols
We distinguish two types of an event: request and response. Together, the re-
quest and response events correspond to the notion of method invocation. As
usual in process algebra, events are atomic, so that only one can be executed
at a time.
An event is accosiated with a method name. With respect to software
components, a method name consists of an interface name and a method
identifier. Then, we denote an event (event name) by a method name follow-
ing the event type mark: “↑” or “^” for request and “↓” or “$” for response.
For example, an event name for a request of open method on file interface
takes the form open.file↑.
From the component’s point of view, an event can be emitted, accepted,
or is internal, syntacticaly forming an event token. Event can be emitted
either as a request on a required interface, or as a response on a provided
interface. Event token denoting an emitted event is prefixed by “!” while
an event token denoting acceptance of an event is prefixed by “?”. Event
which occurs between component’s internal interfaces forms and event token
prefixed with “τ”. For example, emitting a response to the commit method
on the customer interface takes the form !customer.commit↓. A sequence
of event tokens forms a trace. A set of all possible (allowed) traces forms a
behavior (a language).
A protocol is a regular-like expression used for expressing a behavior. In
addition to event tokens, it is composed of operators sequencing “;”, alterna-
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tive “+”, repetition “∗”, and-parallel “|”, and or-parallel “‖”.
The result of the sequencing operator A;B consists of the traces generated
by a concatenation of all the traces generated by A by all the traces generated
by B, while the result of the alternative operator A + B consists of all the
traces generated either by A or by B. For example:
L(a+ b) = {< a >,< b >}
L(a; b+ c; d) = {< a, b >,< c, d >}
L((a+ b); (c+ d)) = {< a, c >,< a, d >,< b, c >,< b, d >}
The repetition operator A∗ generates all the traces produced by an arbitrary
but finite repetition of all the traced generated by A. Note that zero-times
repetition is allowed, resulting in an empty behavior null. For example:
L(a∗) = {< null >,< a >,< a, a >,< a, a, a >, . . .}
L((a+ b)∗) = {< null >,< a >,< b >,< a, a >,< a, b >, . . .}
And-parallel operator A|B represents all the interleavings of event tokens in A
and B. It is useful to express parallel execution of two traces. The or-parallel
operator A‖B is an acronym for A+B + (A|B). For example:
L(a|b) = {< a, b >,< b, a >}
L(a; b|c) = {< a, b, c >,< a, c, b >,< c, a, b >}
Several acronyms are defined for the most often used constructs (see
Fig. 2.4 for examples): A simple method call !i.m stands for !i.m↑; ?i.m↓, a
simple method acceptance ?i.m stands for ?i.m↑; !i.m↓, a composite method
call !i.m{A} stands for !i.m↑; (A); ?i.m↓, and finally a composite method ac-
ceptance ?i.m{A} stands for ?i.m↑; (A); !i.m↓.
With respect to components, we distinguish the following specific behavior
protocols:
• a frame protocol specifies the behavior of a particular component
(Fig. 2.4), Typically, a frame protocol describes the expected behav-
ior of a primitive as well as composite component and is written by a
developer.
• an architecture protocol specifies the behavior of several components,
usually constructed automatically from frame protocols of particular
components, and
• an interface protocol specifies the behavior on a particular interface.
For composite component, both frame and architecture protocols exists.
For additional operators (restriction “/” and adjustment “| |”) and
acronyms we refer the reader to the original paper [10].
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2.3.2 Example
An example of a real-life frame protocol is presented in Fig. 2.4. The protocol
displays the behavior of the Arbitrator component from the Airport Internet
providing service example [15] (Fig. 2.5) developed within the scope of the
Component Reliability Extensions for Fractal Component Model project [12].
The component starts with a synchronization with other components. First,
it awaits a Start call from the IArbitratorLifetimeController. Then (;),
it starts the initialization of the ITokenLifetimeController component by
calling the Start method. The synchronization ends by accepting a response
of the Start call on ITokenLifetimeController and emitting a response to
the Start call on IArbitratorLifetimeController. Both calls are executed
synchronously, which is denoted by square brackets. Synchronous execution
(atomic actions [19]) is not a basic part of Behavior protocols, it has been
introduced in the project to simplify complex synchronization of components
at the beginning.
After the synchronization, the component runs in parallel (|) five pro-
tocols. The first one reacts on the ILogin interface (?ILogin.). It ac-
cepts the calls (+) of GetTokenIdFromIpAddress, LoginWithFlyTicketId,
LoginWithFrequentFlyerId, LoginWithAccountId, and Logout methods.
The implementation of the GetTokenIdFromIpAddress method does not
produce observable events, thus the specification of the method is empty
(there are no curly brackets). In contrast to the GetTokenIdFromIpAddress
method, the LoginWithFlyTicketId method does produce observable events:
First, it calls the CreateToken method on the IFlyTicketAuth interface.
Then, the DisablePortBlock method is called on the IFirewall or (al-
ternatively +) the method call is skipped (NULL). Similarly behaves the
LoginWithFrequentFlyerId, LoginWithAccountId, and Logout methods.
Next three parallel protocols differs only in the indexes. The methods
TokenInvalidated * on the interface ITokenCallback calls the appropriate
method EnablePortBlock * on the IFirewall interface.
The last parallel protocol awaits for the IpAddressInvalidated 1 method
call on the IDhcpCallback interface. In the implementation of the method,
the InvalidateAndSave 2 method is called on the IToken interface.
All five parallel protocols are executed continuously since all can be re-
peated (∗).
2.3.3 Composition and Compliance
The composition operator unionsq expresses the behavior of two communicating
components. Formally, AunionsqEB collects together two behavior protocols A and
10
( ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start^ ;
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start^ ;
[?ITokenLifetimeController.Start$,
!IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start$] );
(
(
?ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress +
?ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId {
!IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId {
!IFreqFlyerAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithAccountId {
!IAccountAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.Logout {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 }
)* |
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3 }*
|
?IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated_1 {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 }*
)
Figure 2.4: Behavior specification of the Arbitrator component (Fig. 2.5) [15]
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Figure 2.5: Architecture of the Airport Internet providing service [15]
B by arbitrary interleaving their events. Additionally to the similar parallel
operator, the composition operator merges all the events of the form !m ∈ A
and ?m ∈ B (and vice versa) where m ∈ E to the internal event τm.
Unfortunately, the composition operator does not express composition
errors. Thus, the consent 5 operator has been introduced [13] (horizontal
contract) by enhancing traces with error tokens. Three types of errors are
detected:
• a bad activity occurs when an event is emitted, but not absorbed. The
trace ends with the ! token,
• a no activity (deadlock) occurs when no component can continue and
at least one component has not finished. The trace ends with the 
token, and
• an infinite activity (divergence) occurs when components leads to infi-
nite run, i.e. the component communication never stops.
Behavior compliance (or compliance for short) express the relation be-
tween the expected behavior specified by a developer and a real behavior
specified by the automatically generated architecture protocol (a vertical con-
tract). Intuitively, the real behavior should be a “subset” of expected behavior
when require and a “superset” when provide. In a sense of behavior proto-
cols, every absorbed method calls in the frame protocol should be absorbed in
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the architecture protocol, while every emitted method call in the architecture
protocol should be emitted in the frame protocol.
The exact semantics of compliance has evolved from naive [9] and prag-
matic [10] to consensual [14], where the compliance is defined by a consent
operator between an architecture protocol and an inverted frame protocol.
In the SOFA component model, the compliance is automatically verified
by an automated tool, a protocol checker [16].
2.3.4 Extended Behavior Protocols
Recently, Kofron proposes in his PhD thesis [18] several extensions to Behav-
ior protocols to simplify several constructs. In particular:
• Local variables and method parameters, but with enumerated types only.
Local variables are introduced in order to eliminate a common practice
of specifying a superset of behavior, which could be refined by additional
data.
• Multiple synchronization, which are represented with specialized emit
or accept actions which are shared among a set of protocols. The se-
mantic differs from atomic actions as mentioned in Sect. 2.3.2 due to
the problem of broken associativity of the composition.
• Cycles as a more powerful repetition construct than the standard repe-
tition operator ∗. A new construct while is introduced which allows to
repeat the protocol till the specified variable contains a specified value.
• Switch statement as a construct of conditional execution not presented
in Behavior protocols at all.
Specifications in Extended Behavior Protocols (EBP) are supposed to be
converted to the Promela [49] language and checked with the SPIN model
checker [23]. Unfortunately, exceptions have not been proposed; probably
due to difficult conversion to the Promela language.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
3.1 Component Models
In this chapter, we introduce a selection of related component models along
SOFA and Fractal presented in Chapter 2. Component-based system devel-
opment promises significant advantages over traditional structural of object-
oriented programming, including increased speed of development, reusability,
and verifiability. Components are studied heavily in recent years, in such top-
ics as versioning [78], benchmarking [79, 80], verification [20], deployment [81],
performance prediction, and quality-of-service [86, 82]. For a recent compar-
ison and evaluation of practical applicability of different component models,
we refer the reader to the CoCoME contest project [87].
In the rest of the Chapter, we present the Tracta/Darwin component
model (Sect. 3.1.1) which inspired many modern component models, and the
Palladio component model (Sect. 3.1.2) as a representative of performance-
prediction approaches.
3.1.1 Tracta/Darwin
Tracta [22] is a development framework whith associates behavior specifica-
tions with software components to analyze a system architecture. Architec-
ture of the system is specified using Darwin [21]. Similarly to SOFA, Darwin
distinguish primitive and composite components. Component services are
published via portals. Portals are similar to interfaces, but provided and
required are not distinguished. Darwin does not have connectors. Instead,
connectors are a special class of components.
In contrast with SOFA, developers specify a behavior for primitive com-
ponents only. The behavior is expressed by a finite state Label Transition
System in a graphical notation. Alternatively, the behavior can be specified
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textually via process notation of FSP (Finite State Processes). Thus, from
the behavioral view, components are finite state processes. Connectors are
modelled similarly to components.
Composite components are constructed by subcomponents. A behavior
of composite components is then computed by a parallel composition of par-
ticular subcomponents.
Tracta allows verifying safety and liveness properties. Safety property
is specified via property automata. These describe a set of allowed traces.
If a model produces traces which are not included (accepted) in property
automata, a violation is reported. Liveness properties are specified via Linear
Temporal Logic.
3.1.2 Palladio
The Palladio Component Model (PCM) [83, 84, 85, 82] aims at a system
quality-of-service (QoS) predictability. Its purpose is to estimate properties
such as response time, throughput, and resource utilization early at design
time. Following the idea of componetns presented in [67], PCM defines com-
ponents as a black-box entity with well-defined interfaces.
The performance of a component varies among different machines it is
deployed on. Obviously, while the designer of a component is aware of the
component’s requirements, he/she cannot predict its performance on an un-
known hardware. PCM addresses the difficulty of performance prediction on
varying environment by parameterizing the QoS characteristics over environ-
mental influences.
The final system characteristics depends on the deploying environment
and usage profile. These information are not typically available at the stage
of component development and/or architecture design. Therefore, PCM dis-
tinguishes, along with component developer (implements and specifies the
properties of the component) and software architect (leads the process of de-
velopment, creates the assemble model), other developer roles involved in the
system development: deployer (specifies hardware resources), domain expert
(requirement analysis), and QoS analyst (extracts QoS requirements form
the specifications, performs analysis, and estimates missing parameters). For
each of these roles, a domain specific modelling language has been created
and relations among them have been defined.
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3.2 Process Algebras
Process algebras formally specify a behavior of processes and allow reasoning
about concurrent systems. Behavior is a description of observable or internal
actions a process perform, including their order and potentially other aspects
as probability and time. Behavior protocols described in Sect. 2.3 belongs to
process algebras.
A process can be modeled as an automaton, where transitions represent
actions. A behavior is then a path from an initial state to some of final states.
To express complex systems with concurrent and communicating processes,
most of the algebras define a parallel composition.
Among most popular process algebras are CCS, CSP, ACP, and µ-calculus.
We introduce CCS in detail.
3.2.1 Calculus of Communicating Systems
Mainly Robin Milner developed calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS).
Most of CCS have been introduced in 1978 [54], including composition, mes-
sage passing, and internal actions prefixed by “τ”. Lately, observational
equivalence and strong equivalence was formulated [55] and CCS as a com-
plete algebra has been introduced [56]
We present concepts of CCS as stated in [68]. A basic behavior entity
in CCS in an agent (also a process). An agent performs actions (or events)
which is either a communication with another agent or it occur independently.
An action can be observable (reception or transmission denoted by a line a)
or silent (internal) τ .
For example, an agent Repeater may be defined on a set of actions
{in, out}. A sequence of events is denoted by an action operator “.”. If
a is an action and A is an agent then a.A is an agent. The action operator
is also referred as the prefix operator with the meaning “an agent A is active
only after the action a has been performed” and denoted as a.A
a→ A.
Thus the behavior of the Repeater agent may take the form of
Repeater
def
= in.out.Repeater
One of the simplest agent is 0 (read as nil) which is incapable of any
actions.
The exact names of the actions are not significant; they only suggest the
underlining meaning in the real word. CCS allows to rename actions of the
agent by the relabelling operator R[f ], where R is the agent name and f is
the relabelling function. For example, relabelling the actions in the Repeater
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agent may take the form of
Repeater2
def
= Repeater[incoming/in, outcoming/out]
defining a new agent Repeater2 that is similar to the Repeater, but uses the
action incoming instead of in and outcoming instead of out. Relabelling is
used in agent replication, where exact action names would lead to uninten-
tional communication confusion among replicas.
An agent may choose of several alternative actions via the choice + oper-
ator. If A and B are agents then A+B is an agent. Choosing to perform A
preempt the performing of B and vice versa.
Complex systems consist of many independent agents, which interact with
each other. In CSS, a combination of two agents is constructed via the com-
position operator |. If A and B are agents then A|B is an agent. Two agents
may interact by a convention via same action names — ports. For example,
consider the agent C defined as a composition of agents A and B:
A
def
= a.x.A
B
def
= x.b.B
C
def
= A|B
Agents A and B are willing to communicate over the shared action x.
However, the composition does not specify (limit) that these two components
must interact with each other; the resulting agent C can communicate with
other agents via x and x actions as well.
If we want to limit the scope of actions, we must use the restriction op-
erator \{s}. Then, agents are synchronized via the specified actions s, which
becomes an internal action τ . For example, the behavior of the agent defined
as:
D
def
= (A|B) \ x
has no actions x or x.
Formal definitions of basic operators are usualy expressed using Structural
operational semantics developed by Gordon D. Plotkin via inference rules.
An Inference rule consists of a set of promises, an optional condition, and a
conclusion:
premise1 premise2 . . . premisen
conclusion
condition
An action operator is the only axiom:
a.A
a→ A
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The composition operator (two symmetric rules):
A
a→ A′
A|B a→ A′|B
B
a→ B′
A|B a→ A|B′
The choice operator (two symmetric rules):
A
a→ A′
A+B
a→ A′
B
a→ B′
A+B
a→ B′
The communication rule (the communication happens only when two com-
patible actions are performed) takes the form of:
A
a→ A′ B a→ B′
A|B τ→ A′|B′
The restriction rule:
A
a→ A′
A/L
a→ A′/L a, a /∈ L
The relabelling rule:
A
a→ A′
A[f ]
f(a)→ A′[f ]
To capture differences between agents, equivalence relations have been
introduced. Milner discuss several approaches to agent equivalence, including
the similarity of behavior and derivation tree. Intuitively, two agents should
be equal if an external agent communicating with them cannot recognize the
distinction between them. We present two concepts of equivalence: a trace
equivalence and a bisimulation equivalence.
If the finite traces of the agents A and B are identical, the agents A and
B are trace equivalent, denoted as A ≈tr B. Trace equivalence is suitable for
verifying safety properties of systems specified by visible actions.
The agent A is strongly bisimilar to the agent B if and only if there exists
a bisimulation relation R over agents such that for all actions a the following
holds:
(i) (A,B) ∈ R,
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(ii) if (A′, B′) ∈ R and A′ a→ A′′ then there is B′′ such that B′ a→ B′′ and
(A′′, B′′) ∈ R, and
(iii) if (A′, B′) ∈ R and B′ a→ B′′ then there is A′′ such that A′ a→ A′′ and
(P ′′, Q′′) ∈ R.
We can always replace an agent with a strongly bisimilar one.
3.2.2 pi-calculus
The pi-calculus [69] is a continuation of CCS supporting a dynamic configu-
ration change during the computation. The reconfiguration is accomplished
by passing a port’s reference (mobility), replication (spawing/forking) of pro-
cesses, and a creation of a new name (port).
3.2.3 Communication Sequential Processes
The theory of Communication Sequential Processes (SCP) has been devel-
oped by Tony Hoare. First introduced in 1980 [59] based on synchronous
communication and as a guarded command language [58], later based on
trace theory [57] and polished [60].
3.2.4 Algebra of Communicating Processes
Algebra of Communicating Processes (ACP) was introduced in 1980 [61]
strictly as an algebra with alternative, sequential, and parallel composition
and no communication, later including communicaton [62] as well.
3.3 Program Slicing
A program slice is a restriction of a program that is essential to values ac-
cording to slicing criterion. A slicing criterion consists typically of a program
location and a set of variables. Program slicing is then a process of compu-
tation of a program slice according to the specified slicing criterion.
Program slicing was introduced in 1979 by Weiser in his PhD thesis [35].
Initially, program slicing should correspond to the programmer’s point of view
when debugging a program [37, 36]: if there is an incorrect value in a variable
at some point (positon), the bug is probably in the (smaller) program slice
with respect to the variable and the position. Thus a program slice should
be constructed by removing statements from the original program, should be
syntactically correct, and executable. However, since there are many different
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1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int main( int argc, char **argv)
4 {
5 FILE *f = fopen( argv[ 1], "r");
6 int c0 = 0;
7 int c1 = 0;
8 int i;
9 while (fscanf( f, "%d", &i) == 1)
10 {
11 if (i<0)
12 c0++;
13 if (i>0)
14 c1++;
15 }
16 printf( "%d\n", c0);
17 printf( "%d\n", c1);
18 fclose( f);
19
20 return 0;
21 }
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int main( int argc, char **argv)
4 {
5 FILE *f = fopen( argv[ 1], "r");
6 int c0 = 0;
7
8 int i;
9 while (fscanf( f, "%d", &i) == 1)
10 {
11 if (i<0)
12 c0++;
13
14
15 }
16 printf( "%d\n", c0);
17
18 fclose( f);
19
20 return 0;
21 }
Figure 3.1: Original and statically sliced program according to c0
perspectives of view, a slicing criterion and a program slicing vary among
applications. For example, some researches consider a program slice as a
subset of the original program, not necessarily executable.
Nowadays, along debugging [65], program slices are used for program anal-
ysis, testing [72, 73], improving comprehension [74, 75], reducing costs of
maintenance and evolution [66], and compiler tuning [38].
As an aside, an optimal program slicing (minimalization) is in general
undecidable.
3.3.1 Static Slicing
Computing a program slice for any input with only static information is called
static slicing. Figure 3.1 (left) shows an example of a program counting a
number of positive and negative numbers in a file. A program slice according
to line 16 and variable c0 takes the form of Fig. 3.1 (right): all statements that
do not influence a value of c0 have been removed. In particular, computing
of positive numbers in c1 is unnecessary.
There are several approaches to how compute a program slice. In the
original work of Weiser, a set of relevant statements is computed closely to
transitive closure (result is a fixpoint), with respect to data and control flow.
Alternatively, program slice can be reinterpret in terms of reachability in a
Program Dependence Graph (PDG) [63]. PDG is a graph where vertices rep-
resent statements and predicates and dependences are represented by oriented
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1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int main( int argc, char **argv)
4 {
5 FILE *f = fopen( argv[ 1], "r");
6 int c0 = 0;
7 int c1 = 0;
8 int i;
9 while (fscanf( f, "%d", &i) == 1)
10 {
11 if (i<0)
12 c0++;
13 if (i>0)
14 c1++;
15 }
16 printf( "%d\n", c0);
17 printf( "%d\n", c1);
18 fclose( f);
19
20 return 0;
21 }
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 int main( int argc, char **argv)
4 {
5 FILE *f = fopen( argv[ 1], "r");
6 int c0 = 0;
7 int c1 = 0;
8 int i;
9 while (fscanf( f, "%d", &i) == 1)
10 {
11
12
13
14 c1++;
15 }
16 printf( "%d\n", c0);
17 printf( "%d\n", c1);
18 fclose( f);
19
20 return 0;
21 }
Figure 3.2: Original and dynamically sliced program according to the line 17,
c0 and c1, and input < 2, 5, 6 >
edges. Slicing criterion is then a selected vertex v and a slice is a subgraph
reachable from v.
3.3.2 Dynamic Slicing
Moreover, we can further slice a program by taking a fixed input into account
— dynamic slicing.
Then, a slicing criterion is enhanced with input and a program location is
replaced by a statement occurrence. An example of dynamic slice is depicted
in Fig. 3.2 with respect to the first occurrence of (statement on) the line 17,
variables c0 and c1, and input < 2, 5, 6 >. Because all the input numbers are
positive, the condition on line 11 is always false and thus redundant, while the
condition on line 13 is always true. Note that static slice can remove neither
one of the conditions, since the real numbers from the input are unknown.
For a comparison of program slicing techniques and history remarks,
please refer to the Tip’s survey [64].
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3.4 Parallel and Distributed Model Checking
3.4.1 Introduction
In a last decade, many researches focused on parallelizing and distributing
model checkers to cope with large state spaces. There are several reasons
why: The increasing frequency of processor raises problems with cooling and
power consumption, therefore the development of processors continues with
increasing the number of computational units (processors) rather than in-
creasing a frequency. Contemporary computers are embedded with at least
two computational units and thus a single sequential computation performed
on it “wastes” about a half of the available performance.
The increasing demand for computer interconnection (particularly caused
by the popularization of the Internet), causes a rapid progress in technology of
local networks. For example, the most popular local area network Ethernet
(IEEE 802.3 standard) transmits data at the speed 10 Mbps in the year
1980, 100 Mbps in the year 1995, 1 Gbps in the year 1999, and 10 Gbps is
in the standardization process (IEEE 802.3ae). Gigabit Ethernet is usually
embedded in contemporary computers by a manufacturer.
A large state space causes two main problems. The first one is the time
required to traverse (generate) the whole state space. We would like to reduce
runtime requirements by enhancing the computational power by aggregating
available CPUs.
The second problem is a storage area for generated states. Traversing
algorithms requires saving visited states to avoid re-entering explored parts
of the state space. This sets a limitation to a state space size. By aggregation
available memory, we would like to push further this limitation.
Because there is an inconsistency in the terms parallel and distributed,
we have to explicitly emphathetize the difference. By parallel, we refer to
multi-threading algorithms, typically in the environment of shared memory
and symmetric multi-processing. On the other hand, by distributed, we refer
to a computation on different computational nodes connected via network
interfaces. Such an environment is characterized by a high access latency to
other’s memory in contrast to shared memory.
3.4.2 Requirements
Ideally, the distributed model checking algorithms should:
• Effectively aggregate the available computational power. Thus the total
computational power should be proportional to the sum of power of all
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the participated computational nodes in the network (cluster). Partic-
ularly, all the processors should be fully loaded during the verification.
• Effectively aggregate available memory. Similarly to the computational
power, the total amount of states that can be stored in the memory
should be proportional to the sum of memory of all the computational
nodes in the cluster.
• Require only low-cost synchronization in parallel computing.
• Require low network bandwidth, i.e. by minimizing inter-node commu-
nication.
• Allow to effectively utilize external storage devices.
These characteristics should be preserved even in non-homogeneous clus-
ters, where the actual performance parameters and available resources differ
among computational nodes. Furthermore, the algorithm should cope with
variing available power usual in a network of user workstations.
3.4.3 Hash-based Algorithm
One of the first approaches to distribute verification was introduced by Stern
and Dill [31] for the Murϕ verifier [33]. Because the hash-based algorithm
becomes widely adopted and is used almost exclusively, we describe the work
in detail and later discuss its potential weaknesses and a scope for improve-
ments.
States are stored in a hash table (the state table) which is partitioned
over the computational nodes in the cluster (a node becomes an owner of a
particular part of the state space). Each node keeps a queue of unexplored
states. A newly generated state is passed to the hash function. The result of
the hash function points to the owner of the state. If the state belongs to the
actual node, then it is processed locally, otherwise the message passing layer
sends the state as a message to its owner. Received states are tested whether
they have been reached before according to the state table. New states are
added to the queue of unexplored states.
The search is finished when there are no messages in process and working
queues of all the nodes are empty. The master node, which queries all the
nodes for the number of states in the queue and the number of messages sent
and received, tests this condition.
The error trace is generated by the node, which reaches an error state.
During the verification, each node writes information about the predecessor of
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the newly processed state to a local file. The error trace is then reconstructed
by a backward search through these (now distributed) files. The authors also
employ a message aggregation technique to improve network utilization.
The distribution of the work is achieved by the randomness property of
the hash function. A good hash function guarantees a relatively good state
distribution.
3.4.4 Identifying and Addressing the Problems
Although the most used, the hash-based approach suffers from several prob-
lems with respect to ideas presented in Sect. 3.4.2.
States and Transitions
Surprisingly at first sight, the real workload is defined by transitions and
not states. Because the method ignores the density of the graph, some non-
homogeneous models may lead to load asymmetry. For example, a node
owning an exceptional node with a high-degree of incoming transitions will
be overloaded by incoming messages. However, because such pathological
instances are rare, the problem is not addressed by traditional distributing
methods and states are considered as a good approximation of transitions.
Network Bandwidth and Load-balancing
In the original paper [31], the authors point out a problem of high bandwidth
demand. A partial solution proposed is sending a (small) result of a hash
function on a state instead of the whole (large) state and wait for one-bit
response. In such a case, the owner of the state cannot expand it.
Another solution to the problem was presented by Lerda and Sisto [30]
when distributing the SPIN [23] model checker. As discussed, optimal par-
titioning function should satisfy three conditions. First, a region selection
should be computed using information obtained from the state only. Second,
states should be spread across regions evenly to guarantee balanced work-
load. Finally, a number of transitions crossing region boundaries should be
minimized to minimize a required network bandwidth, i.e. the partitioning
function should exploit a structure of the state space.
Exploiting the structure of a state space is extremely difficult, in general
as hard as the model checking itself. Especially in real-life industry specifi-
cations, the generated state space is very non-uniform, with both dense and
sparse regions.
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Lerda and Sisto’s suggested partitioning function to select regions accord-
ing to a specified process of the specification. In the Promela language [49], a
system is specified via synchronously communication processes. In one step
(a single transition), the system differs from one state to another only in few
components. Typically, this is either a simple internal action where states of
another components are untouched, or it is a communication which affects
states of two components only. Thus, a transition crosses a region boundary
only when communicating with the specified process, all other transitions are
processed localy. Unfortunately, the method is very sensitive to the actual
structure of the specification.
Another approach by Ciardo et al. partitions a state space statically
according to user-defined hash functions [25]. Although a well-defined hash
function partitions the state space evenly, the main drawback of the method
is that the user has to fully understand the state space structure and then
specify a function which both spreads the states evenly and simultaneously
minimizes the number of cross-transitions. This is obviously not an easy task.
Moreover, when a single computational node becomes overloaded and starts
to trash, the whole computation stalls.
This approach was later improved by Nicol and Ciaro [26] with heuristics.
Before the verification itself, the state space is examined by a random walk.
Given explored states, a search tree is constructed using a randomized lex-
icographical function and is duplicated across nodes. Exits from the search
tree define classes of states, which are associated with nodes.
The method is to some extent adaptive to the actual structure of the
state space, however the structure is static during the verification and is not
able to adapt to actual CPU or memory load. This is addressed by dynamic
remapping, where the current load (number of states) is periodically checked
and classes of states are tuned accordingly. The dynamic load balancing is
considered essential.
Heyman et al. [50] present a method of dynamic memory-balancing by
an adaptive partition function. When memory requirement becomes unbal-
anced, a balance procedure is executed. The coordinator (a single process
in the network) matches processes with high memory requirements to those
with small one. Then, the partition function is modified, the state space
is re-partitioned, and finally all other processes are informed about the new
partitioning function. The main drawback of this approach is that during the
re-partitioning, the affected processes cannot continue with the state space
traversal.
A dynamic load-balancing is a nontrivial task. We illustrate the prob-
lem on the work of Behrmann et al [52]. While the distribution performed
25
well on a platform providing fast communication [51], significantly worse per-
formance was achieved on a Beowulf cluster [52] caused by load-balancing
problems and high communication overhead. The author identified the prob-
lem in overreacting of the auto-balancing system to small load differences,
leading to unstable system where the load of one or more nodes drops to
zero. An interesting observation is that an increase in the size of the output
collecting buffers causes worse performance. The reasons are that the increas-
ing latency between nodes delays load-balancing algorithm, makes worse the
approximation of the breadth-first search order, and reduces the coalescing
effect of explored states leading to more explored states.
Note that the problem with network bandwidth is proportional to the
speed of a new state generation, the size of a state, and the efficiency of state
encoding.
Non-homogeneous Clusters
Intuitively, effectively distribute a work in clusters of computers with differ-
ent hardware using hash function is even more complicated than in uniform
clusters. The difficult task is to decide which parameter should be chosen to
distribute the work. If it is the CPU performance, fast CPUs are prone to
exhaust available memory and start to trash. On the other hand, partition-
ing by available memory causes situations where fast computers are not fully
loaded.
Non-homogeneous environment is usually not addressed. Most common
approach is to divide the state space according to available memory which is
main limitation when coping with large state spaces.
Non-dedicated Clusters
Small as well as large organizations own tens or hundreds of workstations
used by administration. These computers are idle most of the time and
available for distributed computing. However, the algorithms must cope with
concurrently running user processes and thus varying available performance.
This situation is somehow similar to non-homogeneous clusters and is rarely
addressed by researches.
Jones and Sorber [34] present the bee-based error exploration (BEE) al-
gorithm for finding LTL [76] violations, suitable for clusters of workstations.
The algorithm works by coordinating parallel random walks. In each step,
the algorithm decides under certain probability whether to backtrack or con-
tinue by exploring one of successor states. Backtracking is implemented as a
random choice of one of the states from the search stack. Unfortunately, the
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BEE algorithm does not assure exhaustive exploration of the state space and
thus is suitable for fast bug-hunting rather than exhaustive model-checking.
3.4.5 External Model Checking
Large storage capacity is attractive for model checking since it allow to explore
significantly larger state space than is allowed when using internal memory
only. Unfortunately, when comparing with internal memory, mass storage de-
vices suffer from high access latency. For example, the access time of modern
hard-disks is usually more than 6ms [53]; that is from 105 to 106 times slower
than the internal memory. Thus, employing external devices requires specific
data organization with respect to locality — randomization of states by par-
titioning function almost prevents employing external memory effectively in a
hash-based distributed model verification. While for most sequential model-
checkers DFS ordering is easier to implement than BFS, in distributed envi-
ronment, DFS implementation is complicated by its sequential nature [27].
Among the first approaches for external model checking (non-distributed)
is the work of Stern and Dill [32] in Murϕ [33]. The state space is searched in
the order of BFS. In contrast with DFS, newly generated states do not have
to be filtered against the already explored states immediately. Instead, the
filtering is processed after the whole level of states has been fully generated.
Then, the table of explored states is retrieved form hard-disk linearly, thus
mitigating latency time.
Surprisingly, only little work has been done on distributed external model
checking. As an example, we present details about recent work of Jabbar and
Edelkamp [24] on distributing the External A* [28] algorithm in IO-HSF-
SPIN [29].
The external A* algorithm stores the search horizon on external device
(BFS ordering). States are organized in buckets with the same path length
(g) and heuristic estimate (h). Since heuristic estimate groups similar states
into same bucket, duplicate detection can be limited to particular buckets.
The parallelization is based on an observation that the internal work on
each state bucket can be parallelized on more processors. On each of the
processors, several concurrent processes are deployed. A work queue is main-
tained via shared file, constructing a communication channel. A job consists
of a bucket index and a file to be considered.
Each bucket of states proceeds over four phases. In the exploration phase,
successors are saved in a file (g, h, p) where g and h are hash values and p is
a processor index. In the first sorting phase, each processor sorts its file. In
the distribution phase, one processor distributes states in all files according
to a hash value. Until the distribution finishes, all other processors have to
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wait. Note that this is a potential bottleneck. Finally, in the second sorting
phase, processors once again sort their file to further eliminate duplicates.
Experiments on a multiprocessor machine with 3 processors reveal a speed-
up factor from 1.64 to 2.41 depending on the task. On two machines connected
via nfs, the speed-up was from minimal 1.08 to 1.41. The bottleneck was a
saturated nfs connection.
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Chapter 4
Commented Overview of the
Papers
In this chapter, we present a basic overview of selected papers included in
Chapters 5-10.
Exceptions in Component Interaction Proto-
cols - Necessity (Chapter 5)
In the paper, we present an analysis of the role and importance of exceptions
in a behavior specification and the way we have enhanced Behavior protocols
by them to handle exceptions in an efficient way in terms of readability,
comprehension, and the size of the specification.
Most of the current component protocols do not allow to express excep-
tions explicitly. To illustrate viability of our results, we present a study of
applying different techniques of expressing exceptions in Behavior protocols
in a specification of a real-life component-based application which uses excep-
tions heavily. Without explicit exceptions, the specification becomes overly
large, complicated, hard to understand, and error-prone.
The paper addresses the goal (1) stated in Sect. 1.2. The author of the
thesis identifies the problem, and proposes the solution and the syntax. The
co-author – Frantisek Plasil – fine-tuned the behavior of parallel exceptions
and polished the syntax.
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Reducing Component Systems’ Behavior Spec-
ification (Chapter 6)
In this paper, we present a method of specification reduction based on sym-
bolic manipulations. The method, which is to be applied at the input of a
verification tool, consists of an iterative application of reduction rules. The
reduction rules modify the specification while preserving important charac-
teristics of the model with respect to the composition (the consent operator
and the inverted frame protocol). If the result of the reductions identifies a
composition error, a corresponding counter example is back interpreted in the
original specification. This makes the reduction method fully transparent to
the user.
To guarantee correctness of the reductions, we have formulated several
conditions to be satisfied. Reductions are of a low overhead, since the algo-
rithm is linear with the size of the specification.
Although a “full” reduction of the specification is not guaranteed in gen-
eral, real-life case studies, such as the one presented in the paper, show that
most of such specifications contain several typical patterns to which reduction
rules apply (and allow a full reduction).
Due to page number limitations, the example presented in the paper is
truncated. We elaborate the example fully in detail in Appendix A.
The paper addresses the goal (1) stated in Sect. 1.2. The author of the
thesis investigates the possibilities of symbolic manipulations, designs the
reduction rules and elaborates the proof-of-the-concept examples. The co-
author – Frantisek Plasil – reviewed the reduction rules and proposes the
structure of reduction explanations.
On Distributed Verification of Generalized
Interaction Models of Software Components
(Chapter 7)
In the paper, we sketch a concept of distributed model verification based
on interfering automata, a generalized language suitable for describing the
behavior of complex interacting systems based on Labelled Transition Sys-
tems. The work is included as a connection between the distributed model
verification presented in Sect. 8 and interfering automata presented in Sect. 9.
The paper addresses the goal (2) stated in Sect. 1.2.
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Streaming State Space: A Method of Dis-
tributed Model Verification (Chapter 8)
In the paper, we introduce a novel method of distributed model verification
of safety properties for large state spaces, targetted at common network in-
frastructures of non-dedicated workstations, proposed as an alternative to
traditional partitioning-based approaches. Instead of dividing the state space
into parts, we keep the states ordered and organized as a stream which is
handed over in a logical circle across the computational nodes. Each compu-
tational node updates the stream in the part it sees.
Due to the predictable organization of states, parts of the state space can
be temporarily stored on external high-latency storage devices.
The presented results show that the method scales very well with the
number of processors and computational nodes involved. Additionally, the
streaming method fits very non-uniform clusters and allows balancing the
load dynamically during the verification.
The paper addresses the goal (2) stated in Sect. 1.2. The author of the
thesis proposes the method, implements the proof-of-the-concept checker, ob-
tains experimental results, and evaluates them. The co-author – Petr Tuma
– suggests improvements in the argumentation and polished the text.
Identifying Representatives for Interfering Au-
tomata (Chapter 9)
The paper covers a technique of a partial-order reduction on generalized in-
teraction protocols — Interfering automata. The technique substitutes a
block of states by a single state — a representative — on-the-fly during the
verification.
A representative is identified in each step of the exploring algorithm. In-
stead of a precise computation of covered states, which would be ineffective,
we select only a subset of available transitions to continue in traversing. The
method is suitable for distributed model verification, since statuses of the
neighboring, potentially dislocated, states are not necessary.
The paper addresses the goal (3) stated in Sect. 1.2.
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Implementation of a Linux Log-Structured File
System with a Garbage Collector (Chapter 10)
The paper covers an implementation of a file system based on a data log
organization (LFS).
An interesting characteristics of the log — with respect to the fault-
tolerant verification — is its late (lazy) removal of deleted data and the con-
cept of snapshots. Data to be deleted are not cleared immediately. Instead,
they are kept until most of the free disk blocks are allocated. Then, the kernel
of the operating system calls the garbage collector (a user-space process) to
clean a part of the disk.
The file system can be employed in model checking in the following way.
Traditionally, the model checker has to store the states in a file on a hard drive.
When the states are stored sequentially, the hard drive is used efficiently.
Unfortunately, removing of already explored states is very time consuming
— states tend to be spread. This problem is solved almost exclusively in
external model checking, where, at every moment, the model checker works
with a set of files (the working set). In the recovery mode after a crash, the
model checker has to reconstruct the working set. This is relatively easily
achieved with a very important feature of the LFS — a snapshot. At a given
time (typically after finishing a level in the BFS), the model checker calls the
command of the operating system to create a snapshot. A snapshot consists
of all the data at the specified time. Then, all the modification are stored in
different areas of the disk so that the snapshot is not affected.
The streamed method presented in Chapter 8 does not use the traditional
working set of files. Instead, the states are stored in linear input/output
buffers. After the crash, the model checker has to recover the full single epoch.
Because the LFS “does not forget” data, this is relatively easy. However the
size of the stream increases during the verification, thus it would be inefficient
to kept on a disk all the epochs. This is the place where the garbage collector
helps. Since it is a user-space program, it is possible to “tweak“ it in such a
way that data of the old epochs are removed in preference.
The paper addresses the goal (2) stated in Sect. 1.2. The author of the
thesis supervised the software project as a lecture in the Faculty of Mathe-
matics and Physics, Charles University and polished the text.
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Abstract. At ADL level, most of the current interaction protocols de-
signed to specify components’ behavior at their interfaces do not allow
to capture exceptions explicitly. Based on our experience with real-life
component based applications, handling exceptions as ﬁrst class enti-
ties in a (formal) behavior speciﬁcation is an absolute necessity. Other-
wise, due to the need to capture exceptions indirectly, the speciﬁcation
becomes very complex, therefore hard to read and, consequently, error-
prone. After analyzing potential approaches to introducing exceptions to
LTS-based interaction speciﬁcation (expressed via terms/expressions) in
ADL, the paper presents the way we built exceptions into the behav-
ior protocols. Finally, we discuss the positive experience with applying
these exception-aware behavior protocols to a real-life Fractal component
model application.
1 Introduction
There are many approaches to describe the desired behavior of software compo-
nents. They include interface automata[4], behavior protocols[16], DFSM[19], us-
age policies[6], interactions and reactions[25], parametric contracts[18], UML2.0
State Machines (in principle stemming from Harel diagrams[8]) and Protocol
State Machines[12], and CSP-based mechanisms, such as Wright[5] and FSP[11].
Those of them which are based on LTS (Label Transition System) where
the transitions model atomic actions, allow for some kind of reasoning on be-
havior (e.g. equivalence[5], compatibility[4], compliance[16]). For instance, these
atomic actions model the request and response triggered by a method call -
? This work was partially supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic
project 201/06/0770; the results will be used in the OSIRIS/ITEA project.
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i.e. mostly the “control-observing” behavior of a component. Obviously, those
LTS-based behavior description mechanisms which are directly applicable in ar-
chitecture description languages cannot explicitly utilize any kind of diagrams,
and therefore typically employ some kind of term expressions. However, there
is a problem with this approach: capturing exceptions. While in a graphically
expressed transition system, an exception can be expressed by adding another
transitional edge, most of the term-expression based formalisms do not allow this
easily. We encountered the problem when we were trying to employ behavior pro-
tocols [1,2,3,16], in non-trivial case studies of component behavior specification,
comprising over 20 components each.
This paper aims at achieving two main goals:
1. To present a “reasonable” syntax extension of behavior protocols which does
not violate the inherent regularity of the traces generated by the protocol
(and therefore preserves important properties like protocol compliance de-
cidability).
2. To show that the proposed syntax increases readability and significantly
simplifies a behavior protocol when an exception is to be thrown/handled.
This claim is supported by experimental results.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the background - be-
havior protocols, in Sect. 3, the problem of handling exceptions in protocols is
analyzed from a perspective of component communication and a solution is pro-
posed. Section 4 illustrates the proposed solution on a case study. Section 5, as
a part of overall evaluation, shares with the reader the experience with applying
the proposed approach to a real-life Java project. Finally, Sect. 6 is focused on
related work and Sect. 7 draws a conclusion.
2 Background - behavior protocols
The basic idea of behavior protocols can be illustrated on the following example
(Fig. 1).
The picture shows the internal structure of a hypothetical Reservation com-
ponent which is composed of five sub-components - Ticket manager (responsible
for registration of tickets), Database manager (implementing the database be-
havior), Storage (permanently stores data), VISA (for payment authentication)
and Operator verification (a connection to third-party servers).
Via behavior protocols, we can capture communication among these compo-
nents. There are three types of protocols - frame protocol specifying the expected
activities on components’ boundaries (their frame), architecture protocol created
automatically as a parallel composition of the frame protocols of the subcom-
ponents (at the first-level of nesting) and the interface protocol describing the
behavior only on a selected interface.
These abstractions allow for addressing two aspects of “design by contract”:
(i) Horizontal contract “Do the children cooperate with no conflicts?” (a conflict
is statically detected as a composition error), and (ii) vertical contract “Do the
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Fig. 1. The Reservation component
cooperating children do what the parent expects?” which is statically verified
via evaluating compliance of the architecture protocol (determined by the sub-
components) and the frame protocol of the parent component. As an aside, the
static composition error detection and compliance verification is done by a tool,
protocol checker, available as a part of the SOFA project[21].
As to (i), three types of composition errors are identified - bad activity (an
emitted event is not accepted), no activity (deadlock), and divergence (infinite
activity). Definition of the semantics of compliance is crucial and has evolved
from a naive[17] and pragmatic[16], to consensual [2] based on the idea that the
architecture should work well (without composition errors) when cooperating
with a separate component representing the architecture’s environment. The
behavior of this environment is defined as the “inverted” frame protocol of the
parent component[2].
For example, compliance of the architecture protocol specifying the composed
behavior of Ticket manager, Database manager, Storage, VISA and Operator
verification with the frame protocol of Reservation can be verified. The frame
protocol of the Ticket manager component can take the form:
?Usr.init;
(
?Usr.buyTicket {
!DatM.preReserve;
!Card.lookUp; !Card.payment;
!DatM.reserve; !DatM.commit;
!Log.print}
+
?Usr.returnTicket {
!Card.revert;
!DatM.free; !DatM.commit}
)*;
?Usr.finish
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The frame protocol specifies that the component expects (?) an initmethod
call on the interface Usr followed (;) by alternatively (+) a call of buyTicket
or returnTicket. After this is repeated a finite number of times (*), a finish
call is accepted; no other incoming calls are allowed. The statements of the form
?i.a{P}, where P is a subprotocol, i is an interface name and a is a method
name, is an abbreviation of ?i.a;(P)!i.a. The ?i.a means accepting (?) a
request () i.a, and the !i.a means emitting (!) a response () to i.a. Along
these lines we see that the buyTicket method (acquiring and reserving a ticket
for the user), calls (!) the preReserve on the DatM interface to inform the
Database manager that a ticket is to be reserved. As a next step, calls of lookUp
and payment methods on the Card interface are made to perform the payment;
further, the reserve and commit methods on the DatM interface are called in
order to confirm the transaction. The last action is to print information about
the transaction - Log.print.
Instead of the alternative operator +, we could use the or-parallel operator
|| to express that calls of buyTicket and returnTicket might be accepted
simultaneously. Additional operators and further details are described in [16].
3 Handling exceptions in behavior protocols
3.1 Primitive techniques
In real settings, exceptional situations (not described in the previous protocol)
also have to be handled - e.g. the VISA component may deny service due to a
network error, and the Database manager may refuse to allocate appropriate re-
sources. In other words, specifying behavior of a component inherently involves
exceptions. However, expressing exception via the standard operators is tedious.
For illustration, consider the DatM.preReserve method call from the example
above which could throw a preReserveException exception. In order to specify
this behavior, we have to split the return from the preReserve method into
a regular return (?DatM.preReserve) and an accepting return with exception
(?DatM.preReserveException) - we call this technique intrinsic exceptions han-
dling. However, in consequence, the frame protocol length would expand rapidly
(exponentially in the number of methods throwing an exception).
Below is a fragment of the frame protocol of Ticket Manager where several
exceptions are thrown and handled - it illustrates how the protocol becomes
complex. In the example, we suppose that the DatM.preReserve method can
throw PreReserveException, methods Card.lookUp and Card.payment can
throw NetworkException, and finally the DatM.reserve method can throw
ReservationException.
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Technique: Intrinsic exceptions
...
?Usr.buyTicket ;
!DatM.preReserve ;
( ?DatM.preReserve ; !Card.lookUp ;
( ?Card.lookUp ; !Card.payment ;
( ?Card.payment ; !DatM.reserve ;
( ?DatM.reserve ; !DatM.commit ;
( ?DatM.commit ; !Usr.buyTicket )
+
( // exceptions of DatM.commit
?DatM.DatabaseException;
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.print;
!Usr.buyTicket
)
)
+
( // exceptions of DatM.reserve
(?DatM.DatabaseException+?DatM.ReservationException);
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.exEvent; !Log.print;
!Usr.buyTicket
)
)
+
( // exceptions of Card.payment
?Card.NetworkException;
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert;
!Usr.NetworkException
)
)
+
( // exceptions of Card.lookUp
?Card.NetworkException;
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert;
!Usr.NetworkException
)
)
+
( // exceptions of DatM.preReserve
?DatM.PreReservationException; !Log.exEvent; !Log.print;
!Usr.buyTicket
)
...
Obviously, a part of the complexity of the problem is the fact that we have to
separate requests and responses of method calls to capture that exceptions can
happen between them. Moreover the “reaction” inside such a call has to be di-
vided into a “regular” and an exception part, and, even worth, the exception part
has to contain repeatedly the “regular” continuation of the method (notice how
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many times is !Log.print appears in the specification). Clearly, if we could take
advantage of keeping the expressive power of the abbreviations ?a{P} or !a{P},
and add specific syntactical constructs for capturing exceptions as classical pro-
gramming languages do, we could shorten this behavior protocol significantly
and make it much more concise and, consequently, easier to comprehend.
Another option is to use the approximation by alternative technique the basic
idea of which is to put after any method call alternative, non-deterministically
chosen reactions (+) covering all the potential continuations. These include “reg-
ular” continuation, and those specific for each of the exceptions the method can
throw. An example of this technique is below. For instance, !DatM.reserve is
followed by alternatively calling !DatM.commit or handling the reservation ex-
ception (the !DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.exEvent; !Log.print part).
Obviously, this approach only approximates real behavior of a component by not
explicitly specifying the issuing and accepting events related to an exception.
Technique: Approximation by alternative
...
Usr.buyTicket {
!DatM.preReserve;
( !Card.lookUp;
( !Card.payment;
( !DatM.reserve;
( !DatM.commit;
(
null +
// exception on DatM.commit
(!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.print)
)
)
+
// exception on DatM.reserve
(!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.exEvent; !Log.print)
)
+
// exception on Card.payment
(!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert)
)
+
// exception on Card.lookUp
(!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert)
)
+
// exception on DatM.preReserve
(!Log.exEvent; !Log.print)
}
...
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3.2 Analyzing the problem and sketching a solution
In this section, we discuss all the key aspects related to expressing/capturing exceptions
and behavior protocols at the level of an ADL (Architecture Description Language).
In our view, the driving facts are:
1. In ADLs, exceptions should be speciﬁed with a granularity of a method (most
likely in the interface speciﬁcations).
2. In ADLs, the key abstractions the protocols are associated with are frame proto-
cols.
3. Issuing a method call in a frame protocol means the call goes outside of the com-
ponent.
4. Throwing an exception in a method means an abnormal end of the method call.
5. Because of (3) an exception has to be handled in the frame protocol of the compo-
nent which issued the call, and, because of (4), such handling is a speciﬁc reaction
of the calling component after receiving the exception. In principle, this reaction
has to be reﬂected by an adequate “traﬃc” on the calling component’s interfaces.
Obviously an abnormal end of a method i2.m call from interface i can be easily
modeled by replacing the standard “end of call” response !i.m by an exception re-
sponse, e.g. !i.e. Moreover, the “abnormality” has to be reﬂected by abandoning the
original protocol specifying the execution of m, i.e. the action !i.e in the protocol P
appearing in the context ?i2.m{P} has to be the last action generated by P. However,
as the example in Sect. 3.1 indicates, addressing these abnormalities by the standard
behavior protocols means becomes cumbersome. Since any protocol can be interpreted
as an abstraction of code, we can, for this purpose, advantageously adopt a Java in-
spired construct of the form ?i2.m{... throw !e ...} with the meaning (informally
put) throw !e generates !i.e and then the execution of i2.m internals directly jumps
to the lexically nearest }. In a similar vein, for handling an exception in a caller’s frame
protocol ((5)), we can adopt a try {P} catch {?i.e:Q} construct with the meaning
very similar to the interrupt operator in CSP (i.e. P4iQ): if the event at the begin-
ning of Q occurs, then the execution of the process P is abandoned and the process Q
executes further. Along these lines, the event ?i.e is the ﬁrst one generated by the
catch {?i.e:Q} construct.
However, we have to analyze exception throwing, propagating, and handling in all
the (1)..(4) contexts below, since the methods are called across component boundaries
and components can be nested. These four contexts represent all the situations on
interface bindings related to a method call and an exception throwing and handling.
These are client (1) and server (2) positions at a binding when no nesting is considered
and the related situation when component nesting is taken into account. The latter
are: nested server (3 - delegation) and nested client (4 - subsumption) positions at a
binding.
(1) Client position (Figure 2)
Consider the component X which calls the method a on the interface A. If an ex-
ception e can be thrown by the call of a (i.e. thrown by Y in the setting of Fig. 2), the
construct try {... !A.a ...} catch {?A.e: ...} is to be used in the frame protocol
of X in order to handle the exception. An unhandled exception would cause an error
(bad activity in terms of [1]).
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Fig. 2. Client-server
(2) Server position (Figure 2)
Consider the component Y accepting a call of a through the interface A’. In general,
as mentioned above in this section, an exception in the execution of a is expressed by:
?A.a { ... throw !e; ... }
Based on the experience with our case studies, typical special cases of throwing an
exception are:
1. An exception e is thrown due to an invalid actual parameter of a (invisible in
protocols, but important for a credible abstraction). In protocols, this is typically
expressed as
?A.a { null + throw !e; ... }
2. An exception is thrown due to a faulty return value in a nested call !C.c: (again
invisible in protocols, but important for a credible abstraction). In protocols this
is typically expressed as
?A.a { ... !C.c; (null + throw !e); ... }
Since both in (1) and (2) the exception is a reaction on an “invisible” invalid value,
it is a good practice to indicate the fact by choosing a mnemotechnical name for
the exception (in Sect. 4, there are several examples of this method).
3. An exception is thrown in a catch construct. This is typical for exception propa-
gation (even under a diﬀerent name). For example, in
?A.a { ... try {!C.c} catch {?C.e1: throw !e2); ... }
the C.c method can throw an e1 exception, which is then converted into e2.
(3) Delegation (Figure 3)
Delegation basically means forwarding an acceptance of a call to an internal component[15];
in Fig. 3 the component Y delegates calls from the component X on the interface A to
the interface A’ in the internal component ZA. In principle, an exception e thrown in
ZA in its method a, has to be delivered to the original caller, i.e. to the component
X. Since the internals of Y are not visible to X, throwing of e should be speciﬁed not
only in the frame protocol of ZA and but also of Y. Notice, however, that an exception
thrown by the component ZC and handled by the component ZA would not be visible
in the frame protocol of Y.
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Fig. 3. Delegation
(4) Subsumption (Figure 4)
Subsumption basically means forwarding a call issued in an internal component
to its parent component[15]; in Fig. 4, the component ZA subsumes the calls on the
interface A’ to the interface A in its parent component X.
Apparently, an exception thrown in Y is to be delivered to and handled by the
caller, i.e. the component ZA. However, the component X is also in the client position
with respect to Y (and, at a design stage, the internals of X do not have to be known).
Therefore, handling of the exception has to be speciﬁed also in the frame protocol of
X.
Since handling an exception in the frame protocol of X in general causes a “recovery
communication” of X visible outside of X, potentially including a speciﬁc communica-
tion on its interface B. Obviously, this recovery communication should be adequately
captured in the architecture protocol of ZA and ZB and, in particular, triggered by
handling the exception in the frame protocol of ZA.
Fig. 4. Subsumption
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3.3 Proposed solution - details
The main purpose of this section is to describe in more detail the semantics of the
constructs introduced in Sect. 3.2 and to analyze the inﬂuence of these protocol en-
hancements on protocol compliance evaluation[1,3,15]. By convention, we will refer to
exception handling based on these constructs as Explicit try-catch technique.
Throwing an exception
Syntax: throw !exception_name
This construct has to appear only in a protocol P written in the context of the
form i.a{P}, i.e. inside the curly brackets abbreviation expressing call acceptance of a
method a. In principle, throw !exception_name means that in the resulting trace the
event !i.a modeling return from a is replaced by the event !i.exception_name and,
at the same time, this is the last event generated by P. Should P contain nested method
accepting constructs (such as ?i.b{Q}), this principle is applied recurently.
For example, ?i.m{!a.x;?a.sl; throw !ex;!a.y} would always generate the trace
?i.m,!a.x,?a.sl,!a.ex. In a similar vein, ?i.m{X;(null + throw !ex); Y} is equiv-
alent to ?i.m; X;(!i.ex + Y; !i.m) for some protocols X and Y.
It should be emphasized that !exception_name is always the last event generated
by P, even though P contains a | and/or || operator. For example, the traces generated
by ?i.m{(!a.x;?a.sl; throw !ex;!a.y)||!a.z*} include (the beginning resp. end of
a trace is denoted by < resp. >):
<?i.m;!a.x;!a.x;?a.sl;!a.sl;!i.ex>
<?i.m;!a.z;!a.x;?a.sl;!a.z;!a.z;!i.ex>
<?i.m;!a.x;!a.z;!a.z;?a.sl;!a.z;!a.z;!a.z;!a.ex>
<?i.m;!a.x;!a.z;?a.sl;?a.z;!a.sl;!a.z;!a.ex>
Anyhow, the reason why throw !exception_name generates the last event in P, no
matter how many parallel activities in P are speciﬁed, is that it is hard to deﬁne a
“reasonable” semantics of more than one exception (the remaining parallel activities
could also throw an exception). As an aside, by opting for “interrupting” all the parallel
activities we basically follow the semantics chosen in CSP for the interrupt operator[10].
Catching an exception
Syntax:
try { A }
catch {?i1,1.exception name1,1, . . . , ?i1,m1 .exception name1,m1 : B1}
catch {?i2,1.exception name2,1, . . . , ?i2,m2 .exception name2,m2 : B2}
. . .
catch {?in,1.exception namen,1,. . . , ?in,mn .exception namen,mn: Bn}
where A, Bj are protocols and iij are interfaces. If a throw !exceptionnameij is applied
in A in a context
try { ... !A.a ...} catch {?iij.exception_namej: ...:Bi},
then the next event generated by the try construct is the ﬁrst event speciﬁed by Bi.
For simplicity, all the exceptions which could be thrown in the try construct have to
be listed exactly once in one of the catch parts of the construct.
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Influence on compliance evaluation. The exception-related constructs preserve
the semantics of the operators deﬁned for behavior protocols (in particular the seman-
tics of the composition and consent operators important for composition error detection
and compliance evaluation[1,15]).
Unhandled (uncaught) exceptions are captured statically by the protocol checker
(information about the possible exceptions have to be a part of interface speciﬁcation
in ADL). An improper/non-existent reaction to an exceptions is typically captured as
a bad activity error.
It can be easily shown that these constructs are without diﬃculty captured by the
LTS representing a behavior protocol. For example, the LTS representing
try { !i.a1; !i.a2; !i.a3}
catch { ?i.e1: !i.b}
catch { ?i.e2: !i.c}
can be easily constructed by adding transitions to the states representing the meth-
ods’ calls in which e1 and e2 can be returned: these transitions will lead to the LTS
representation of the e1 and e2 handlers (Fig. 5). Since the resulting LTS remains a
ﬁnite automaton, the ﬁnite trace-based semantics of the behavior protocol operators is
preserved.
Fig. 5. Transition diagram
4 Case study
In this section, using again the example from Fig. 1, we illustrate how the exception-
related constructs simplify speciﬁcation of exceptions in the behavior protocols of the
components introduced in Sect. 2.
The frame protocol of the Ticket manager is shown below. The component was
already described in the Sect. 2; here we present a slightly more detailed version which
includes the initialization of other components and the check of the lookUp method
return value.
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Ticket manager frame protocol
?Usr.init { !Card.init; !DatM.init};
(
?Usr.buyTicket {
try {
!DatM.preReserve; !Card.lookUp;
null + (!Card.payment; !DatM.reserve; !DatM.commit)
}
catch { ?DatM.PreReservationException:
!Log.exEvent;}
catch { ?Card.NetworkException:
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert;
throw !NetworkException}
catch { ?DatM.DatabaseException, ?DatM.ReservationException:
!DatM.cancel; !Card.revert; !Log.exEvent };
!Log.print;
}
+
?Usr.returnTicket {
try { !Card.revert; !DatM.free; !DatM.commit }
catch {?DatM.DatabaseException:
!DatM.cancel; !Log.print}
}
)*;
?Usr.finish {!DatM.finish; !Card.finish}
Below is the frame protocol of the VISA component. After being initialized by
accepting an init call, the “business” stage takes place: lookUp, payment, and revert.
The lookUp and payment methods may throw an exception due to the problem on
the network (null + throw !NetworkException). The lookUp method also veriﬁes the
card number via the verify method on the Blacklist interface. If the veriﬁcation yields
a negative result, ListException is thrown and validity is re-checked by the operator
(call of askValidity on the Operator interface).
VISA frame protocol
?Card.init;
(
?Card.lookUp {
try { !Blacklist.verify }
catch { ?BlackList.ListException: !Oper.askValidity};
null + throw !NetworkException
}
+
?Card.payment {
null + throw !NetworkException}
+
?Card.revert
)*;
?Card.finish
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In a similar vein, the frame protocol of Database manager indicates that the
preReserve, reserve and commit methods can be alternatively called after initial-
ization. All of them communicate with the Storage component via a !Strg.Access call
which can return StorageException. Notice that this exception is converted to the
PreReservationException resp. ReservationException consequently delivered to the
caller of preReserve resp. of reserve or commit.
Database manager frame protocol
?DatM.init { !Strg.init };
(
?DatM.preReserve {
try { !Strg.Access* }
catch { ?Strg.StorageException:
throw !PreReservationExcpetion}
}
+
?DatM.reserve {
try { !Strg.Access* }
catch { ?Strg.StorageException:
throw !ReservationException}
}
+
?DatM.commit {
try { !Strg.Access* }
catch { ?Strg.StorageException:
throw !ReservationException}
}
+
?DatM.cancel
)*;
?DatM.finish { !Strg.finish }
Storage frame protocol
?Strg.init;
(
?Strg.access { null + throw !StorageException}
)*;
?DatM.finish
The frame protocol of Reservation describes the communication with the envi-
ronment of the whole reservation application. Notice that the exceptions which are
thrown and handled inside the component are naturally not visible at this level, but
NetworkException is propagated through the Reserv interface so that it has to appear
in the frame protocol in the throw construct. On the other hand, ListException is
handled in this frame protocol as null} since its handling does not require external
component communication (as an aside, details of its handling are visible the VISA
frame protocol - !BlackList.test is subsumed from VISA). In contrast, if a Opera-
torVeriﬁcation component were outside Reservation (Fig. 6), details of ListException
handling would be visible in the Reservation frame protocol, as illustrated in it by the
comment line.
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Fig. 6. Modified reservation component
Reservation frame protocol
?Reserv.init;
(
?Reserv.buyTicket {
!Log.exEvent;
!Log.print
+
(
try { !BlackList.test }
catch { ?BlackList.ListException: null};
// catch { ?BlackList.ListException: !Oper.askValidity}
(!Log.exEvent + null);
!Log.print + throw !NetworkException
)
}
+
?Reserv.returnTicket
)*;
?Reserv.finish
5 Evaluation
This work was inspired by our experience gained during our attempt to a apply behav-
ior protocols to a non-trivial, real-life component-based application. We had chosen the
Speedo project[22] available from the ObjectWeb consortium as an open source imple-
mentation of the Sun JDO speciﬁcation[23]. The implementation is based on the FRAC-
TAL component model[7] and is heavily using the Perseus persistence framework[14].
Together, behavior protocols of 26 components were written. Our experiences has been
that without an explicit notation for exception handling, protocols are very hard to
read and comprehend, and furthermore, the correspondence between the behavior spec-
iﬁcation and code is very hard to trace. We support this claim be the ﬁgures provided
in Fig. 7. Here, the length of behavior protocol speciﬁcation is given for four speciﬁc
techniques of expressing exceptions via behavior protocols. The “Ignoring exceptions”
techniques means specifying behavior in a way which does not consider exceptions at
all. The “Explicit try-catch” technique is based on the behavior protocol extensions
described in Sect. 3.2, while “Intrinsic exceptions” and “Approximation by alternative”
are the methods described in Sect. 3.1.
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Fig. 7. Description complexity of the Speedo project formalism
Each bar of the graph is divided into two parts to indicate the number of lines spec-
ifying the “regular” behavior (gray) and exception-related behavior (black). From the
chart it is clearly visible how signiﬁcantly the proposed “Explicit try−catch” construct
shortens behavior speciﬁcation. Both “Approximation by alternative” and “Explicit
try−catch” do not cause any signiﬁcant grows of the “regular” part of the behavior
speciﬁcation, in contrast to the “Intrinsic exceptions” technique where often some of
the speciﬁcation sections have to be repeated. Notice also that “Approximation by
alternative” causes grows of the exception-related behavior speciﬁcation in comparison
with “Explicit try−catch”.
6 Related work
There are many publications on exception handling, however not many of them are
related to exceptions at a level of abstraction higher than source code.
In [20] the authors employ the C2 architectural style featuring composition con-
tracts. Components have top and bottom interfaces connected via connectors responsi-
ble for routing and ﬁltering asynchronous messages. There are two types of messages -
a request message and a notiﬁcation message depending on whether the message ﬂows
up or down though the system. This is very similar to our request-response notation.
The composite contract (a service-implementing component) ends either with a nor-
mal notiﬁcation or an exceptional notiﬁcation. In the latter case, an exception handler
component is activated. If the exception recovery is successful, an abort notiﬁcation is
generated; otherwise a failure notiﬁcation is generated and the component may be left
in an inconsistent state. In this approach, the contract component “remotely” corre-
sponds to our try construct and exception component to the catch construct, however,
the philosophy of component hierarchy is diﬀerent compared to ours and there is no
behavior speciﬁcation at the level of the whole component.
The static source analyzing tool PREfast[13] checks all the execution traces for
possible erroneous behavior (typically null reference, memory leaks). In the context
of this paper, it is interesting that during exception propagation some (predeﬁned)
functional failures are detected, such as missing memory deallocation and resource
unlocking. This property is checked by our approach implicitly - communication errors
would be detected in the behavior composition process[3].
Session types are used for describing behavior of CORBA IDL in [24]. The approach
of behavior description is similar to our interface protocol (protocols restricted to an
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interface), with a diﬀerent syntax though. An exception is expressed in the speciﬁcation
of potential responses of a method. However, if the method can raise more exceptions,
the same label is used for each of them.
A CSP based exception handling is introduced in [9]. The exception operator (
−→4),
is inspired by the CSP interrupt operator 4i[10]. While P4iQ means preemption of P
on an externally coming event i and continuation by Q (i is the ﬁrst event of Q), the
exception operator considers in P
−→4Q the event i as an internal event and therefore
Q can be interpreted as an exception handler and P as a try construct. Since in our
proposed extension of behavior protocols the composition of two components’ behavior
also yields an internal action τe (one of the components throws an exception !e and
another one accepts it via ?e in a catch construct), the approaches are similar in this
respect. However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. In CSP, interrupts can occur without
an intervention of the original process P, thus being similar to hardware interrupts. In
our approach, an exception is triggered by invoking a method call and it has to be an
expected event. Additionally, one catch block can handle more that one exception to
avoid repeating of the same handling routine if an identical reaction is desirable. Also
exception handling can be subject of compliance tests of both horizontal and vertical
contracts (Sect. 2).
7 Conclusion
The key contributions of this paper include:
(i) An analysis of the role and importance of exceptions in behavior speciﬁcation of
software components is given and it is shown how behavior protocols can be extended
to handle exceptions in an eﬃcient way in terms of readability, comprehension, and
the size of a behavior speciﬁcation.
(ii) This claim is supported by providing experimental results from a real-life case
study of applying diﬀerent exception handling techniques based on behavior protocols.
From these experiments, it is clearly visible how signiﬁcantly the proposed behavior
protocol extension by an explicit exception handling construct shortens the behavior
speciﬁcation of a non-trivial component-based application.
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Abstract—Behavior verification of large component systems
suffers of state explosion in particular when components involve
parallel activities. For behavior protocols, a method of component
behavior specification, we present a method of state space size
reduction based on symbolic manipulation with the specification
done by applying a set of reduction rules. A case study is
presented showing that the specification size is often reduced
to only a fraction of the original one.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Behavior protocols
Behavior protocols [1] were designed as a specific process
algebra, to specify the desired finite sequences of method calls
on component interfaces (their interplay) - the behavior of
components.
A behavior protocol P is an expression that generates a set
of traces of event tokens representing atomic events (actions)
related to method invocations (?m↑ stands for accepting a
method m invocation, !m↑ issuing an invocation of m, ?m↓
accepting the response (end) of m’s execution, !m↓ issuing
the response). In addition to event token, P is composed
of operators (’;’ sequencing, ’+’ alternative, ’∗’ repetition,
and ’|’ parallel interleaving without a communication), and
abbreviations ?m (stands for ?m↑; !m↓), ?m{P} (meaning
?m↑;P ; !m↓); similar rules are introduced for !m, and !m{P}.
The behavior protocol specifying the behavior of a par-
ticular component is called a frame protocol. As an ex-
ample, consider the frame protocol of the AccountDatabase
component depicted in Fig. 15 from Fig. 1. The protocol
specifies that on its provided interface IAccount, it accepts
a call of GenerateRandomAccountId, or alternatively (+),
calls of CreateAccount and RechargeAccount. In the latter
case as a reaction on accepting the call it issues a call of
Withdraw on its required interface ICardCenter. This can be
repeated a finite number of times (∗). In parallel (|) to this,
AccountDatabase can repeatedly accept calls on IAccount of
AdjustAccountPrepaidTime 1, AdjustAccountPrepaidTime 2,
and AdjustAccountPrepaidTime 3. Each time these adjusting
calls can be accepted in a sequence a finite number of times.
Behavior protocols introduce special case of parallel com-
position (the consent operator 5) [2] with communication
and hiding as known from the process algebra ACP [3]. It
produces interleaving of events, while merging the invoke “!”
and accept “?” events with the same name into an internal
event “τ” which (similarly to CCS [4]) in principle means
combining communication and hiding as defined in ACP.
Moreover, accept events are blocking, while invoke events
have to be merged by a counterpart immediately; unlike other
process algebras, the consent operator produces specific event
tokens corresponding to composition errors which are
• bad activity occurring when the issued event cannot be
accepted,
• no activity (deadlock) when only accept events are en-
abled, and, since only finite traces are allowed,
• divergence (infinite activity) when the composition would
produce an infinite trace.
By convention, a communication error is expressed by an
error event token ! for bad activity,  for no activity, and
∞ for infinite activity, which is always the final token in an
erroneous trace [2].
B. Checking compliance
Because of its ability to identify communication errors, the
consent operator is advantageously used to verify component
behavior compliance. By composing the frame protocols of
the communicating components on the same level of nesting
(e.g. the frame protocols of ValidityChecker, CustomToken,
and Timer in Fig. 1), it is verified that these components
will cooperate correctly — horizontal compliance is verified.
Naturally, this is true provided their implementation obeys
their frame protocols.
In a similar vein, it is important to verify whether the com-
posed behavior of the components cooperating at a particular
level of nesting complies with the behavior specified for the
surrounding (parent) component (Token in the example above).
This vertical compliance is again verified with the help of
the consent operator via the following trick: Even though the
parent component in principle just mediates the calls (both
incoming and outcoming) for its subcomponents, it can be
easily turned into an ’environment’ component which, instead
of mediating, really issues and accept these calls. Its frame
protocol is easily composed as the inverted frame protocol of
the parent component, with ! replaced by ? and vice versa.
Going back to the example, the composition FPValidity-
Checker 5 FPCustomToken 5 FPTimer thus verifies the
horizontal compliance and FPToken−1 5 (FPValidityChecker
5 FPCustomToken 5 FPTimer) the vertical compliance. Here
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the Airport Internet providing service
FP stands for a frame protocol and −1 denotes protocol
inversion.
Verification of compliance is done by model checking —
a number of specialized model checkers have been designed
for this purpose [5]–[7]. Since parallel composition is involved
via the operators | and 5, the Cartesian products of the state
spaces associated with the operands of each of these operators
tend to run into the state explosion problem.
C. Goals and basic idea of contribution
State explosion is a problem inherent to model checking
involving parallel activities. The typical techniques to address
it include abstraction [8], abstract interpretation [9], and partial
order reduction [10], [11]. The former is hard to apply to
behavior protocols’ compliance verification, since the level of
abstraction at with they capture behavior of software compo-
nents is already very high (they abstract from component state
and method parameters). At a first sight, partial order reduction
is much more promising, since (i) the events in operands of
the | operator do not communicate, however, their interleavings
can significantly influence whether a non-blocking transition
is enabled or not.
The goal of this paper is to show that state explosion in
behavior compliance verification can be addressed by reducing
the frame protocols via a technique which, in addition to (i),
employs observation that (ii) each pair of components com-
municates by events with unique, dedicated names (composed
of the name of an interface and method). Advantageously, this
can be employed to predict the communication leading to τ
actions in the composition done by the consent operator. The
reduction technique, reduction process (Sect. II), is based on
a set of heuristic reduction rules (Sect. III). In some cases, the
reduction can even eliminate the need of actual model check-
ing, as the frame protocols involved in parallel composition get
reduced to NULL. Since the original behavior specification
(frame protocols) is modified, it is very important to find a
way to interpret a counter example found by a model checked
in the original frame protocols. This is shown in Sect. IV.
The proposed reduction process was applied in a case study
(Sect. V) with a positive experience (Sect. VI).
II. REDUCTION PROCESS
A. Overall strategy
The classical method of system verification via model
checking consists of three steps. First, the user writes a
specification (a model) of the system. Then, the specification
is verified by a model checker. Finally, the result of the
verification (report on correctness or a counter example) is
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presented to the user. We add two more steps: reduction and
counter example back interpretation (Fig. 2).
a) Reduction: Before running the model checker, the
specification is analyzed and reduced (by a tool) in order to
lower the size of the corresponding state space. In addition to
the reduced specification, the tool produces also a log of the
modifications done in the original specification. The reduced
specification is then passed to the model checker.
A reduction requires a thorough knowledge of the relations
among different concurrent activities involved in a consent
operation. Therefore, with the aim to efficiently capture these
relations, a frame protocol is represented as a hierarchy of
LTSs, following the syntactical nesting of the | operators;
roughly speaking, a frame protocol is represented as a hi-
erarchy of parallel automata. Moreover, to capture potential
communication in the consent operation, counterpart relation
is maintained in addition. The basic idea is that pairs of the
form (!i.a↑, ?i.a↑) and (!i.a↓, ?i.a↓) are in the relation. The
conversion from textual frame protocols to this LTS internal
representation is described in Sect. II-B.
The actual reduction is achieved by a repetitive application
of reduction rules. Each reduction rule describes a frame
protocol modification (its LTS modifications) and the set of
conditions which must be satisfied in order to apply this rule.
The list of reduction rules and the associated conditions are
described in Sect. III.
b) Counter example back interpretation: As the model
checker finishes by reporting an error in the reduced specifi-
cation and not in the original one, the counter example has to
be back interpreted for the user. This is achieved by applying
inversion of all the modifications saved in the log; details are
described in Sect. IV.
As the bottom line, the reduction is transparent to the user.
B. Converting Behavior protocol into LTS
As shown in Sect. I-A, the frame protocol of a component
is an expression employing in addition to the classical regular
expression operators +, ; and ∗ also | and 5. While it is easy
to convert a regular expression into LTS, when converting a
!c↑ ?c↓ !c↑ ?c↓
!a↑ ?b↑ !b↓ ?a↓
!c↓
A: !a{?b}
C: ?c∗
!b↑ ?b↓
?c↑
?a↑ !a↓
B: ?a{!b|!c; !c}
D1: !b
D2: !c;!c
s1 s2
z1 z2
x1 x2
Fig. 3. The LTS representation of the parallel composition
!a{?b}5?a{!b|!c;!c}5?c∗
frame protocol a special care must be taken for the parallel
operators | and 5. The semantics of A|B is defined as all the
possible interleavings of the traces generated by the protocols
A and B. Obviously, creating a corresponding LTS based on
this definition typically leads to enormous size of the LTS
— it determines a subset of Cartesian product of the state
spaces of A and B. Therefore, because the events in A and
B do not communicate, they can be actually expressed as
separate, parallel LTSs (basically following the idea of parallel
automata). In general, in a frame protocol fp these LTSs
can be nested, being constructed recursively by following the
syntactic structure of fp.
Consider an example of parallel composition of frame pro-
tocols of three components !a{?b}5?a{!b|!c;!c}5?c∗, where
the first component calls a method a and meanwhile accepts
a callback b, the second component awaits a call of a and
implements it as a parallel call of the methods b and c
(two calls of the latter), and the third component accepts an
arbitrary number of the c method calls. The corresponding
LTSs working in parallel are depicted in Fig. 3.
We graphically capture LTSs as boxes with round corners
(sometimes except for the topmost LTS). In the protocol
?a{!b|!c;!c} represented by the LTS B, the execution splits
after ?a↑ from state s1 in two nested LTSs D1 and D2, with
the initial states z1 and x1. We say that states z1 and x1 are
associated with s1. By convention, associations are depicted
by dashed arrows like those from the state s1 to the states z1
and x1. In a similar vein, when both LTSs D1 and D2 finish
in the states z2 and x2, the execution joins in the state s2 and
continues in the LTS B.
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III. REDUCTION RULES
A. Elimination of ν-transitions
As mentioned in Sect. I-A, a τ event is created as a result
of a parallel composition (via 5) of an invoke and accept
events with the same name; in some process algebras it is said
that such two events synchronize or communicate. Assuming
a τ event is produced in the result of A5B by synchroniz-
ing !a↑ and ?a↑, it becomes here an internal action which
cannot synchronize any further. In particular, in a subsequent
parallel composition such as (A5B)5C, this τ represents
an “uninteresting” asynchronous action. However, its presence
may be important to express that some other events are
not immediately enabled; this holds for each of the parallel
compositions A5B and (A5B)5C. The key idea behind this
paper is whether one could statically decide on eliminating the
actions !a↑ and ?a↓ directly from A resp. B (i.e. reduce A
resp. B) for the purpose of compliance checking. Obviously,
such an elimination should neither introduce a communication
error, nor eradicate one. The challenge is to find the reduction
rules which would guarantee this requirement. Since it is easier
to articulate such rules for the LTS representation of a protocol,
we will use this notation in the rest of this section.
Consider again the composition A5B and event tokens
!a↑ resp. ?a↑ to appear in A resp. B. in such a way that
they synchronize (which of the appearances can synchronize
is determined from the counterpart relation).
To help articulate rules for making sure that elimination
of such transition does not eradicate a communication error,
consider first the following example:
(!a∗|!b∗)5(?a+?b)∗
The corresponding LTS is in Fig. 4 where the abbrevia-
tions are expanded. By convention, the transition which are
candidates for elimination are denoted as ν-transition — in
this example these are the transitions originally labeled ?a↓
and !a↓. Semantically, a ν-transition is an empty transition
(NULL in protocols) not visible in any trace. It is similar to
the -transition in automata theory [12], where this transition
accepts an empty input string. Notice, however, that if the
ν-transition was eliminated in Fig. 4, the 5 composition
would eradicate the bad activity error present in the original
composition (!a∗|!b∗)5(?a+?b)∗. The error is caused by !b↑
which cannot be accepted immediately when !a↑ is accepted,
since !a↓ is to be issued first. The corresponding error trace is
τ ; !b. Obviously, the ν-transitions were not good candidates
for elimination. Below are the rules for a save removal of a
ν-transition.
Consider a ν-transition −−→s1s2. If it complies with the follow-
ing rules, it is guarantied that no communication error will be
eradicated by −−→s1s2 removal:
(i) If s2 has only outgoing transitions and s1 6= s2 (Fig. 5a),
the transition is removed and states s1 and s2 are joined
into a single state s1 ◦ s2.
(ii) If s2 features both outgoing and incoming transitions
other than the ν one (Fig. 5b), the ν-transition −−→s1s2 is
?a↓
!a↓
!a↑ !b↑
?b↓
?b↑
!b↓?a↑
ν ν
ν
ν
5
Fig. 4. Naive ν-transition elimination
ν
s1
s2
A
s1◦s2
A
ν
s1
s2
B
s1
B
s2
α← α→ γ→γ←
β→
α← α→
β→
γ← γ→
δ← δ←δ→ δ→
δ→
a) b)
Fig. 5. Elimination of ν-transition
removed and all the outgoing transitions from s2 (such
as δ) are duplicated by introducing them to s1 as well.
(iii) If s1 = s2, the transition can be safely removed; this is
a special case of (ii).
To justify the rules, assume a ν-transition −−→s1s2 was elimi-
nated and a bad activity error !a was eradicated by that. Then
the result of the elimination accepts an event a which would
not be accepted in the original LTS. Therefore there has to
be a transition outgoing from s2 accepting a, but none such
transition outgoing from s1. Hence to avoid this bad activity
error, all the accepted events in s2 must be accepted in s1 as
well.
B. Identification of ν-transactions
Consider a parallel composition of the form A15A2.
This section provides a list of rules as to how to identify
and eliminate ν-transitions from A1 and A2 in such a
way that no communication error will be injected into this
parallel composition. At the same time, applications of these
rules assume that the conditions (i) - (iii) from Sect. III-A
are satisfied. Again, the rules are articulated for the LTS
representation of A1 and A2.
1) Simple method call: This rule (Fig. 6) addresses calls of
a method a, assuming that no ”reactions” via {. . .} for both
accepting and issuing of such a call are specified in A1 and
A2; i.e. each of the accepting call specification in A2 takes the
form ?a↑; !a↓, and each issuing of such call in A1 is specified
as !a↑; ?a↓.
Obviously, the basic idea is that, with respect to the con-
sent operator, the transitions ?a↓ and !a↓ are “redundant”
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!a↑
?a↓
?a↑
!a↓
s1
s2
s3
z1
z2
z3
A1 A2
!a↑
ν
?a↑
ν
s1
s2
s3
z1
z2
z3
A1 A2
. . . ; !a↑; ?a↓; . . .
. . . ; ?a↑; !a↓; . . .
. . . ; !a↑;null; . . .
. . . ; ?a↑;null; . . .
Fig. 6. Simple method call
in the specification, can be replaced by ν-transitions, and
reduced. The correspondence of the state triples (s1, s2, s3)
and (z1, z2, z3) is determined by the counterpart relation. This
reduction does not introduce a communication error provided:
(i) there are no other transition from the states s2 and z2
(ii) for each instance of the state triple (s1, s2, s3), there is
an instance of (z1, z2, z3) determined by the counterpart
relation (and vice-versa)
(iii) the reduction is performed for all instances of (s1, s2, s3)
and (z1, z2, z3) satisfying (ii).
To show that no communication error is injected into
A1 and A2 by the application of this rule, assume no
communication error is present in A15A2 due to the parallel
composition of (s1, s2, s3) and (z1, z2, z3). Since (i) requires
no other transition from the states s2 and z2 to exist, skipping
of ?a↓ and !a↓ - events that communicate, cannot introduce
a communication error.
2) Serial method invocation: A sequence of method invoca-
tions (Fig. 7) is often a result of simple method call reductions.
The basic idea is that since !a↑ and ?a↑ synchronize, the
following events !b↑ and ?b↑ are ”redundant” and can be
safely replaced by ν-transitions and removed. Again, the
correspondence of the state triples (s1, s2, s3) and (z1, z2, z3)
is determined by the counterpart relation, and this reduction
does not introduce a communication error provided:
(i) there are no other transition from the states s2 and z2,
(ii) for each instance of the triple (s1, s2, s3), there is an
instance of (z1, z2, z3) determined by the counterpart
relation (and vice-versa)
(iii) the reduction is performed for all instances of (s1, s2, s3)
and (z1, z2, z3) which satisfy (ii).
Also to show that no communication error is injected into
A1 and A2 by application of this rule, the same arguments as
in the III-B1 hold.
3) Simple cycle: Let the specification of A2 contain just
a single state z and a transition t, labeled ?a↑ which thus
begins and ends in z (Fig. 8a). Then all the events !a↑ in A1
!a↑
!b↑
?a↑
?b↑
s1
s2
s3
z1
z2
z3
!a↑
ν
?a↑
ν
s1
s2
s3
z1
z2
z3
. . . ; !a↑; !b↑; . . .
. . . ; ?a↑; ?b↑; . . .
. . . ; !a↑;null; . . .
. . . ; ?a↑;null; . . .
A1 A2 A1 A2
Fig. 7. Serial method invocation
which are in counterpart relation with t synchronize (unless
they are unreachable in A1). Therefore they (and t) can be
safely replaced by ν transitions and removed. Since these
events communicate while A2 remains in state z, removing
these ν transitions cannot inject a communication error. A
similar rule can be articulated for a !b↓ transition (Fig. 8b).
!a↑
s1
s2
z z
A1
A2
A2?a↑
ν
s1
s2
A1
!b↓
v1
v2
x x
A1
A2
A2?b↓
ν
v1
v2
A1
. . . ; !a↑; . . .
?a↑∗
. . . ; τ ; . . .
null
. . . ; !b↓; . . .
?b↓∗
. . . ;null; . . .
null
a)
b)
Fig. 8. Simple cycle
4) External events: Consider verification of vertical
compliance of two components with the frame protocols A
and B. The components do not communicate only with each
other, but also with their “environment” via their interfaces
not yet bound (there are external events in the frame
protocols). Note, that these external events are unambiguously
identified, since their names are unique (Sect. I-C). Assume
now that there is an ideal environment with the protocol
E. Here “ideal” means that it (i) accepts any external event
issued by A and B, (ii) issues any event A and B are ready
to accept as external, and (iii) does not issue any other
external event. Then, obviously, E5(A5B) can contain
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only such communication errors which are caused by the
communication of A and B. Therefore, all the transitions
labeled by an external event in A and B can be safely
replaced by ν-transitions and removed (Fig. 9).
!a↑
s1
s2
s1
s2
A A
!b↑
z1
z2
z1
z2
B B
ν ν
. . . ; !a↑; . . . . . . ;null; . . . . . . ; ?b↑; . . . . . . ;null; . . .
(?a↑, !a↓, ?a↓) (?b↑, !b↓, ?b↓)
Fig. 9. External events
5) Initital state transitions: Consider again a parallel
composition A15A2. If from the initial states of A1 and A2
there are only single transitions which synchronize (Fig. 10),
they can be safely replaced by ν-transitions and removed
provided there is no “third-party” synchronization in the
state z2 (or s2) as depicted in Fig. 11. In this setting, the
ν-transitions from the initial state of A1 and A2 would
eliminate the bad activity error (!b↓ cannot be accepted
immediately in the initial state of A2.)
!a↑ ?a↑
s1
s2
z1
z2
A1 A2
ν ν
s1
s2
z1
z2
A1 A2
a↑; . . . ?a↑; . . . null; . . . null; . . .
Fig. 10. Initial state transition
!a↑ ?a↑
?b↑
s1
s2
z1
z2
z3
A1 A2
!b↑
x1
x2
A3
!a↑; . . .
?a↑; ?b↓; . . .
!b↑; . . .
Fig. 11. Danger of hiding a bad activity error
C. Reduction outside 5 composition
This section articulates three rules for reducing an LTSs in
a “classical” automata minimalization way.
?b↑
z1
z2
z1
z2
B B
?a↓
s1
s2
s1
s2
A A
Fig. 12. Unbound actions
α
s1
s2
A
s1
s2
A
Fig. 13. Unreachable states
1) Unbound actions: Components often implement more
business logic than required in a particular environment.
Typically, the unused features are reflected in the component
architecture as unbound interfaces. Obviously, in the frame
protocol, no event at an unbound interface can be ever ac-
cepted, so that its acceptance never appears in a trace. Hence
a transition labeled by such an accept event can be safely
removed (Fig. 12). As an aside, on the contrary, issuing an
event on unbound interface triggers a bad activity error in a
consent composition.
2) Unreachable states: Obviously, unreachable states and
consequently unreachable transitions are unnecessary in an
LTS, since they do not contribute to any trace. At the same
time, it is important to emphasize that reducing them may
subsequently enable another reduction rules to be applied.
The basic idea of removing an unreachable states and all
related transitions outgoing from it is illustrated in (Fig. 13).
Here the state s1 and also the transition α are removed in
an LTS A. The unreachability of s1 is emphasized by the
crossed arrow. Unfortunately, to decide precisely whether a
state is reachable (the reachability test) is time-consuming;
typically it is as hard as the corresponding state space traversal
itself. Therefore, for practical reasons, we impose a stronger
condition in the reachability test: a state is unreachable if it
is neither a starting state, nor an associated state, and has no
incoming transition.
3) Redundant state: In general, by redundant state we
mean a state which transitions (if any) do not contribute to
any trace. However, for simplicity, we consider only four key
situations when a redundant state is easily removable without
introducing any communication error (Fig. 14). Even though
the situations a) - d) in this figure look artificial, they typically
result from a series of other reductions. Except for the trivial
a) situation, the other reductions in Fig. 14 involve associate
states related to nesting of LTSs in very special, pathologic
situations, namely: A nested LTS contains just a single state
and no transition (b), the outmost LTS contains just a single
and associate state to initialize nested LTSs and another such
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state for waiting the activities of these LTSs to be finished (c),
and there is a redundant level of LTS nesting such as B in the
case d).
A
s1 s2
A
z
B
A
s1 z1
B1 B2
s2 z2
B1 B2
s1 s2
A
ν
s1 s2
A
x2x1 y2y1
B
C1 C2z1
z2
C1 C2
A
s1 z1
s2 z2
x2x1 y2y1
z1 z2
a)
b)
c)
d)
Fig. 14. Redundant state
IV. COUNTER EXAMPLE BACK INTERPRETATION
For every application of a reduction rule, we save in a
log file all the states and actions (transitions) that have been
affected by it. To back interpret the counter example, we take
all the reductions from the log in reverse order and apply them
inversely to the states and transitions in the counter example
to enhance it accordingly.
The reductions B1, B2, B3, and B4 replace unnecessary
transition by a ν transition, which is immediately reduced
according to Fig. 5 as discussed in Sect III-A. The counter
example must be modified when a ν transition was (virtually)
executed. Although the execution of a ν transition cannot
be explicitly expressed in the counter example, its effect is
indirectly recoverable from the transition’s starting state. In
Fig. 5a, it is the transition from β→ starting at s1◦s2. In
Fig. 5b, it is the transition from γ→ starting at s1.
The reduction B5 represents a direct action execution (τ ). To
back interpret its effect, we have to explicitly add the reduced
action at the beginning of the counter example.
The reductions C1 and C2 remove unemployed behavior and
thus are not reflected in the counter example. The reduction
C3 modifies internal structures only, so that it is not reflected
in the counter example either.
TABLE I
EFFECTS OF REDUCTION RULES ON THE STATE SPACE SIZE
Step Reduction State space size Time
0 Original specification 871122 143m42s
1 External events (26x) 36369 4m43s
2 Simple method call (10x) 9506 1m9s
3 Initial state transition(1x) 9504 1m4s
4 Redundant state (4x) 9504 1m4s
5 Simple cycle (9x) 108 0.4s
6 Simple method call (3x) 50 0.3s
7 Simple cycle (3x) 9 0.2s
8 Simple method call (2x) 4 0.2s
9 Simple cycle (2x) 1 0.2s
10 Redundant state (17x) 1 0.2s
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we will share with the reader our experience
with applying the reduction rules presented in Sect.III to a
nontrivial demo application developed in one of our projects
[13] (Fig. 1).
As a proof of the concept, we have taken one of the
tests specifications prepared in the project (Fig. 15). The test
consists of a consent composition of the following compo-
nents: Arbitrator, Token,AccountDatabase, CardCenter,
and Firewall. Without applying the rules, the verification
required to visit 871122 states and it took about 2 hours and
23 minutes in total to traverse them; see Tab. I. The table also
illustrates the effect of applying the reduction rules.
First, external events (26 alltogheter) were to be re-
placed by ν. Ten of them could be removed immedi-
atelly, such as ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start↑ and
?Ilogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress↑. However, removal
of the rest of them was prevented by conditions of ν-
elimination (Sect.III-A); in particular by the fact, that no
accept transition can begin from the state which is the end
of a ν-transition. Fortunately, these “preventing” transitions
were also external events which could be removed. After all
of these reductions, the verification took less than 5 minutes
and required approximately 36000 states to traverse.
In the following step (2), ten simple method calls were
reduced, for example IF irewall.DisablePortBlock and
ICardCenter.Withdraw. After that, in the step (3) initial
state transitions !ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑ and
?ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑ were eliminated. The
status of the specification after this step finished is in Fig. 16.
Further, the topmost redundant states in the components
Arbitrator, Token, AccoutDatabase and Firewall were
reduced by applying the rule in (Fig. 14c). After this re-
duction, the number of the topmost LTSs rose from five
to 17. In the next step (5), nine simple cycles such as
?IcardCenter.Withdraw↑∗ were reduced. At the first sight
surprisingly, after applying additional reduction rules (steps 6-
10 in Tab. I) only a single state for each LTS remains, and is
finally removed as redundant.
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Arbitrator
( ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Startˆ ;
!ITokenLifetimeController.Startˆ ;
[?ITokenLifetimeController.Start$,
!IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start$] );
(
(
?ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress +
?ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId {
!IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId {
!IFreqFlyerAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithAccountId {
!IAccountAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.Logout {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 }
)* |
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3 }*
|
?IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated_1 {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 }*
)
Token
?ITokenLifetimeController.Start ;
( ?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 }* |
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 }* |
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 )*
)
AccountDatabase
( (
?IAccount.GenerateRandomAccountId +
?IAccount.CreateAccount +
?IAccount.RechargeAccount {
!ICardCenter.Withdraw }
)* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3*
)
CardCenter
( ?ICardCenter.Withdraw* )
Firewall
( ?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3* |
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock*
)
Fig. 15. System specification: arbitrator.bp
Arbitrator
(
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlockˆ + NULL)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlockˆ + NULL)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlockˆ + NULL)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1ˆ }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2ˆ }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3ˆ }*
|
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
)
Token
(
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1ˆ + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 }*
|
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2ˆ + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 }*
|
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3ˆ + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 )*
)
AccountDatabase
( !ICardCenter.Withdrawˆ* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1ˆ* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2ˆ* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3ˆ*
)
CardCenter
( ?ICardCenter.Withdrawˆ* )
Firewall
( ?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1ˆ* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2ˆ* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3ˆ* |
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlockˆ*
)
Fig. 16. Situation after step 4
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VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Even though the results of the case study are persuasive,
two obvious questions have to be answered to claim a real
benefit of the presented reduction process.
a) In which order are the rules to be applied (and how
many times): Based on experiments, the rule of thumb is
that the Rules B4 and C1 reflect are to be applied first and
only once (in any order). This is because they are driven by
the static component architecture and do not consider actual
relationship among method calls.
On the other hand, all the remaining rules depend on each
other. For example, applying the rule B1 on two consecutive
method calls will enable the rule B2 or B3 to be applied. At
the same time, applying the rule B2 may enable B3 while
applying the rule B3 may enable B1 and B4.
In general, it is not easy to specify a correct order of
reductions to achieve minimal state space. However, for a class
of specifications created by method abbreviations only, the best
result is achieved by the same ordering of reduction rules as
chosen in Sect. III. Fortunately, behavioral constructs outside
the scope of method calls or acceptances are rare.
b) Is the result of reduction always a composition of
empty protocols, similar to the case study: It is relatively easy
to show that the answer is no. Consider for instance the com-
position of the protocols: (?c↑; !d↑)∗; ?a↑5(?d↑; !c↑)∗; !a↑—
there is no way to reduce them by static analysis. However,
our experiments indicate that in all real case studies we had
available, there is always a substantial reduction in the state
space size, in particular when the B1 rule is repeatedly applied.
On our future work list, there is the search for frame protocol
classes which guarantee emptiness of the reduction result.
Related to our work are slicing and symmetry exploiting
methods. In program slicing, we define slicing criterion which
is typically a pair of program location and a set of variables.
Then, a program slice is a part of the original program
which affects the values of presented variables at the specified
location.
The idea of program slicing was introduced by Weiser
[14], [15] originally for debugging purposes. Later, program
slicing has been used for various purposes such as analysis,
parallelization, comparison, and testing. With respect to our
work, the most interesting topic is compiler optimization.
Larus and Chandra [16] present a detection of redundant
common sub-expressions. The code is enriched by instructions
for trace inspection. Traces are then interpreted as a stream of
events, where a directed acyclic graph is constructed with all
the arguments and operators which affects the current value
in the register. Because the approach uses information about
executions, it represents a class of dynamic slicing.
Specification slicing aims at creating a reduced specification
while preserving all the desired information. It is analogous
to program slicing for specifications. Wu and Yi [17] present
slicing of Z [18] specifications. First, data, control, and logic
dependencies of the specification are represented by a speci-
fication dependence graph. Then, the reduced Z specification
is created by a two-pass reachability algorithm applied to the
graph.
Another work (done in our group) [19] presents slicing of
the component behavior specification according to the actual
component composition. The technique aims at removing the
unused behavior to make the actual real role of a particular
component more visible by removing the unemployed parts of
the frame protocols. Thus, although the size of the specifica-
tion is reduced, the real size of the state space is untouched,
since only its employed part contributes to the size of the
consent composition.
A key difference between slicing and our reduction method
is that slicing reduces the unemployed part of the specification,
while our method is specialized towards consent composition
and reduces also the parts of the specification for which
composition without communication errors can be statically
guaranteed. At the same time, the method guaranties that, by
the reduction, no communication errors will be injected and no
communication error will be eliminated from the specification.
Moreover, our reduction method involves also logging of
the partial reduction steps to ensure the original form of
the specification can be reconstructed - this is necessary for
providing counter examples referring to the original form if
the reduction does not result in an empty specification and
model checking has to be applied in its rest. This is not strictly
required in a case of slicing.
There are several approaches to exploit symmetry in the
specification. For example in Murφ model checker [20], Ip a
Dill introduced [21] a new data type scalarset which represents
and unordered set. Operations on scalarset are restricted to
guarantee that every function on the set is automorphism.
Thus, scalarset is symmetric and the behavior of the program
is independent on the actual permutation of elements. Addi-
tionally, conditions under which the scalarset can be used are
statically checked.
VII. CONCLUSION
We attack the state space explosion problem by reducing
the specification to be verified. The reduction is done by
an iterative application of reduction rules, which have been
articulated with respect to the consent composition. To guar-
antee that the reductions do not inject additional compositional
errors and do not eradicate a compositional error present in
the specification, we have formulated several conditions to be
satisfied. Reductions are of a low overhead, since the algorithm
is linear with the size of the specification.
Although a ”full” reduction of the specification is not
guaranteed in general, the real-life case studies, such as the
one presented in this paper, show that most of such speci-
fications contain several typical patterns to which reduction
rules apply. If the result of the reductions is not an empty
protocol and, therefore, a standard model checking verification
is to be applied on the rest, the potential counter example is
back interpreted in the original specification. This makes the
reduction method fully transparent to the user.
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On Distributed Verification of Generalized
Interaction Models of Software Components⋆
Viliam Holub
Distributed Systems Research Group
Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University in Prague
Abstract. The presented work aims at developing a distributed verifi-
cation tool for a generalized automata system. The verification is done
by an exhaustive state-space exploration – a stream of linearly-organized
system states is updated on each node of a computational cluster and
handed over to the next node over a network. The automata system is
proposed to be general enough to describe common automata-based for-
malisms used for describing interaction of software components. We also
present results obtained with the proof-of-concept implementation.
1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Model checking of software components is an approach to automatically verify
selected aspects of component correctness. As software itself is very difficult to
verify, abstracted models and constraint languages have been introduced. We
focus on those models and languages, that are based on automata and interac-
tions among them, such as the specification of the transition rules and compo-
nent composition. In behavior protocols[1] these models and languages allow us
to check rules and bounds on interface utilization, and even to check complex
interactions in the entire component system based on a complete description of
possible actions and reactions.
The existing approaches to model-checking of complex software architectures
are trying to overcome two major problems. One is the problem inherent to
the complexity of the model – the number of states of a model tends to grow
exponentially with the size of the model, leading to a situation where the model
either does not fit into the available memory, or the time to visit the states
of the model is too long. This is referred to as a state explosion. The other is
the problem inherent to the complexity of the model-checking methods – the
methods consist of complex algorithms that are often implemented as a proof
of concept only, thus lacking the potential an optimized implementation would
bring.
One of the approaches to solve the state space explosion problem is distribu-
tion of the model checking algorithm. The typical method is dividing the state
space into distinct parts[2], where each node checks only the assigned states and,
if necessary, asks the other nodes to visit other reachable states as the model
⋆ This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (GACR) 201/05/H014.
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checking algorithm traverses the state space. The network latency and load be-
comes a bottleneck, giving rise to a hard problem of optimal state distribution.
Moreover, due to random access to states, the state space cannot be effectively
saved on mass storage devices.
Our goal is to solve these problems, namely:
– To develop an effective distributed verification tool based on exhaustive ex-
ploration of linearly-organized state space and error state reporting. We re-
strict the problem to systems that describe interactions among components,
are based on Label Transition Systems (LTS), and have a finite number of
states. Because of limitations on the model, we can use more powerful op-
timizations than similar systems based on complex formalisms (LTL, CTL,
models with unlimited state space).
– To design a formal model of component interaction should the existing mod-
els prove unsuitable. The model should be general enough to allow describing
a majority of common constructs available on LTS and be suitable for effec-
tive automated verification.
– To present the approaches to conversion from other formal models to the
verified one and to show how to interpret the results.
2 Related Work and Model Analysis
The related work discusses ADL-based approaches to modeling, the abstract
modeling approaches based on automata, and the problem of model verification.
The Wright Architectural Description Language[3] uses a process algebra (a
subset of CSP) for defining component behavior. The tested property is called
compatibility[4] and in short says that the connector interaction cannot detect
that the role process has been replaced by the port process. Behavior protocols[1]
(BP), embedded in SOFA[5], allow the simplification of the verification process
by hierarchical decomposition of the architecture, starting with the smallest
parts of the system and continuing in the bottom-up manner, thus reducing the
internal complexity of composite components. BP allows identifying several com-
position errors, including no activity (deadlock) and bad activity. Furthermore,
it defines compliance[6] as the relation of expected and real behavior.
Interface automata[7] allow compatibility checks between interface models in
optimistic view, i.e. components can be used together if there is at least one
correct design. The composition is defined on two automata only, synchroniz-
ing on one input and one output action. Team automata[8] is a composition of
component automata. The specified action is executed in the team by simultane-
ously executing the action in all component automata. There is no limitation for
the number of states. Component-interaction automata[9] has been developed
with respect to ADL and software components. The concept is similar to team
automata; however there are differences the authors give reasons to be more
suitable for software design.
Although a large spectrum of formalisms has been mentioned and analyzed,
none of them is both general enough and easy to verify. Thus, we have decided
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to propose a new model denoted later in the text as interference automata. It is
close to team automata.
Notably, interference automata are not limited to one type of synchronization
(synchronous, asynchronous or blocking, non-blocking) nor a number of action
participants (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many). Having this in mind,
the model can be outlined as a set of local automata, augmented by a set of
transition rules and a set of alarms. A system state is a vector of states of all the
local automata. A transition is a pair of starting and final state. For practical
reasons, a range of starting and final states is allowed as well. Alarms describes
states which are somehow “interesting” and its reachability should be reported
(often it is related to erroneous states). The proposed model does not cover all
the needs of the mentioned formal methods (for example, the unlimited number
of states), but fits perfectly to our requirements.
There are many verification tools (including SPIN[10] and DiVinE[11]) that
aim mainly at checking LTL or CTL formula. SPIN uses the Depth First Search
(DFS) to explore the state space and uses the operational memory as a state
cache to prevent a re-exploration of previously visited states. Because a random
access to data structures is required, external slow devices such as hard-disks
cannot be used effectively. We believe that targeting simpler interaction protocols
and relations among components allows for a more efficient verifier implementa-
tion.
3 Distributed Verification
We face the need of storing a large amount of states via a special state space en-
coding. All properties (such as state-explored and state-to-be-explored) of reached
states are stored sequentially in the order of the DFS traversal algorithm, cre-
ating a stream. Because a numeric value of the state can be computed from its
position in the stream, it is omitted. This approach saves a significant amount of
storage space. The stream can be passed across computational nodes organized
in a logical circle, allowing all the nodes to work simultaneously on different
parts of the stream and systematically updating the state space. Because of the
linear access pattern, buffering on mass storage devices is possible with nearly
zero-overhead.
A drawback of this approach is the need to avoid random access to the
stream. During the verification process, nodes access the states only sequentially
and use their operational memory as a state cache and a state buffer. In the case
of memory overflow, the node has to suspend the exploration, store the explored
states from the state buffer, and thus free the sufficient amount of memory.
Because forced flushing of the state buffer reduces verification effectivity,
three basic techniques to reduce memory consumption are used. The first tech-
nique is a static optimization which affects each component of the system indi-
vidually (automata minimalization). A dynamic optimization takes into account
the interactions among automata, trying to identify unreachable system states
and remove them from the model. This improves the state space compression.
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The third optimization is applied on-the-fly during the verification process. A
coherent part of the explored state space with the same properties is replaced
by a single cut-off superstate.
We plan to prove the concept on a real-life project[12]. At present, a basic,
single-node prototype without dynamic optimizations shows promising results.
For instance, the average amount of explored states is about 5 millions states per
second (sps) on a low-end desktop, compared to 180000 sps of the SPIN model
checker. This will change as more optimizations will be included. On a testing
example with 107 states, the overall memory requirements were 6 bits per state.
Future work will focus on implementation of a parallel reduction technique
(with less overhead than classical LTL and CTL verifiers have) and further static
model optimizations.
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Abstract
We present an alternative to traditional approaches of
parallel and distributed model verification. In contrast to
methods based on partitioning the state space, we keep
the states together, sorted and organized as a stream. The
stream is passed across computational nodes in a logical
circle where each node updates the states in the part of
the stream it currently sees. The presented method relies
on state locality, allows storing the state space at external
storage devices, and scales well on a non-dedicated, non-
uniform cluster of up to tens of nodes. We have implemented
an experimental version of the algorithm and obtained very
promising results in scalability in the number of processors
and computational nodes used in a large real-life use case.
1 Introduction
Model verifiers based on an explicit state space enumer-
ation have to face the problem of large state space size [18].
The size of the state space tends to grow exponentially with
the size of the model specification (the state explosion prob-
lem) and is one of the main obstacles in practical use of
model verification for real-life systems. Together with other
methods aimed at reducing the number of states that have to
be generated [22] or stored [6], the time consumption can be
significantly reduced by modifying the state space organiza-
tion and the verification algorithm so that all the available
computational resources are employed optimally.
Contemporary computers have several independent exe-
cution units (a combination of multiprocessor, hyperthread-
ing or multicore technologies), are equipped with network
cards and hard drives. In a verification tool based on ex-
haustive state space enumeration, we would like to take ad-
vantage of modern equipment. Particularly, we would like
to achieve:
• parallelization – concurrent computation on more than
one processor of a computational node (also referred
to as tightly coupled processors, most often symmetric
multiprocessors, SMP). Parallel computing becomes a
significant direction in future hardware development,
and, partly due to power consumption, the number of
available processors is likely to increase more than the
raw performance of each single processor.
• distributability – computational nodes are connected
via network (referred to as loosely coupled proces-
sors). This type of computational power aggregation is
characterized by expensive access to memory of other
nodes. In contrast with parallelism, increasing the
computational power by adding nodes is even cheaper
than by adding processors.
• use of external storage devices – these are significantly
cheaper than main memory and provide larger storage
space. The main drawback here is a relatively slow ac-
cess to the device, and even worse, the random access
latency is very high [4].
We are interested in computing clusters made of com-
mon desktop computers. The computers do not have to
be dedicated for verification use, we would like to utilize
the idle time during a common user workload. Such envi-
ronment is very non-uniform in the terms of available per-
formance, memory size and disk space. In a medium size
organization, we expect tents of computers connected via
100Mbs or 1000Mbs Ethernet to be available.
A traditional approach to distributed model verification
(Sect. 2.2) is to partition the state space into regions accord-
ing to the number of computers (computational nodes) in
the cluster. The partitioning function is designed to mini-
mize the necessary network communication. We have cho-
sen a different approach. In this paper, we present a method
of circulating the whole state space across nodes in a logical
circle (Sect. 3.1), inspired by the fact that a streamed work-
load fits the modern computers perfectly. Because such
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an approach raises questions about effectivity, our aim was
also to experimentally measure the real performance of the
method on very large theoretical and practical examples.
First, we outline the necessary background (Sect. 2).
This includes an overview of the exploration process, the
traditional approaches to distributed model verification and
their drawbacks. After that, we explain the ideas behind our
method (Sect. 3) and describe our prototype implementa-
tion. We then present (Sect. 4) and evaluate (Sect. 5) expe-
rience from our case studies. Finally, we discuss the related
work (Sect. 6) and summarize the contribution (Sect. 7).
2 Background
2.1 General exploration algorithm
The state space exploration (or simply exploration) is a
process of systematic enumeration of all the system states.
Its goal is to decide which states are reachable in the for-
mal model and report those reachable states that have cer-
tain sought-for properties. The properties of a state that we
are searching for vary among different formal models and
include a failure to satisfy a condition or an existence of a
deadlock.
The traversal algorithm is sketched in Alg. 1. The explo-
ration process begins in the starting state (step 1) and pro-
ceeds by the repeat loop (the exploration step, steps 2-9).
We use two permanent state sets, V and E, and one tempo-
rary state set S. The set V contains states that are reachable
from the starting state, but whose successors have not been
enumerated yet. These states are referred to as open. After
all successors of a state have been enumerated (step 5), the
state becomes closed and is moved from V to E (steps 6, 7,
and 8). The algorithm stops when all open states have been
closed, that is when V = ∅ (step 9).
Algorithm 1 General traversal algorithm.
1: Set the initial values
E = ∅, V = {starting state}, S = ∅
2: repeat
3: Take one state s from V
4: Report s if it has the sought-for properties
5: Generate all successors of s and store them in S
6: Add s to closed states E
7: Remove already closed states (∈ E) from S
8: Add S to open states V and empty S
9: until V 6= ∅
Specific instances of the general traversal algorithm dif-
fer mostly in the data structures used and in the approach
to choosing open states for the exploration (step 3). Among
the most common are Depth First Search [12] (DFS) and
Breadth First Search [19] (BFS).
DFS keeps the active path in a stack and the states se-
lected in step 3 are successors of the state on the top of the
stack. DFS is relatively easy to implement and is used pri-
marily in non-distributed model checkers [12]. The main
disadvantages of the algorithm are long counter-examples
produced [21] and a relatively complicated implementation
in a distributed environment [24, 3].
In BFS, states in step 3 are selected based on their dis-
tance from the starting state. The algorithm is preferred in
distributed model checking, partly because of easier paral-
lelization. The main advantage of BFS is that the counter-
example returned is the shortest possible. Unfortunately,
strict BFS requires synchronization, which may reduce the
overall performance [13]. That is why some researchers
propose algorithms that only follow BFS in principle, but
break the strict BFS ordering in situations where the exact
behavior would cause performance penalty.
2.2 Traditional approach to distributed
verification
A widely adopted method of distributed verification is
to partition the state space into several disjunct parts cor-
responding to the number of available computational nodes
[25] and assign each part to one node. A node visits only
the assigned states and, if it reaches a state outside the as-
signed part, it asks the owner of the corresponding part to
visit the state. In other words, for every new state s a func-
tion partition(s) is evaluated. If the result belongs
to the owned state part, it is processed locally. Otherwise,
the request for visiting the state is sent in a message to the
corresponding state space part owner.
The choice of the partition function is crucial for an ef-
ficient distribution. The best partitioning function (as dis-
cussed in [17]) should divide the space evenly and mini-
mize the number of cross-region transitions. A badly cho-
sen function may lead to workload asymmetry, increased
communication overhead, and thus induce a performance
penalty. Because the state space is typically not homoge-
neous, mostly due to the structure of the associated model
specification, finding the optimal state space division is a
problem as hard as the verification itself (see Sect. 6 for fur-
ther details).
The problem of dividing the load still persists in non-
uniform clusters and clusters of workstations. Fast com-
puters will wait for their slower counterparts or, if assigned
a larger portion of the state space, may reach their mem-
ory limits. Especially in clusters of workstations, perfor-
mance of individual computers continuously varies due to
user workloads, which cannot be compensated for with a
static partitioning function. Thus, most approaches target
dedicated uniform clusters, while the specific properties of
non-uniform clusters are rarely addressed [15].
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Figure 1. Streaming state space: data flow
3 State space streaming
3.1 Concept
Instead of partitioning the state space (Sect. 2.2), we cir-
culate the whole state space across all nodes in a logical cir-
cle. States are kept sorted and passed sequentially, forming
a stream (hence the name streaming). Each node receives
the stream of states from its predecessor, updates it, and
hands the updated stream over to its successor. A part of
the stream can be temporarily held in the node memory or
buffered on an external storage device. One passage of the
stream through the logical circle is referred to as an epoch.
During the computation (the algorithm is sketched in
Alg. 2 and illustrated with a dataflow diagram in Fig. 1),
we keep a buffer of generated states S, the last state passed
to the output last, and the epoch number epoch. In the gen-
eral exploring algorithm (Sect. 2.1), the open and closed
states were kept in separate sets. Here, we keep the open
and closed states together, distinguished by an additional
status flag assigned with each state.
The first node in the logical circle (selected arbitrarily)
starts the exploration by forming an initial stream consist-
ing of the starting state and the end-of-stream tag. After
the initialization (step 1), the algorithm starts reading states
from the input stream (4). If the read state s is open (5), we
generate its successors (6), remove duplicates of s (7), and,
marked as open, we store the successors in the buffer S (12-
15). If the state s has the sought-for properties, we mark it
as sought-for and inform the user (8-10). Otherwise,
we mark it as closed. Before we store s to last and pass the
state s to the output stream (21-22), we extract all the states
within the interval last..s from the buffer S and write them,
sorted, to the output stream. As we reach the end-of-stream
tag (3), we pass it to the output, set last as a starting state
and increase the epoch index (24-26).
Our method follows BFS in principle, but not strictly.
During one epoch, when all the successors of open states are
generated, a subset of them may be included into the same
epoch. That is due to the independence of the exploring
(steps 6-7 and 12-15) and updating (steps 19-20) operations.
Algorithm 2 Streaming state space
1: Create a stream with the starting state followed by the
end-of-stream tag (first node only)
S = ∅
last =starting state
epoch = 0
2: loop
3: while not end-of-stream on input do
4: Take a state s from the input
5: if s is open then
6: Generate all successors of s into Z
7: Remove s from S and Z
8: if s has the sought-for properties then
9: Mark s as sought-for and successor of s
10: Report s
11: else
12: for all z : z ∈ Z ∧ z 6∈ S do
13: Mark z as open and successor of s
14: Add z to S
15: end for
16: Mark s as closed
17: end if
18: end if
19: Extract X = {∀x ∈ S : last < x ≤ s} \ {s}
20: Put ordered and sorted X on output
21: Put s on output
22: Set last = s
23: end while
24: Pass end-of-stream tag from input to output
25: Set last =starting state
26: Increase epoch
27: end loop
3.2 Termination
The exploration finishes when no open state exists in the
state stream or in the node buffers. Unfortunately, this is
not an easily testable condition in a distributed environment,
where a consistent snapshot of the state stream and the node
buffers cannot be obtained efficiently due to message la-
tency and synchronization constraints. A solution used in
our experimental implementation is to keep a flag associ-
ated with the end-of-stream tag (here simply a tag). The
flag is cleared by the first node in the logical circle, which
also counts the number of open states passed to its successor
in the logical circle during an epoch. When a node receives
the tag and its buffer is not empty, it sets the flag, otherwise
it passes the flag on unchanged. When the first node re-
ceives the tag with the flag cleared and the number of open
states in the epoch is zero, the exploration is complete and
all participants are directed to stop passing the stream.
71
3.3 Counter-example extraction
Apart from its status, each state is associated with in-
formation about its predecessor (steps 9 and 13). Thus the
counter-example path can be extracted from the stream be-
ginning at the sought-for state and continuing backwards to
the starting state. One predecessor per state is enough for
successful reconstruction of one counter-example. More-
over, because we always keep the first predecessor of the
state, the counter-example path is likely to be the shortest
one.
In our implementation, after stopping the circulation of
the stream, we query all nodes to obtain the range of states
that they hold. We then ask the owner of the sought-for state
for the information about its predecessor, and repeat this
step recursively until the initial state is reached. Because
the stream is sorted, a state can be located quickly within a
node using binary division search.
Alternatively, the predecessor states can be stored on a
hard drive [25] in order to reduce the stream size.
3.4 Sorting
Except for transitivity and reflexivity, the algorithm im-
poses no restrictions on the ordering function used for the
sorting of states (steps 19-20). Preferably, the function
should take locality into account – for example by using
a basic lexicographic ordering and prefixing the states with
a value of a traditional partitioning function from Sect. 2.2.
Additionally, as we have observed during our experi-
ments, even a simple lexicographic ordering of states speeds
up an otherwise unoptimized generation of successors. This
is an effect of real hardware behavior, memory caches in
particular.
3.5 Buffer organization
Because we need to extract a range of states from the
buffer S frequently (step 19), it is beneficial to keep the
buffer in a specialized data structure. One example is main-
taining two separate heaps, with states that are greater (resp.
smaller) than last added to the first (resp. second) heap in
step 14. In steps 19-20, we can then easily extract all the
states smaller than s from the top of the first heap and write
them directly to the stream. Heaps are exchanged at the
end of the stream. Accesses to the states have logarithmic
complexity.
To handle very large state spaces, only a part of the buffer
(states close to s) has to be accessible in node memory. The
rest of the states can be stored on an external storage device,
freeing the node memory.
3.6 External storage
The stream grows during the verification process and can
easily overflow the available memory. We can offset the
overflow limit by storing the stream temporarily on an ex-
ternal storage device. As we get the states from the pre-
decessor, we immediately initiate an asynchronous write to
the external storage device. The states are then retrieved as
necessary by the verification algorithm.
Since we access the stream linearly and thus predictably,
we can mitigate the impact of high access latency. The
states are manipulated in large chunks to reduce the num-
ber of seeks and are read in advance so that the verification
proceeds smoothly, without access-latency-induced delays.
3.7 Load balancing
In non-uniform clusters and especially in clusters of
workstations, the performance of a node may vary owing to
the hardware configuration and the actual user load. Opti-
mally, the process of verification would load all the compu-
tation nodes to their maximum capacity. In our case, the key
requirement behind this goal is that the algorithm should not
block because of shortage of input states. In other words, if
a node is about to block, its predecessor in the logical circle
has to speed up.
To meet this requirement, we need to adjust the speed
of the stream passage through a node. The exploration al-
gorithm has two time-expensive parts – the first one gen-
erates successors and adds them into a buffer (steps 5-18),
the second one extracts the states from the buffer and writes
them to the output stream (19-20). A node can skip both
parts at will, slowing down the progress through the state
space but preserving the correctness of the exploration. Be-
cause the state extraction part adds open states to the stream
and thus increases the workload for the successor node, it is
beneficial to reduce the workload smoothly by skipping the
exploration of open states with certain probability.
The workload balancing in our implementation works as
follows. Every node keeps a parameter p in the range [0..1],
initialized to 0. Each node skips the exploration part of a
state with the probability of p. When a node encounters a
shortage of input states, it sends a hurry up message to its
predecessor. A node that receives the message increases the
probability of skipping states by 50%: p = p+(1−p)/2. To
address dynamic changes in the environment, p is decreased
by 0.1 towards zero periodically: p = max(0, p− 0.1).
Additionaly, when states are missing on the input, a node
may start to explore open states stored in the buffer: in
step 4, s would be removed from the buffer, after step 18,
s would be returned back to the buffer, and the algorithm
would continue with step 3. The duplicate state detection is
thus postponed.
72
Input buffer
Network-side buffer
Decode Explore
SortMerge
EncodeOutput buffer
Network-side buffer
Output stack
Verification coreInput stack
Figure 2. The internal structure of a computational node.
3.8 Implementation details
In this section, we share the details of our experimental
proof-of-concept implementation with the reader. In the im-
plementation, we verify models specified by the Interfering
Automata [11], suitable for modelling Behavior Protocols
[1, 2, 23]. The internal structure of the implementation is
displayed on Fig. 2 and corresponds to the data-flow dia-
gram on Fig. 1.
Our idea is to spawn the same number of execution
threads (workers) as is the number of available processors
and assign the work dynamically. We have divided the al-
gorithm into five distinct operations – decode, explore, sort,
merge, and encode.
The decode operation decodes the states from the net-
work and stores them in a host-friendly format. This is re-
quired because of different hardware architectures among
the nodes in a cluster. The resulting stream of decoded
states (still sorted) is forwarded to the input of the merge
operation. Open states are marked as closed (corresponds
to step 16 in Alg. 2) and additionally copied to the input of
the explore operation.
The explore operation generates successors of the input
states and accumulates them in the output buffer (step 6).
It also tests the states for the criteria being verified on the
model; these states are reported to the user (steps 8-10).
For the purposes of duplicate state detection and the ad-
dition of the generated states to the stream (steps 19-20), the
merge operation forms the output stream by combining the
original input stream and the newly generated states in the
buffer. Because the generated states from the explore op-
eration may be in an arbitrary order and the merge requires
sorted states to work effectively, the (large) buckets of states
are sorted by the sort operation.
The last operation – encode – forms the final output
stream in the network format and passes it to the output
stack. It is a symmetric counterpart to the decode opera-
tion.
To achieve independence of the operations and thus low
synchronization overhead, the states passed to the opera-
tions (i.e. intermediate results) are grouped into buckets.
The operations on buckets can execute independently, syn-
chronization occurs only when buckets that wait for pro-
cessing are stored into or retreived from bucket buffers (gray
boxes in Fig. 2).
Remaining to be described in Fig. 2 are the input and out-
put stacks. The role of the input stack is to continuously re-
ceive the input stream and pass it to the verification core as
required. We achieve this by keeping two separate buffers:
the network-side buffer and the input buffer. When the size
of a buffer reaches a predefined limit, a part of it is stored
asynchronously on the external storage device (for the net-
work side buffer) or retrieved from the external storage de-
vice (for the input side buffer). We choose the capacity of
the buffers and the limits big enough to cover the access
latency of the external storage device.
The output stack behaves in the same manner as the input
stack. Its role is to fluently receive a newly created stream
and pass it to the successor in the circle.
As far as scheduling is concerned, we have achieved the
best results when using a strict priority policy. We take the
operations in the order of their description in the text, test
the availability of input data and execute the first operation
whose input is available. If none of the operations can be
executed, we temporarily block the worker until some of the
buffers changes.
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4 Experiments
This section presents the results we have obtained dur-
ing the verification of several models using our prototype
implementation.
We have chosen four models – Dining Philosophers,
Producer-Consumer, an artificial parallel test and an indus-
trial example from [14]. Dining Philosophers and Producer-
Consumer are classical synchronization problems widely
used for experiments. The artificial parallel test consists
of pairs of handshaking components and is parameterized
by the number of pairs. The state space of the test has an
acyclic structure, high number of duplicit states and an up-
per bound on the degree of nodes. A diagram of the state
space would look like a very complex diamond. The in-
dustrial example aggregates the tests from [14] to achieve a
sufficiently large state space.
To get representative results, we have used the simplest
configuration – a basic lexicography comparator and state
space reductions. The experiments have been executed mul-
tiple times and the cases that exhibit significant variance of
results are explicitly mentioned. The hardware characteris-
tics of the nodes are in Tab. 1.
As the first experiment, we have measured the depen-
dence of the verification time on the number of threads
(Fig. 3, Tab. 2). We have used a single computer with sys-
tem configuration 1 from Tab. 1. Increasing the number
of threads speeds the verification up proportionally, as evi-
denced by the straight lines on the logarithmic-scale graph.
From 1 to 8 threads, the speedup is close to optimal v/t,
where v is the verification time and t is the number of
threads. The break at 8 threads is caused by hyperthread-
ing, which runs two threads concurrently on each processor
core. Unfortunately, because parts of the core are shared,
the performance increase is lower than when using a stan-
dalone processor core.
An experiment measuring the dependence of the ver-
ification time on the number of computational nodes is
also very promising (Fig. 4, Tab. 3). For maximum clar-
ity, we have used up to 8 uniformly configured comput-
ers with system configuration 2 from Tab. 1. The verifica-
tion speed increases proportionally to the number of nodes,
again evidenced by the straight lines on the logarithmic-
scale graph. The average network bandwidth during the
experiment was 344kB/s, which is significantly below the
theoretical 100Mb/s throughput. Compared to the multipro-
cessing experiment, we can see a slowdown of about 5%.
This overhead can be attributed to the network layer.
Figure 5 and Tab. 4 show the dependence of the verifica-
tion time on the size of the input disk buffers. The experi-
ment uses the Producer-Consumer test with 2 buffers, which
generates a large state space that does not fit into memory
and has to be stored on disk. To simulate potential user in-
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Figure 3. Scalability in the number of threads.
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System configuration 1
Model Dell PowerEdge 6850
Processor 4x Intel Xeon 7140M 3.40GHz 16kB L1, 2MB L2, 16MB L3, Dual-core, Hyperthreading
Chipset Intel E8501, 800MHz FSB
Memory 32GB organized as 4x8x1GB, DDR2-400 PC2-3200 ECC
OS RedHat Enterprise Linux v4 Advanced Server x86 64, Linux 2.6.9-42.0.3.ELlargesmp
System configuration 2
Processor AMD Athlon 64 3000+ 1800MHz, 64kB L1, 512kB L2
Chipset VIA KT800Pro
Memory 512MB organized as 2x256MB DDR 400MHz PC3200 CL2 (Dual Channel)
Network Yukon Gigabit Ethernet card 100Mb
Hard disk Seagate Barracuda ST3250823AS
OS Debian GNU/Linux 3.1 Sarge, Linux vanilla 2.6.17.6
Network switch
Model Cisco Catalyst WS-C2950G-48-EI/B0
IOS 12.1(22)EA9
Implementation
Language C99
Compiler gcc 3.3.5 (Debian 1:3.3.5-13)
Optimizations -O2
Table 1. Reference systems
Test States Verification time (mm:ss)/Number of threads1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
phil(13) 268 055 039 158:24 80:29 53:51 40:46 32:47 27:30 23:54 22:23
prod(4) 312 343 245 440:44 221:20 148:42 112:18 90:26 75:41 65:46 58:31
ind 423 514 367 635:45 318:19 214:05 161:35 130:10 108:52 94:36 83:04
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
phil(13) - 21:06 19:57 19:07 18:16 17:34 16:56 16:31 16:12
prod(4) - 55:28 52:46 50:30 48:28 46:44 45:14 43:47 42:56
ind - 78:50 75:07 71:52 69:04 66:38 64:34 62:23 60:54
Table 2. Scalability in the number of threads.
Test States Verification time (mm:ss)/Number of nodes1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
phil(13) 268 055 039 158:27 83:42 56:01 42:24 34:05 28:37 24:51 22:38
prod(4) 312 343 245 440:58 230:11 154:40 116:49 94:04 78:44 68:24 60:52
ind 423 514 367 635:55 331:03 222:39 168:03 135:23 113:14 98:23 86:24
Table 3. Scalability in the number of nodes.
Test Verification time (mm:ss)/Buffer size in megabytes1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
prod(2) 10:34 7:12 3:43 3:28 3:22 3:21 3:21 3:21
Table 4. Dependence on the size of input disk buffers.
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terference, we have copied unrelated files on the disk during
the experiment. Our results show that the minimum buffer
capacity for effective use of the disk is 3MB. The results ob-
tained with 1MB and 2MB buffers have significant variance
and have been partially distorted by the kernel read-ahead
feature.
In the last experiment, we have attempted to create as
large a cluster as possible. We have pooled 47 desktop
workstations within our department. The configurations
vary from AMDAthlon 900MHz to AMDAthlon 64 3200+
at 2GHz. The cluster verifies the industrial example within
12 minutes, with the average speed of 597254 closed states
per second. The example of 16 dining philosophers (21.109
states) has been enumerated within 11 hours.
5 Evaluation
The distinguishing feature of the proposed approach is
sequential rather than random access to the states. The ob-
tained results show that the method not only works but also
scales well. The differences between the optimal (in the
sense of ideal load distribution) and the measured values
are relatively low. An important feature of the streaming
method is its ability to adapt to non-uniform cluster with dy-
namic performance changes typical for user workstations.
This is rarely achieved by hash-based approaches.
The difficult part of the traditional approach to dis-
tributed model checking is the choice of the state space par-
titioning function. Similar role (but not the same) within
the streaming approach can be found in the choice of the
state ordering function. With the traditional approach, poor
partitioning function leads to poor distribution of workload
among nodes. With the streaming approach, poor ordering
function leads to higher distance in the stream of states that
are neighbors in the state space and thus higher communica-
tion latency. Note, however, that unlike with the partition-
ing function, a poor choice of the ordering function does not
lead to workload asymetry.
In general, a metric for the quality of the ordering func-
tion is the ratio of the distance in the stream to the distance
in the state space, the smaller the better.
We have performed several comparison tests with the
hash-based partition method on a symmetric cluster of uni-
form nodes. The hash-based implementation uses stan-
dard uniform hash function and message buffering to im-
prove network utilization, while the streaming implementa-
tion uses basic lexicographic ordering. For medium-sized
models, the hash method has generated lower network load,
however, the performance of both methods has still been
comparable. We have observed that in some cases, the gen-
eration of new states was up to 2 times faster in the stream-
ing implementation than in the hash implementation, al-
though both implementations shared the same code. This
effect is due to memory caches working better when the
state look-up tables are accessed more predictively, which is
the case with the lexicographic state ordering. This speedup
compensates the cost of merging new states into the sorted
stream.
For dense models with many small cycles, surpris-
ingly, the streaming implementation generates lower net-
work load. Where the traditional approach has to send
O(m) messages where m is the number of transitions, the
streaming approach saves the states in a buffer until the right
place in the stream reaches the node, and thus eliminates
many duplicates locally.
For large models and the traditional method, nodes start
swapping when the size of the state tables exceeds the avail-
able memory. Consequently, the verification speed drops
down to only a fraction of the original speed. In contrast,
the streaming method uses disks to store the state space and
the verification continues smoothly even when the stream
does not fit into the available memory.
During the experiments with large models, the network
bandwidth was not saturated. The stream flow is relatively
slow and does not place high demands on the network in-
frastructure. Although the stream speed is determined by
the fastest computer in the cluster, even very slow comput-
ers (below 10% of the fastest computer) did not represent
a bottleneck. This is because stream forwarding has very
low requirements compared to successor state generation,
allowing the load balancing mechanism from Sect. 3.7 to
compensate.
Even when the method produces larger network band-
width, the streamed data transfers fit the contemporary
hardware perfectly and are therefore processed more effi-
ciently than random access to the states. Note that although
the circulation of the closed states may appear inefficient at
the first glance, it is typically not an issue. Since the ex-
ploration is close to BFS, the number of epochs is close to
the depth of the traversed model, which tends to be small in
real-life models [21].
The efficiency of the approach also depends on the state
space structure. For example, a state space that consists of
a single path will be not traversed effectively. Fortunately,
similar situations are very rare as state spaces tend to branch
a lot and describe many concurrent executions. When nec-
essary, the model can also be adjusted before the verifica-
tion in order to reduce the presence of such pathological
constructions.
6 Related work
Distributed verification is heavily studied and several
significant improvements to existing model checkers have
been created so far. The approximation of an optimal par-
titioning function was addressed in several ways. Among
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the first proposed methods was the use of a hash function
in Stern and Dill’s [25], where the distributed version of
the Murϕ verifier was described. The table of states is par-
titioned across the computational nodes, which allows ad-
dressing more states than on a single node and carry the
verification out in parallel. While this approach divides the
states evenly, it does not reduce the number of cross-border
transitions. The method has been improved by exploiting
common constructs in the model (for example Lerda and
Sisto’s [17] by relying on one state component only). An-
other attempt was based on interpolating partial state space
obtained by pre-exploration of the state space [20]. Addi-
tionally, to mitigate the problems associated with imperfect
partitioning, model verifiers were proposed to periodically
check the current load and redistribute the load by adjusting
borders on the fly [7].
While some approaches target safety properties, there are
also approaches for verifying liveness properties expressed
mainly in linear temporal logic (LTL). Since LTL model
checking relies on finding accepting cycles in the state space
by the nested DFS, and DFS is inherently sequential [24],
distributed LTL model checking is complicated by keeping
additional information and enforcing synchronization. Bar-
nat, Brim, and Stribrna proposed a distributed variant [5]
of the SPIN model checker [12]. The method is based on
updating dependency structure of all accepting states and
boundary-crossing transitions. Nested DFS parts are then
processed sequentially for all the accepting states according
to the order specified by the dependency structure. Jones
and Sorber in [15] proposes a new parallel algorithm for
LTL model checking using coordinated depth-bounded ran-
dom walks.
State space splitting for distributed model checking has
been used also for the computation tree logic (CTL) in a
work of Brim, Yorav, and Zidkova [8]. Each computational
node verifies an incomplete part of the state space, modelled
as a Kripke structure. Nodes exchange assumptions about
formula values via border states.
Stern and Dill have also proposed an external model
checking in Murϕ [26]. An improved version was presented
by Bao and Jones [4]. They propose a variant of parallel par-
titioned hash table algorithms and use a chained hash table.
There are several approaches to external BFS [10, 19]. In
[16], Korf and Schultze use a perfect hash function for the
delayed cycle detection on an external storage drive, but the
distribution was not addressed.
An improvement to delayed cycle detection has been
proposed in [27] by Zhou and Hansen. Unfortunately, the
method aims at graphs with a regular structure which is
not typical in model verification. Jabbar and Edelkamp in
[13] extend the External A* [9] algorithm for parallel model
checking. The approach is based on observation that the in-
ternal work on each state bucket can be parallelized on more
processors. The method is distributed and parallel, unfortu-
nately presented for 3 processes only.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a novel method of distributed model
verification of safety properties for large state spaces, pro-
posed as an alternative to traditional partitioning-based ap-
proaches. The method is targetted at common network in-
frastructures of non-dedicated workstations.
Preliminary results show that the method scales very
well with the number of processors and computational
nodes involved. When the state space exceeds available
memory, it can be temporarily stored on external storage
devices with very low overhead. Additionally, the stream-
ing method fits very non-uniform clusters and allows to bal-
ance the load dynamically during the verification. The or-
dering function between states can be constructed in order
to address state locality, although the method does not rely
heavily on this.
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ABSTRACT 
In model checking, the number of states of a model tends to grow exponentially with the size 
of the model's description, leading to unacceptable space and time requirements. Focusing on 
generalized interaction protocols (Interfering Automata), we present a method of substitution 
of groups of states by a single state (representative) during the verification. As the number of 
representatives is significantly smaller than the size of the whole state space, our method 
pushes the limits of practical verification. Our approach is focused on parallel and distributed 
model checking. 
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1. Introduction 
As the complexity of software systems and 
the cost of the failure grow, the industry 
starts using formal verification to discover 
errors. A software system is expressed as a 
formal model and tested for specified 
properties using a model checker. A naive 
implementation of a model checker gener-
ates and tests all the states of the model. 
Unfortunately, the number of states tends 
to grow exponentially with the size of the 
model and the verification process quickly 
reaches practical limits of memory and 
time consumption (the state space explo-
sion problem). 
The state space size is determined basically 
by the degree of parallelism obtained in the 
model. This is illustrated in Fig.1 which 
shows two parallel processes passing 
through a sequence of states. Searching for 
deadlocks in a system of two independent 
(with respect to communication) processes 
leads to visiting nxm states, while only 
n+m states have to be visited - a significant 
difference. The key idea is to find those 
states that are crucial for obtaining a cor-
rect result and omit the superfluous ones 
resulting in a state space reduction - we say 
that those key states are representative 
states (or representatives for short). 
Our goal is to find representatives during 
the verification of a model expressed in the 
formalism of Interfering Automata in a 
way suitable for distributed verification. 
Interfering Automata (first mentioned in 
 [1]) is a formal language which allows 
simulating several Label Transition System 
(LTS)-based formalisms. The design of 
Interfering Automata is focused on a fast 
automatic exploration and its typical use is 
as an intermediate language during the 
verification process. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example of inefficiency: a sim-
ple checker searching for all deadlocks 
would generate all the possible interleav-
ing of two independent processes. 
 
We first summarize the necessary back-
ground in Sect. 2. Along with a precise 
definition of Interfering Automata, we 
briefly explain a practical modeling lan-
guage called Behavior Protocols [2] which 
we use for examples, and explain the proc-
ess of state space exploration. The method 
is explained in Sect. 3 - we identify the no-
tion of a reduction, analyze an approach of 
constructing representatives, attempt to 
further improve the method by heuristics, 
and proof the correctness of the method. 
How the reduction method works in prac-
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tice is discussed in Sect. 4. The idea of 
state space reduction has been studied by 
many researches. In Sect. 5, we present 
alternative and related approaches. Finally, 
our work is concluded in Sect. 6. 
 
 
2. Background. 
 
2.1 Behavior Protocols 
Behavior Protocols [2] is a textual descrip-
tion of communication among software 
components, describing all allowed scenar-
ios of message passing on component 
boundaries. We use Behavior Protocols for 
examples, because, in comparison with 
temporal logics, Behavior Protocols are 
easier to comprehend on the first look. 
We can express two types of actions - a 
non-blocking emit a message (denoted by 
!) and a blocking accept a message (de-
noted by ?). A message is identified by an 
interface name and a method name, and an 
action type (↑ for request and ↓ for re-
sponse). For example, !i.a↑ is emitting a 
request a on an interface i, and ?r.b↓ ac-
cepting a response b on an interface r. A 
message flow is expressed by operators - 
sequencing ;, alternative +, repetitive *, 
and an arbitrary interleaving |. For exam-
ple, a call of a function m1 or m2 on an 
interface I would take the form (!i.m1↑; 
?i.m1↓)+(!i.m2↑; ?i.m2↓). 
Component protocols are combined with a 
composition [2] operator. The semantics of 
a composition is to decide whether compo-
nents cooperate without problems, i.e. 
searches for emitting a message without an 
accepting counterpart (a bad activity error) 
and deadlocks (a no activity error). 
 
2.2 Interfering Automata 
Many formal languages based on LTS al-
ready exist - theoretical Interface Auto-
mata [3], Team Automata [4], and Compo-
nent-Interaction Automata [5] and those 
based on Architecture Description Lan-
guage (ADL) like Behavior Protocols [2], 
and Darwin [6]. These languages allow 
specifying the behavior of a single compo-
nent and define relations among them to 
check the properties like equivalence [7], 
compatibility [3], and compliance [8]. In 
contrast, an automaton in Interfering 
Automata is just a set of states where ex-
actly one is active, and the behavior is de-
fined on a group of automata only. To em-
phasize this, we refer to the automaton as a 
participant and to a set of interacting par-
ticipants as a system. 
In contrast to traditional approaches, inter-
fering automata are not intended to be a 
language for direct modeling by humans. 
Its objective is to be easily explorable by 
tools and allows simulating other LTS-
based formalisms. There is no limitation to 
the type of neither synchronization (syn-
chronous, asynchronous or blocking, non-
blocking) nor the number of action partici-
pants (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-
to-many). 
In the following text, we will keep a nota-
tion of the i-th element of a vector as [i], 
and P(a) represents the set of all subsets of 
a. 
Interfering automata are formally defined 
as a triple ),,( DNn , where n is total num-
ber of participants, a vector N specifies the 
number of states of all participants, and D  
is the set of transition templates. 
A system state S  is a vector of active 
states of all the participants, and thus for 
each ][][0:..1 iNiSni <£= . A starting 
state is a special instance of a system state 
where all the active participant states are 
equal to 0 . Thus the starting state takes the 
form of the zero vector )0,...,0( . 
A transition template is a pair ),( RC=a  
where: 
- condition C  is a vector which specifies 
the system states the transition template 
may be applied to, and :..1 ni ="  
(][ PiC Î }1][..0{ -iN Æ\) , is a set of al-
lowed participant states. For example, a 
condition })5{},8,3,1({  specifies that the 
first participant must be in states 1, 3 or 8 
and the second participant must be in the 
state 5. 
- result R  is a vector, where :..1 ni ="  
})1][,..,0({][ -Î iNPiR . Each element of 
the result specifies a new value of partici-
pant states. Multiple states ( 1|][| ³iR ) are 
interpreted as a non-deterministic choice, 
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while empty states ( Æ=][iR ) are inter-
preted as a ``keep untouched'' rule and the 
state of the participant i is not to be 
changed. 
A system state s  meets the condition of a 
transition template ),( RC=a  if and only 
if :..1 ni ="  ][][ iCis Î . 
We say that a transition template a  is en-
abled in a system state s , if s  meets the 
condition ofa . Otherwise, we say that a  
is disabled in s . 
Applying a transition template α=(Cα,Rα) to 
a system state s results in a system state z 
such that for "i=1..n: ][][ isiz =  if 
Æ=][ir and xiz =][ , ][irxÎ  otherwise. 
The application of a transition is denoted 
as )(sz a=  and zs ¾®¾a . 
To improve readability, we will follow 
these convention rules of how to write 
transition templates: 
- the condition and result parts of a transi-
tion are separated by an arrow ®  and both 
embedded within angle brackets >< ... , 
- empty state sets are omitted and sets with 
only one element are written without curly 
brackets {...}, 
- in the condition part, sets that contain all 
the participant states are omitted as well 
(note that empty sets are forbidden in con-
ditions), 
- prefixing states with the exclamation 
mark ! means ``all but''. 
For illustration, >< 4!},3,2{,1 ® ,6{,2<   
>,},7  is interpreted as a transition which 
could be applied to all the system states 
which have the first participant in a state 
number 1, the second participant must be 
in states number 2  or 3 , and the third par-
ticipant must not be in a state 4 . The two 
system states resulted from applying the 
transition will have the first participant in a 
state 2  and the second one in a state 6  or 
7  respectively. The transition does not 
change the state of the third and fourth par-
ticipant. 
A path p  from a state s  to the state z  is a 
sequence of system states js  and transi-
tions je  such that ¾®¾= 1
esp  ¾®¾ 21
es  
zn¾®¾e  and for :..1 ni ="  )( 1-= iii ss e . 
A state z  is reachable from s  if there ex-
ists a path from s  to z . If a state s  is 
reachable from the starting state, we say 
that s  is reachable. 
A system state s  is deadlocked ( s  is a 
deadlock) if all transition templates are 
disabled in s . 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of a system layout, behav-
ior description, and LTS transcription. 
 
A reachable deadlock is crucial - all impor-
tant checked conditions must be presented 
as a deadlock in the model. This is not lim-
iting us because of the power of transition 
specification. For example, Fig. 2 shows a 
system of three components and their 
specification in Behavior Protocols. The 
composition operator of these three com-
ponents in Interfering Automata would 
take the form: 
 
A 
><®><
><®><
><®><
><®><
__,,3,20_,,3,1
_,1,3_,0,1,2_,
_,1,2_,0,0,1_,
__,,1,10_,,0,0
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B 
><®><
><®><
><®><
><®><
1_,_,_,0_,,3,1!
1_,_,_,0,1,2!_,
1_,_,_,0,0,1!_,
1_,_,_,0_,,0!,0
 
 
The match of emit-accept actions are ex-
pressed by transitions A. Transitions B ex-
press a bad activity error by enforcing the 
model to reach deadlock (failure transi-
tions). This is achieved by traversing to the 
state 1 of the fourth (additional) participant 
and requesting the state to be 0 for all the 
transitions. 
 
2.3 State Space Exploration 
State space exploration (or simply explo-
ration) is a process of systematic traversal 
of system states. The goal is to decide 
which specified states are reachable in the 
model and report them to the user. The no-
tion of a state we are looking for varies 
among different formal models. It includes 
such attributes as a fail of a condition, 
deadlock, and reachability from the start-
ing state. 
We will describe a simple general explora-
tion algorithm which is satisfactory for our 
needs. Three sets of states are used - a set 
of visited but not explored states V (we 
have not generate their successors yet), a 
set of explored states E (successors have 
already been generated) and a temporary 
set of states S. The exploration process be-
gins in the starting state (see the algorithm 
below) and proceeds by repetitive applica-
tion of an exploration step (operations 
within the repeat loop). 
- Set initial values E=0, V={starting state}, 
S=0 
repeat 
 - Take one state s from V 
 - Generate all successors of s to S 
 - Report s to the user if interesting 
(s is deadlocked if and only if S=0) 
 - Remove already explored states 
(in E) and the state s from S 
 - Add s to explored states E 
- Add S to visited states V 
until V=0 
 
This algorithm visits all the reachable 
states, which are eventually included in E. 
A set of all reachable states is referred to 
as a full state space. If some of the states 
have been omitted due to optimizations, 
we say that the set is a reduced state space. 
Exploring algorithms differ mostly in data 
structures used and in the scheme of how 
the states ``to explore'' are chosen. Most 
often used instances of this algorithm are 
referred to as depth first search (DFS) and 
breadth first search (BFS). 
 
 
3. Identifying representatives 
 
3.1 Representatives 
Our goal is to reduce the state space that 
has to be explored, without loss of the abil-
ity to report important reachable states. In 
other words, by applying reducing optimi-
zations we must not lose any deadlocked 
state. Because the size of the reduced state 
space is smaller than the full state space, 
states contained in the reduced state space 
may represent (be representative of) more 
than one state in the full state space. 
In a single exploration step, the model 
checker has to decide either whether some 
of the newly explored states are repre-
sented by some of the already explored 
states or whether there is a relation of rep-
resentativity among newly explored states 
themselves. In this particular moment, the 
problem can be converted from the relation 
between states to the relation between two 
enabled transitions - derivately by consid-
ering the resulting states: a transition a  is 
a representative for a transition b  in a 
state s  if and only if )(aa  is a representa-
tive for )(sb . 
Let's analyze the exploration step in a gen-
eral system state s . Our task is to find a 
representative subset d  from the set of all 
enabled transitions in s . Thus, every en-
abled transition in s  is ind , or is repre-
sented by some transition fromd . Fur-
thermore, only this subset of transitions 
will be used for the exploration step. 
We can iteratively test all the pairs of en-
abled transitions and remove those which 
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already have a representative. This simpli-
fies the problem to finding a relation be-
tween two transitions a  and b , which 
says whether a  is a representative of b . 
Given that all the properties that we want 
to check are expressed by (the) reachability 
of a deadlock state, we can say that a tran-
sition a  is a representative for a transition 
b  if there is no deadlock reachable 
through b  that would not be reachable 
througha . 
 
3.2 Sensitive transitions 
Suppose that the deadlocked state d  is 
reachable from s  by a path: =s  
¾¾ ®¾ =be10s dss nn =¾®¾¾®¾
ee 21  and 
not reachable from )(sa  (Fig. 3). We 
know that a  is enabled in s , but is not 
enabled in d . This means that there exists 
such ie : ii ss i¾®¾-
e
1  that a  is enabled 
in 1-is , but is not enabled in is . The transi-
tion ie  incorporates changes that violate 
a  conditions. Because it is not easy to de-
cide from s  which transitions will break 
the conditions ofa , we will introduce a 
slightly modified relation a  is sensitive to 
ie  and further assume that the relation 
holds in 1e . 
 
  
Fig. 3. Modeling situation: a path from a 
state s  to a deadlocked state d . State d  is 
reachable from s  by applying b  first, but 
is not reachable by applying a  first. 
 
Formally, a transition template ,( aa C=  
)aR  is sensitive to transition template =e  
),( ee RC  in a state s , if a  is enabled in s  
and for at least one participant i  the fol-
lowing holds: 
- the participant state ][is  meets the condi-
tion of e , i.e. ][][ iCis eÎ , 
- a  does not allow all the states of partici-
pant i , i.e. ]}1[..0{ -=/ iNCa , 
- the result part Æ=/][iRe  and ][][ isiR =/e . 
We can simply avoid marking a  as a rep-
resentative if it has a sensitive transition. 
Although this is a sufficient restriction 
which guarantee the correctness of the ex-
ploration, we are loosing some representa-
tives due to the fact that not all transitions 
which a  is sensitive to are reachable from 
s . 
 
3.3 Reachability of sensitive transitions 
Given a situation from Sect. 3.2, our aim is 
to decide whether a state 1-is  (and, deri-
vately, a transition ie ) is reachable from 
the state s  ( )(sb ). Unfortunately, we are 
solving the problem of reachability itself, 
thus the precise calculation would not help 
us. This is a common problem of reduc-
tions based on partial order reduction 
(POR). As already shown by many re-
searchers ( [9] for example), the problem is 
at least as hard as the model checking it-
self. 
Rather than finding the best possible solu-
tion, we have to consider the representative 
relation as heuristics - to find an approxi-
mation under acceptable cost during the 
verification. While the false-negative error 
is unacceptable, the false-positive error 
does not break the correctness, but declines 
the efficiency of the reduction. The power 
of heuristics is crucial and varies among 
different approaches. For our purposes, we 
will heuristically decide whether the se-
lected sensitive transition is also reachable. 
Although originally introduced for state 
compression, we will use a relation of de-
pendance described in  [10]. The idea be-
hind state dependance is an observation 
that a participant active state strongly de-
pends on active states of other participants. 
Formally, the relation of dependance takes 
the form )),(),,(( 2211 rprp  where 1p  and 
2p  are participants and 1r  and 2r  are re-
spective participants' states. The relation 
)),(),,(( 2211 rprp  does not hold if a partici-
pant 1p  is active in a state 1r  and partici-
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pant 2p  cannot be active in state 2r . Oth-
erwise, the relation holds. 
We can test the reachability of ie  from s  
by trying to create an unknown state 1-is . 
Because a  and ie are both enabled in 1-is  
and a  is sensitive to ie  in s , we have 
enough information to construct candidates 
for 1-is  by restricting possible state values. 
Let's initialize xs  such that for nj ..0=" :  
][][ jsjsx =  if }1][..0{][ -=/ jNjCa , and 
][][ jCjs
ix e
=  otherwise. Then for all par-
ticipants j , all participants jp =/  and all 
the states k  in ][ psx  test the dependance 
)),(]),[,(( kpjsj . If it does not hold, re-
move k  from ][ psx . 
After all the iterations, xs  holds all the 
candidates for 1-is . If there exists a partici-
pant p  such that Æ=][ psx , there is no 
suitable candidate for 1-is  and ie  is un-
reachable from s . 
 
3.4 Proof of correctness 
Let's enrich the algorithm from Sect. 2.3 
with constructing representatives as de-
scribed in Sect. 3.2 and 3.3. Suppose that 
the algorithm does not report a deadlock 
state d  reachable by a path: =)0,,0(   
=¾®¾¾®¾¾®¾ nsss n
eee 210
1  d . There 
must exists a state is  such that the states 
10 ,, +iss   have been visited except 1+is . 
This means that in a state is  the algorithm 
has chosen some a  as a representative for 
1+ie . Thus the algorithm 
- does not find a sensitive transition in is . It 
follows from the definition of the sensitive 
relation that a  was enabled after all suc-
cessive ni ee ,,1 +  and thus in a state d . 
But this is not possible, because d  is dead-
locked. 
- does find a sensitive transition je : ij ³ , 
but marks it as unreachable. A transition 
je  was enabled in all the initial candidate 
states 1-js , but not after iteratively remov-
ing participant states based on state depen-
dance. Thus, a reachable state has been 
removed. Assuming that the relation of 
dependance is correct, this is not possible.  
 
 
4. Experiments 
A prototype has been implemented to 
demonstrate the techniques described in 
this paper. To evaluate our approach, we 
present the results of two examples 
(Tab. 1). The first one analyzed is syn-
thetic (theoretical). It consists of a compo-
sition of component pairs, each pair in-
vokes a method call [11]. This involves a 
high parallelism of independent component 
pairs. As shown in the table, the parallel-
ism has been completely removed by the 
relation of sensitivity. 
 
Test 
name 
FSS size RSS 
sensitivity 
RSS sensi-
tivity and 
reachability 
Parallel 
test [11] 
1048576 40 40 
CS1 [12] 10458 10458 56 
CS2 [12] 635780 126762 3123 
CS2 [12] 
SPIN 
17128 - 17128 
 
Tab. 1. Results of constructing representa-
tives. FSS stands for a full state space, RSS 
for a reduced state space, and CS for a case 
study. 
 
Based on a real case-study [12], the second 
example CS1 is a composition of selected 
components “arbitrator”. The sensitive re-
lation does not reduce the state space at all. 
This is caused by a high communication 
among components and a lot of failure 
transitions. However, when the failure 
transitions have been effectively removed 
by the relation of reachability, the state 
space is reduced by the factor of 180. 
The third example CS2 contains the whole 
case-study. The sensitive relation reduces 
the state space significantly, supposedly 
due to the optimized asynchronous timer 
that involves a high degree of parallelism. 
The reachability relation deflates the state 
space even more. 
Generally, the relation of sensitivity fails 
in situations where there are more than one 
method implementations in the protocol, 
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where there is an alternative (+) of a con-
trol flow, and in situations of a lot of unop-
timized unreachable transitions in the 
model. 
The fourth example compares our method 
with the state-of-the-art model checker 
SPIN. The specification of CS1 has been 
translated to the Promela language and 
verified with enabled and disabled partial 
order reduction. To our surprise, SPIN has 
serious problem to optimize the verifica-
tion in this type of the model. Although the 
partial order reduction does change the be-
havior of the checker - reflected by the 
printed statistics - the total number of 
stored states does not change. We believe 
this is due to the “powerful” semantic of 
transitions that does not fit to the SPIN 
partial order reduction implementation and 
thus SPIN cannot be used effectively for 
the verification of such models. 
 
 
5. Related work 
A reduction of a state space has been stud-
ied by many researchers in many different 
scopes. The partial-order reduction tech-
nique [15] [13] [14] (along with BDD) 
seems to be the most efficient. In contrast 
with  [15], our relation of representative is 
not equivalence. While being close to am-
ple sets [9] in the exploration step, our ap-
proach better fits to the environment of 
general state exploration [16]. Also, our 
method better situates to distributed com-
puting - to make the decision of sensitivity 
and reachability, we do not need to check 
the status of the other (possibly not locally 
stored) states and, furthermore, there is no 
need for reopening of already explored 
states which would lead to the problem of 
race-conditions. 
A model checker for Behavior Proto-
cols [11] generates the automata on-the-fly, 
while for Interfering Automata, partici-
pants have to be extracted before the state 
space exploration itself. This allows ana-
lyzing all the transitions in the exploration 
step and does not suffer any limitation as 
the sizes of automata (participants) are 
small. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have presented a state space reduction 
by identifying representatives on-the-fly 
during the exploration. The key benefits of 
the method are: 
- fits perfectly for distributed verification, 
because statuses of “near” states are not 
required for the reduction, 
- is able to reduce the state space even in 
models where other approaches fails 
(Sect. 4), 
- evaluated results shows that the method 
reduces the size of the state space signifi-
cantly, and 
- brings low overhead to the exploration 
process. 
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ABSTRACT
In many workloads, most write operations performed on a
file system modify only a small number of blocks. The log-
structured file system was designed for such a workload,
additionally with the aim of fast crash recovery and sys-
tem snapshots. Surprisingly, although implemented for Sun
Sprite and BSD systems, there was no complete implemen-
tation for the current Linux kernel. In this paper, we present
a complete implementation of the log-structured file system
for the Linux kernel, which includes a user-space garbage
collector and additional tools. We evaluate the measure-
ments obtained in several test cases and compare the results
with widely-used ext3.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.3 [Operating Systems]: File Systems Management—
file organization; D.4.2 [Operating Systems]: Storage
Management—garbage collection; E.5 [Data]: Files—orga-
nization/structure
Keywords
Log-structured file systems, Linux file systems, garbage col-
lection
1. INTRODUCTION
As random access memory is getting cheaper and more abun-
dant in both personal computers and servers, many more
workloads fit entirely into the disk cache. With most of
the read requests satisfied by the cache, it is reasonable to
optimize file systems primarily for writing. Moreover, quick
crash recovery is a common requirement for a production file
system and the most common way of achieving it is jour-
naling. On the other hand, this technique incurs a write
performance penalty[6] because it needs to write a portion
of data twice to achieve a consistent metadata state at any
given moment[13].
Log-structured file systems (LFS) have been proposed in [7]
and first implemented for Sun Sprite system[9] in order to
address these two issues. A log-structured file system writes
all new information to a sequential structure referred to as
the log, thus minimalizing the number of seeks and allowing
fast crash recovery. They can also provide additional func-
tionality not easily implemented by traditional file systems,
such as snapshots.
Following the Sprite-LFS mentioned above, Seltzer et al.[10]
implemented a LFS system for contemporary BSD systems
in 1993. Unfortunately, over the course of time it has been
removed from FreeBSD and OpenBSD. It is still present in
NetBSD but it appears to be no longer completely functional
as of NetBSD 2.0.2[14]. There have been several attempts
to write LFS for Linux, but all except one have been aban-
doned without achieving their goals. The only exception is
the currently developed NILFS project[5], but it still lacks
working garbage collector which is a vital part of any LFS
and also the part that poses most implementation issues. In
the end of the day, there has not been an implementation
of a traditional1 LFS for an open-source operating system
until now.
In this paper, we present a design and an implementation of
LFS for Linux 2.6 kernel which takes full advantage of the
page cache, has a working garbage collector, uses sophisti-
cated data structures for large directories that considerably
speed up directory operations, implements snapshots and is
capable of fast recovery from a system failure. We concen-
trate on those parts that differ from the BSD implemen-
tation[10], how the file system is integrated to the current
Linux environment and our solutions to the problems en-
countered during the implementation of the garbage collec-
tor and the segment management in general. We have also
done a series of measurements to compare our file system
with ext3.
We start with an overview of our implementation (Sect. 2),
outlining the basic structures and describing the writing pro-
cess and recovery mechanisms. The most significant issues
that have arisen during the implementation are discussed
in Sect. 3. This includes the free space and segment man-
1There are LFS for flash-based devices but they pursue dif-
ferent goals and are not considered by this paper.
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agement and the garbage collector in particular. We eval-
uate the file system performance using several benchmarks
in Sect. 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
2. IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW
Although the fundamental principle of LFS may seem sim-
ple, it presents us with two important issues. The first is
a need for an indexing structure so that read requests can
be performed without sequentially scanning the disk. We
have adopted the traditional approach of representing files
and directories with inodes and use the well known mecha-
nism of direct and indirect blocks to quickly locate requested
data[12]. We write both structures to log whenever changed.
The trickier problem is how to manage free space so that
writes are coalesced into large contiguous bursts. As all
other LFS, we have solved this issue by dividing the disk
into fixed size segments[9, 10], one megabyte each. When
processing a write request, LFS must find an empty segment
first. Afterwards, it accepts write requests from the memory
management, VFS layer or the garbage collector and keeps
writing the given data to the allocated segment as long as
the currently written entity fits in. When it does not, we
finish the full segment by appending metadata (described
below) and allocating and writing a new segment from that
point on. Thus, we always write the current segment se-
quentially from the beginning to the end. The drawback of
this approach is that we must copy all live data out of the
segment before rewriting it.
LFS systems need to finish the current segment also after
they have flushed dirty data during sync or fsync system
calls. Moving on to a new segment would potentially waste a
lot of disk space. Therefore, these file systems introduce the
so called partial segments. Each physical segment consists of
one or more partial segments (Fig. 1). Multiple partial seg-
ments usually result from the system calls mentioned above.
Detailed description can be found in the official documen-
tation of the project[2]. Each partial segment contains the
following elements:
1. Data blocks and indirect blocks of files and directories.
2. Inodes
3. Journal enabling the roll forward utility to deal with
directory operations (Sect. 2.3).
4. File info structures required to identify all data and
indirect blocks so that the garbage collector can rec-
ognize live data (Sect. 3) and the roll-forward utility
understands which data have been changed since the
last checkpoint (Sect. 2.3).
5. Segment summary which contains information global
to the partial segment, including but not limited to
checksums, addresses and sizes of the individual entity
blocks described above, and so on.
Clearly, LFS must have some means of tracking segment
states and inode positions. Sprite-LFS did so by introduc-
ing a segment usage table which contains, among other in-
formation, number of live blocks and inodes left in segments
device
partial segment ...
segment ... segmentsegment segment segment segment
finfo segment
summaryjournal
dblock or
iblock ... finfo...inodes
finfo_block
journal_block
inode_block
lfs_finfo lfs_finfo ... lfs_finfolfs_inode lfs_inode ... lfs_inode
dblock or
iblock
partial segment partial segmentpartial segment
Figure 1: The internal structure of segments and
partial segments.
and an inode table to store the inode positions. Both were
fixed size stand-alone kernel structures written to the log at
file system checkpoints. BSD-LFS and our implementation
place both of them into an immutable regular file, visible in
the file system, called the ifile. This approach simplifies the
design because the ifile can be handled with less special-case
code. Moreover, it does not impose any limit on the num-
ber of inodes in the system as the ifile can grow just like any
other file.
2.1 Segment Building
All data and metadata except superblocks are written into
the log consisting of segments. Therefore, the primary role
of the code performing writes is to create the segments and is
usually referred to as the segment building subsystem. Our
implementation of LFS does not actively seek any data to
write, it simply services write requests issued by the memory
manager, the user or the garbage collector. In all these cases,
the write requests are demands to flush a dirty page, a set
of dirty pages or an inode to the disk. The basic algorithm
turns out to be fairly simple:
1. Obtain a free segment from the segment management
subsystem.
2. Any request to write a data block or an indirect block
which fits into the current segment is carried out in the
following steps: First, we schedule all necessary journal
records to be written when the current partial segment
is finished (see Sect. 2.3). Second, we create a new file
info structure that describes the given block and plan
to write it when the partial segment is about to be
closed. Third, we immediately write the block itself to
the end of the log. Finally, we update the segment us-
age table if needed. Even though we queue some meta-
data, the actual blocks are not queued or copied in any
way. This property of the segment building subsystem
is very helpful in out-of-memory situations because the
allocated structures are incomparably smaller than the
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written block which is about to become clean and thus
reclaimable in the page cache.
3. Requests to write inodes are handled in a simpler way.
First, the required journal records are also scheduled
like in the previous case. The inode is then copied to
an extra chunk of memory and is ready to be written
before the system moves onto the next partial segment.
The segment usage table may also need to be updated.
4. The subsystem checks whether there is enough room
for both the blocks and all the planned metadata in
the current segment. If any request cannot be safely
accommodated in it, the queued inodes, journals, and
file info structures are flushed to the disk together with
a newly created segment summary record. Finally, we
write new information about the current segment to
the segment usage table and store new positions of all
inodes in this segment in the inode table. The segment
has been finished and the subsystem starts again from
point 1.
5. A similar course of events takes place when the current
partial segment must be closed because of operations
like sync. The difference is that there is usually a
substantial amount of unused space left in the current
physical segment. In that case, we start a new partial
segment within it.
Sprite-LFS stored the file information records and the seg-
ment summary at the end of every partial segment. It re-
quired the underlying block device layer and the disk con-
troller to preserve the order of write requests and thus a
presence of a segment summary guaranteed the whole par-
tial segment has been written successfully. BSD-LFS did not
make such assumptions, used checksums to verify a segment
was valid and the authors have therefore decided to put the
two structures at the beginning of a partial segment. Even
though we also use checksums to verify segment integrity,
the algorithm described above dictates that metadata are
placed after the data and indirect blocks because the blocks
are flushed to the disk before we even know how much meta-
data there will be, let alone what its structure will be.
We create consistent checkpoints by flushing all dirty data
from the page and inode caches and by writing a consistent
ifile. Unfortunately, the algorithm described above cannot
produce a consistent ifile because the segment usage table
is stored within the ifile and any update of it marks a new
block dirty. Therefore, we first create consistent ifile partial
segments in memory and flush them to disk after reaching a
stable state. This is not a problem though, because creating
a checkpoint is never a part of memory reclaiming and so
we can safely perform substantial allocations.
2.2 Metadata Caching
In order to work effectively, any file system must buffer all
data it may access repeatedly within a short period of time.
The page cache is the key mechanism to buffer file data
in Linux. Because virtually all file systems use it despite
storing data in many very different ways, it offers a great
level of control over how the data are read and written. On
the other hand, traditional Linux block device based file
Figure 2: Indirect blocks as a special stream.
systems use the device node page cache to buffer metadata.
That is convenient as long as the metadata stay in the same
place on the disk because the device node cache can flush it
to the spot where it was read from at any time.
Obviously, such behavior is highly undesirable in LFS. Be-
cause directories can use the page cache, new techniques to
buffer indirect blocks and inodes had to be investigated. Let
us consider the indirect blocks first. NILFS solved a similar
problem by introducing a cache of their own. On the con-
trary, we wanted to unify the code that deals with direct
and indirect blocks as much as possible, maximize the uti-
lization of functionality already offered by the Linux kernel
and minimize the number of special cases. We have observed
that the page cache itself meets our requirements if we can
create an extra stream of pages2 per every file (Fig. 2). This
solution proved to work very well. In addition, the number
of places where different code paths are taken according to
the type of the processed block is very small and all of them
are only a few lines at most.
Inodes are compulsorily buffered by the inode cache in the
Linux kernel and thus there was no question of using some-
thing else. On the other hand, the semantics of the inode
cache does not perfectly suit LFS either. When the cache
decides to free a dirty inode, it asks the corresponding file
system to synchronously write it to the disk and discards
the memory structure immediately afterwards. Neverthe-
2In Linux kernel terminology, this is called a mapping.
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less, the segment building algorithm described in Sect. 2.1
does not and cannot actually write the inode until the cur-
rent partial segment is closed. Closing it whenever an in-
ode is written synchronously because of memory reclaiming
would bring about unbearable performance overhead. This
means that after the inode cache structure is discarded and
before finishing the segment, the current version of the in-
ode is present neither in the cache nor on the disk and the
address in the inode table is wrong.
In order to avoid this problem, all inodes we plan to write
are also added to an ihash hash table and kept there until
the disk controller signals they were successfully written.
If the kernel requests an inode in the critical time window
described above, we obtain it from the ihash rather than
from the disk. Moreover, the ihash also helps us to avoid
writing a single inode several times into one partial segment
and unnecessary inode garbage collection.
2.3 Crash Recovery
LFS currently offers two ways of recovering from an unex-
pected crash. The simpler one is to continue from the last
checkpoint, guaranteed to be in an entirely consistent state,
and discard any subsequently written data. Moreover, we
also provide a roll forward utility to recover as much infor-
mation as possible even if it was written after a checkpoint.
This utility starts with the last checkpoint and follows the
chain of segments that have been written since then as long
as their checksums are correct. All entities in each of these
segments are identified by examining the segment summary
and file information records and the appropriate metadata
are updated. If a data block is read, the utility modifies the
relevant indirect block or inode. If an inode is encountered,
it updates the inode table so that it points to this copy of
the inode. In both cases, segment usage table must also be
modified.
The utility must also deal with consistency between direc-
tories and inodes. If a crash occurs while only a part of a
directory operation has been written to the disk, the link
counter of an inode might not match the number of direc-
tory entries or such an entry may refer to a non-existent or
even a wrong inode. The basic problem is that most direc-
tory operations affect multiple inodes and either all changes
or none at all must be recovered during roll forward. BSD-
LFS fights with the problem by marking all partial segments
that contain an unfinished directory operation and not per-
forming roll-forward of them unless they are followed by a
segment that completes the operations. Sprite-LFS and our
implementation insert a record for each directory operation
to the log . These records together form a directory operation
journal. Both file systems guarantee that the correspond-
ing journal record appears in the log before any affected
inode or directory block. Even though this approach makes
roll-forward more difficult to implement, it allows recover-
ing more data and imposes very few requirements on the
implementation of the directory operations which thus can
be simpler and quicker.
2.4 Directories
The log-based organization performs very well in situations
where small files are manipulated intensively. Because such
workloads update directories frequently, the directory ma-
nipulation operations should be performed in logarithmic
time. Therefore, for directories larger than one block, we use
the htree indexing method proposed by Danies Phillips[8]
and currently used in ext3. Our implementation follows the
paper closely, except that our data structures are simpler
because we do not need to provide backward compatibility
with early ext2 directories.
3. FREE SPACE MANAGEMENT
AND GARBAGE COLLECTION
Free space management in LFS has two main goals. It pro-
vides free segments to the segment building subsystem and
it recognizes and deals with ”out of free space” situations.
These situations must be detected by the system call han-
dler because we cannot signal the error to the user space
afterwards. Therefore, whenever we allocate a new block
or an inode, we appropriately decrement a global free space
counter stored in the superblock, unless it would become
smaller than a certain threshold value. In that case we re-
turn an error to the user space. Conversely, whenever the
user deletes an entity, we increment the same counter. The
threshold value is set to 15% of the total disk size and is re-
quired to store metadata and provide some extra space for
garbage collection.
We have already stressed that all live data must be copied
out of a segment before reusing it. However, there may be al-
most no free segments available even though there is enough
free space on the disk. Empty segments are created during
garbage collection by rewriting live data from underutilized
segments. There are four important issues when doing so:
1. the file system must be able to detect situations when
it is essential or profitable to start cleaning,
2. the best segments to empty must be identified,
3. live data within those segments must be identified,
read and appended to the current end of the log, re-
sulting in a smaller number of near-full segments,
4. the selected segments must be reclaimed once it is safe.
We implemented the second step in the user space and the
rest of the garbage collector in the kernel. All four steps are
nontrivial and we will cover them in the rest of this section.
3.1 Segment Preallocation
The segment building code cannot start garbage collection
at the moment it requests a new segment – it is already
too late at that point. It could have been called because
memory is low and so any memory allocations can either
fail or block until the issued write finishes. Since identifying
and reading live data from a segment may require a lot of
memory allocations, both could cause a deadlock. Moreover,
since the decision which segments are to be cleaned is done
in the user space, any access to memory can cause a page
fault and a blocking memory allocation which would also
lead to a deadlock.
To avoid this situation, we track the number of dirty blocks
and inodes in the cache. We compare it to the space in the
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currently free segments each time a system call or the page
fault handler is about to mark another block dirty. The
key idea is to ensure that all dirty blocks can be written
to the currently free segments at any time. This method is
called segment preallocation. Moreover, we always reserve a
number of free segments for the garbage collector and the
ifile. Therefore, when a block is about to become dirty but
there are not enough free segments to satisfy the constraints
described in this section, we suspend the current process
until enough segments are emptied and activate the garbage
collector with an emergency message.
One exception to this rule is the ifile because its blocks are
regularly marked dirty by the segment building code which
cannot wait for garbage collection. Still, we must guarantee
a place in free segments for dirty ifile blocks too, otherwise
the system might deadlock. Therefore we add the size of an
ifile to the mandatory segment reserve.
3.2 Segment Selection and Cleaning
Sprite-LFS had all components of the garbage collector in-
corporated in the operating system kernel. BSD-LFS has
moved it to the user space so that different cleaning strate-
gies tailored to different workloads could be easily imple-
mented. Additionally, their garbage collector used the ifile
to learn about segment utilization. Our implementation also
makes the selection decisions in the user space for the same
reasons. Nevertheless, we returned the rest of the cleaner
back to the kernel so that it can efficiently communicate
and synchronize with the segment building code through the
page cache. The user space and kernel parts communicate
by the NETLINK protocol so that there is only one com-
munication channel independent of the on-disk format. The
user space selection utility listens on the NETLINK socket
for information about segment usage changes and cleaning
commands. Cleaning commands are issued by the kernel
when there is an imminent shortage of segments or the file
system has been idle for a given period of time. Even though
the kernel can support a number of segment selection util-
ities, so far we have implemented only one based on the
cost-benefit algorithm [9]. When the utility selects a partic-
ular segment to clean it sends back a request to the kernel
over the same NETLINK interface. We clean the selected
segment in the kernel on the behalf and within the context
of the selection task.
We process the segment by reading the relevant segment
summaries, file info structures, and inodes and identifying
live entities like Sprite-LFS and BSD-LFS do. When we find
a live block, we read it to the page cache, mark it dirty, and
pass the whole inode to the segment building code which
writes all dirty pages of that inode to the end of the log.
It is important to note that both read and write operations
need to lock the corresponding page in the page cache. That
means no process can have any page cache locked if blocked
during preallocation and waiting for the garbage collector
to free more segments. However, these processes originally
intended to update the contents of a page and thus must re-
lease the appropriate page lock before blocking. Fortunately,
the generic write functions in Linux kernel 2.6.17 and later
can handle this situation and reacquire the lock if neces-
sary. Flushing all dirty pages and not just those read by
the garbage collector is deliberate because it stores adjacent
Figure 3: Roll-forward is off: Data from segment 1
were successfully moved. Segment 1 was reclaimed
before checkpoint was updated resulting in loss of
that data.
Figure 4: Roll-forward is on: Data from segment 1
and 3 were successfully moved. Segment 1 was re-
claimed but this is no problem because data can be
reconstructed during the roll-forward. Then seg-
ment 3 is reclaimed resulting in loss of data from
segment 1 because the path of segments for roll-
forward is broken.
blocks in the file next to each other on the disk. Prealloca-
tion guarantees there are free segments for both the blocks
that were garbage collected and those modified by the user
so this can never exhaust the segment reserve for cleaning.
3.3 Segment Reclaiming
When all data blocks, indirect blocks, and inodes in a seg-
ment have either been deleted by the user or moved to a
different place on the disk, the segment becomes empty. But
there are important reasons why it cannot be reused imme-
diately. Consider the following situation: the user has modi-
fied a data block and thus a write request has been issued to
store it to a new location on the disk. At the same time, the
segment usage is decremented and drops to zero. If the seg-
ment was immediately reclaimed and overwritten, the block
subsystem could reorder the writes so that the old copy of
the block is overwritten before the new one safely lands on
the disk. If a system crash occurs within this time interval
the block would be lost. The segment management there-
fore never reuses a segment unless all segments to which data
could be moved have been safely written to disk. Moreover,
when roll-forward is turned off, segment reuse must be post-
poned until the next sync. Otherwise, we could not recover
from crashes by simply continuing from the last checkpoint
on because parts of the consistent checkpoint file system
state might be overwritten (Fig. 3).
On the other hand, if roll-forward is enabled, the file system
must take care not to reuse any segment that is younger
than the current checkpoint. Segments form a singly-linked
list which would obviously be broken by overwriting any of
its items (Fig. 4).
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3.4 Snapshot Implementation
When a snapshot is mounted, the real file system creates a
checkpoint. We record the ifile inode position within this
checkpoint and use it in the same functions that perform
reading of the live data. In this way, the user has access
to all data at the time of the mount as long as no part
has been overwritten. To enforce this, the garbage collector
does not consider segments that are older than the snapshot
checkpoint and never reclaims them until the snapshot is
unmounted. We currently support only one snapshot at
a time but the scheme can be easily extended to support
multiple concurrent ones.
When a snapshot is mounted, the free space management of
the live file system behaves somehow non-intuitively. Natu-
rally, every block which has been modified after the snapshot
was mounted must be stored twice, thus occupying twice as
much space on the disk. The disk free space therefore de-
creases even by modification of already existing data, not
only when new are created. Most intriguingly, the user may
run out of free space by simple file deletion because there is
no space left to store the modified copy of the directory.
As stated above, over the lifetime of the snapshot, we do not
reuse segments that were not free during mounting. That
means the life system has only the free segments at its dis-
posal during this time. Therefore, when the snapshot is
mounted, we set the new free space to 85% of the free seg-
ments size. Conversely, when the snapshot is unmounted
later on, we mark all segments which have meanwhile be-
come empty as immediately usable and return the free space
to its usual value.
4. EVALUATION
We have carried out a number of measurements[3] to evalu-
ate the performance of our LFS implementation under dif-
ferent workloads and compare it to the most common Linux
file system today, namely ext3. The reference computer was
AMD Athlon XP 2500+ with 256MB RAM and two SATA
disks. The measured file systems always resided on a 80GB
Seagate Barracuda drive while the rest of the system was
placed on a 120GB WD. The memory available was inten-
tionally fairly low so that data sets bigger than the available
cache did not have to be huge.
4.1 IOZone Benchmark
IOZone[1] is a filesystem benchmark capable of measuring a
wide variety of file system operations. We have used it to
run four series of measurements. Two of them were single-
threaded and two involved eight threads. Additionally, two
included the time taken by an fsync after writing, unlike
the other two. In each series, different record and file sizes
were used. The maximum file size was always 512 megabytes
which was twice the amount of available RAM.
LFS performed extremely well in creation of new small files
in both runs without a subsequent fsync (Fig. 5). This was
expected because ext3 needed to read and process meta-
data from the disk while LFS did all processing in memory.
The speed of creating files of the same size as the amount
of RAM or bigger is comparable to ext3 because both file
systems need to evict data from the page cache and ext3
also writes it almost sequentially because the data is new.
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On the other hand, frequent fsync operations mean a lot of
expensive partial segment finishing and so when they were
included in measurements, both file systems have performed
comparably. Both file systems also produced similar results
when rewriting existing files in all runs except the single-
threaded one with fsync in which LFS was not as fast in
writing small files.
LFS was better in experiments where records were overwrit-
ten randomly and immediately flushed to disk by an fsync,
especially in the multi-threaded case (Fig. 6). LFS has also
clearly outperformed ext3 in a mixed workload with fsync
test in which each thread runs either a read or a write test
on a round robin basis (Fig. 7).
Single-threaded read performance of LFS was comparable to
ext3 for all but the smallest files (Fig. 8). We believe this is
because ext3 implementation is more optimized rather than
because of the different disk layout. Quite surprisingly, the
opposite is true in the multi-threaded case where LFS is
better at reading small files but worse at mid-sized ones9.
4.2 File creation and removal
LFS are known to perform very well in metadata dominated
workloads [9, 11] such as creating and deleting files. In order
to examine the performance of our implementation in this
field, we have measured the time required by LFS and ext3
to create and delete half a million files of various sizes, in-
cluding a final sync. The results presented in Fig. 10 show
that LFS performs better, often significantly, at creating
small files, except for those having 16 kilobytes. We believe
ext3 performs unexpectedly well in this particular case due
to such factors as cache alignment. LFS is also substantially
better at deleting files, particularly mid-sized and large ones.
This experiment also proved that our directory operations
implementation is efficient.
4.3 Postmark Benchmark
Postmark[4] is a widely used benchmark to assess system
performance under small file and generally metadata inten-
sive workloads. It works by creating a number of small files
and subsequently modifying them in so called transactions.
Each transaction consists of a pair of create-or-delete and
read-or-append operations. We evaluated LFS using five
million postmark transactions on ten thousand files and de-
fault values of other configuration options. Postmark re-
ported LFS was more than seven times as quick as ext3 in all
measured operations. This correlates with the good results
obtained in the mixed workload of the IOZone benchmark.
4.4 Garbage Collector Overhead
All measurements described in this section so far involved
very little or no garbage collecting at all. However, the need
to reclaim underutilized segments is a major drawback of
the LFS concept. In order to asses the effect of garbage
collection on write performance, we have carried out the fol-
lowing set of experiments. We filled a quarter, a half, and
three quarters of a 10 gigabyte partition with data and then
measured how much time it takes to randomly rewrite it
with 8 gigabytes of data. Rewritten records have 64 kilo-
bytes and were rewritten either with the same probability
or with so called 10/90 access pattern in which 10% of hot
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records are overwritten with 90% probability and 90% of
cold records are modified with the probability of 10%. The
results can be found in Fig. 11. When the 10/90 access pat-
tern was used, the time required to complete the test when
three quarters of the disk were utilized was nearly double
of that when only a quarter was. On the other hand, when
all records were selected with the same probability, it was
over seven times as big. LFS can therefore deliver the per-
formance presented in the previous measurements only if
a substantial part of the disk is left unused. Nevertheless,
the required amount depends heavily on the access pattern
of a particular workload and is quite reasonable when hot
data take only a small portion of disk. Moreover, the file
system also carries out garbage collection in periods of in-
activity which reduces the overhead when high performance
is required.
5. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a novel and complete implementation
of LFS for the Linux kernel with an associated user space
garbage collector.
The obtained results show that our implementation outper-
forms ext3 in workloads with prevailing writes, especially
when modifying a lot of metadata, but also when writing
ordinary data randomly. Moreover, the speed of read op-
erations is generally comparable to ext3. This performance
may degrade because of garbage collection overhead, but we
have shown this negative effect is small when the working
set itself is small compared to the free space available.
Thus, LFS is suitable for systems such as news or mail
servers. Moreover, as disks are continuously getting bigger
and their seek times do not improve as much, the advan-
tages of this layout will probably increase while the need
for extra space is likely to present an ever smaller problem
in the future. Finally, because our implementation is open
source, other programmers and researchers may extend on
the idea of LFS.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed several novel approaches to mitigating the state explosion
problem. In this Chapter, we briefly evaluate the proposed techniques “set-
tled” in time, with respect to further applications and research opportunities.
Behavior protocols were enhanced with exceptions (presented in Chap-
ter 5, alternatively presented in [7]) on demand from practice of creating for-
mal specification of an already existing large project. However, since following
projects focuses on the bottom-up development (for example [15]), the excep-
tions were not used. That leads to omitting the exceptions in the Kofron’s
proposed sequel of Behavior protocols [18], partially also due to potentially
more complex implementation of the conversion to Promela. Nonetheless, we
still believe the exceptions are commonly used in components and should be
appropriately reflected in the specification.
The method of formal manipulation with a specification presented in
Chapter 6 is very promising. Majority of the specifications (and thus models)
preserves some structural properties (most method calls are synchronous, for
example) which could be employed in order to reduce the size of the gener-
ated state space. Since Behavior protocols are a specification language with a
relatively simple syntax, most of the reduction rules are relative easy to test
and therefore the method works very well. Enhancing the rules to Extended
Behavior Protocols [18] is a challenge due to parameter passing which could
make the relations among components difficult to track statically. Neverthe-
less, reducing EPB by symbolic manipulations is a future research challenge
for us. Moreover, the result could be applicable and extendable to even more
complex languages such as Promela. As an aside, many reduction rules are
blocked by dependences which are not present in the final model. Unfortu-
nately, these “virtual” dependences are difficult to eliminate precisely, since a
thorough analysis is as time consuming as the verification itself. If we could
find a reasonable estimate or a heuristic to refine the dependences, the effi-
97
ciency of the reduction would be pushed further. We see a potential in the
algorithm [6] based on heuristic reachability analysis.
Probably the most appealing results are presented in Chapter 8; The
streamed method of distributed verification combines features hardly achiev-
able by traditional partitioning methods (such as optimal load balancing and
employing external mass storage devices). Since we have focused in safety
analysis only, our future intention is to investigate whether the method is
applicable also in checking liveness property. Furthermore, we would like
to identify in detail the models and languages the method is suited best:
As discussed, we expect higher network bandwidth than in the traditional
approach and, thus, large state representations would (intuitively) lead to
network saturations and verification efficiency degradation.
Although the partial-order reduction presented in Chapter 9 does not
bring a new “killer” result, a very interesting finding is the possibility of
notable reductions in abstract languages where asynchronous processes are
so tightly synchronously coupled as in Behavior protocols. Our experience
is that the partial-order reduction in the SPIN model checker produces very
poor results in a one-to-one conversion from Behavior protocols to Promela.
LFS presented in Chapter 10 is an approach to providing a background
for fault-tolerant streamed distributed model verification. In this case, the
recovery is achieved by the operating system as a specialized data organiza-
tion. Obviously, an implementation in the kernel of an operating system is
very challenging and for the purpose of the verification itself very demand-
ing. Thus, practically from the checker implementation point of view, it is
beneficial to either use an already existing logging facility embedded in the
operating system (as is the case of LFS) or implement an in-house solution
in the scope of the model checker.
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Appendix A
Full-fledged Example of the
Reduction Presented in
Chapter 6
In this appendix, we elaborate the example from the Chapter 6 in detail.
The whole protocol depicted in Fig. A.1 is reduced in nine steps. Each step is
dedicated to exactly one reduction rule which is applied multiple times. We
discuss the conditions which must be satisfied to guarantee the correctness
of the reduction. Note that the order of reduction rules has been chosen to
fit well to our description and does not correspond to the order suggested in
Chapter 6.
Step 1: Reduction of external events First, we reduce external events by the
rule B4. External events are (method call/acceptance abbreviated):
• ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start,
• ?ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId,
• !IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithAccountId,
• !IAccountAuth.CreateToken,
• ?ILogin.Logout,
• ?IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated 1,
• ?IAccount.GenerateRandomAccountId,
• ?IAccount.CreateAccount, and
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Arbitrator
( ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start^ ;
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start^ ;
[?ITokenLifetimeController.Start$,
!IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start$] );
(
(
?ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress +
?ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId {
!IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId {
!IFreqFlyerAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.LoginWithAccountId {
!IAccountAuth.CreateToken ;
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + NULL) }
+
?ILogin.Logout {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 }
)* |
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2 }*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3 }*
|
?IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated_1 {
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 }*
)
Token
?ITokenLifetimeController.Start ;
( ?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 }* |
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 }* |
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3 + NULL);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 )*
)
AccountDatabase
( (
?IAccount.GenerateRandomAccountId +
?IAccount.CreateAccount +
?IAccount.RechargeAccount {
!ICardCenter.Withdraw }
)* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2* |
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3*
)
CardCenter
( ?ICardCenter.Withdraw* )
Firewall
( ?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2* |
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3* |
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock*
)
Figure A.1: Airport Internet providing service [15, 3] (Fig. 2.5)
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• ?IAccount.RechargeAccount.
We can reduce these transitions under the conditions of ν-elimination, particullary missing
accepting transitions from the end of the reduced transition. Immediately, we can reduce:
• ?IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start↑,
• ?ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress↑,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId↑,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId↑,
• ?ILogin.LoginWithAccountId↑,
• ?ILogin.Logout↑,
• ?IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated 1↑,
• ?IAccount.GenerateRandomAccountId↑,
• ?IAccount.CreateAccount↑, and
• ?IAccount.RechargeAccount↑,
but rest of the transitions are blocked by sequel accepting transitions. However, most of
them are actually events from the list above. Thus, after reducing external events from
the first list, we are able to reduce:
• !IArbitratorLifetimeController.Start↓,
• !ILogin.GetTokenIdFromIpAddress↓,
• !ILogin.LoginWithFlyTicketId↓,
• ?IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken↓,
• !ILogin.LoginWithFrequentFlyerId↓,
• ?IAccountAuth.CreateToken↓,
• !ILogin.LoginWithAccountId↓,
• !ILogin.Logout↓,
• !IDhcpCallback.IpAddressInvalidated 1↓,
• !IAccount.GenerateRandomAccountId↓,
• !IAccount.CreateAccount↓, and
• !IAccount.RechargeAccount↓.
Now, method calls !IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken↑ (two instances) and
!IAccountAuth.CreateToken↑ remains. Fortunately, since these were blocked by
?IFlyTicketAuth.CreateToken↓ and ?IAccountAuth.CreateToken↑ and have already
been removed in the previous reduction, we can reduce them as well. Finally the
specification takes the form of Fig. A.2.
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Arbitrator
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start ;
(
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock + null)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3
}*
|
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
)
Token
?ITokenLifetimeController.Start
;
(
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1
}*
|
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2
}*
|
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3
)*
)
AccountDatabase
(
!ICardCenter.Withdraw*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3*
)
CardCenter
(
?ICardCenter.Withdraw*
)
Firewall
(
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3*
|
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock*
)
Figure A.2: Step 1 — Reduction of external events
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Step 2: Simple method call reduction In this step, we reduce simple method
calls (and acceptances) of
• ITokenLifetimeController.Start,
• IFirewall.DisablePortBlock,
• IFirewall.EnablePortBlock {1,2,3},
• IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime {1,2,3}, and
• ICardCenter.Withdraw.
To preserve the correctness, we have to test all the conditions of the ν-elimination on the
second part of method invocation and acceptance:
• !ITokenLifetimeController.Start is at the beginning of Arbitrator. We want
to reduce ?ITokenLifetimeController.Start↓ which has outgoing accepting tran-
sitions ?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated {1,2,3}↑ and potentially can violate
ν-elimination conditions. But the counterparts of these transitions lay in Token and
are sequentially blocked by ?ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑. Thus they can-
not cause a bad activity error at the start of ?ITokenLifetimeController.Start↓
and the correctness of the ν-elimination is preserved.
• A similar argument holds for !ITokenLifetimeController.Start↓. Here, the
potentialy dangerous actions are ?IToken.InvalidateAndSave {1,2,3}↑.
However, those are sequentially blocked at the Arbitrator by
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑.
• !IFirewall.DisablePortBlock↓ is in three instances in Arbitrator. Since all the
transitions we can continue to are emitting, the conditions for ν-closure holds.
• The same argument used in the previous bul-
let holds for !Firewall.EnablePortBlock {1,2,3}↓,
!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime {1,2,3}↓, !ICardCenter.Withdraw↓,
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime {1,2,3}↓, and
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock↓.
After the reductions, the protocol takes the form of Fig. A.3.
Step 3: Initial state transitions This step consists of a reduction
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑ and ?ITokenLifetimeController.Start↑ accord-
ing to the reduction rule B5. The reduction is allowed since Arbitrator and Token can-
not continue without proceeding τITokenLifetimeController.Start↑, Firewall awaits
blocked Arbitrator, and AccountDatabase can only communicate with CardCenter and
vice versa (Fig. A.4).
Step 4: Redundant state reduction After the reduction in step 3 (Fig. A.4),
Arbitrator, Token, AccountDatabase, and Firewall consist of several independent parts
connected together via a single state for each component. Since these parts behave concur-
rently, the connecting states are redundant and can be reduced according to the reducing
rule C3.
The effect of the reduction is depicted in Fig. A.5. Four components are split up to 16
parts.
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Arbitrator
!ITokenLifetimeController.Start^ ;
(
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^
}*
|
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
)
Token
?ITokenLifetimeController.Start^
;
(
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1
}*
|
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2
}*
|
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3
)*
)
AccountDatabase
(
!ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^*
)
CardCenter
(
?ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
)
Firewall
(
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^*
|
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^*
)
Figure A.3: Step 2 — Simple method call reduction
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Arbitrator
(
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^
}*
|
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^
}*
|
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
)
Token
(
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1
}*
|
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2
}*
|
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3
)*
)
AccountDatabase
(
!ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^*
|
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^*
)
CardCenter
(
?ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
)
Firewall
(
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^*
|
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^*
|
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^*
)
Figure A.4: Step 3 — Initial state transitions
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Arbitrator
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^
}*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^
}*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^
}*
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
Token
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1
}*
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2
}*
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3
)*
AccountDatabase
!ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^*
CardCenter
(
?ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
)
Firewall
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^*
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^*
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^*
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^*
Figure A.5: Step 4 — Redundant state reduction
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Arbitrator
(
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
(!IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^ + null)
+
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1
)*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^
}*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^
}*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3 {
!IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^
}*
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
Token
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1
}*
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2
}*
(
(!IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^
+ null);
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3
)*
AccountDatabase
!ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_1^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_2^*
?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime_3^*
CardCenter
(
?ICardCenter.Withdraw^*
)
Firewall
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_1^*
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_2^*
?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock_3^*
?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock^*
Figure A.6: Step 5 — Simple cycle reduction
Step 5: Simple cycle reduction After the splitting of AccountDatabase and
Firewall in the previous step, we can reduce eight simple cycles according to the rule B3:
• ?IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime {1,2,3}↑
• ?ICardCenter.Withdraw↑
• ?IFirewall.EnablePortBlock {1,2,3}↑, and
• ?IFirewall.DisablePortBlock↑,
and counterparts:
• !IFirewall.DisablePortBlock↑
• !IFirewall.EnablePortBlock {1,2,3}
• !IAccount.AjustAccountPrepaidTime {1,2,3}, and
• !ICardCenter.Withdraw↑.
The reduction removes all these calls which results in empty protocols. Thus the
resulting behavior in Fig. A.6 is empty for AccountDatabase, CardCenter, and Firewall.
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Arbitrator
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1^*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2^*
?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3^*
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
Token
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1 {
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_1^
}*
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2 {
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_2^
}*
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated_3^*
AccountDatabase
null
null
null
null
CardCenter
null
Firewall
null
null
null
null
Figure A.7: Step 6 — Simple method call reduction
Step 6: Simple method call reduction In this step, we reduce sim-
ple method calls of ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated {1,2,3}↑ (Fig. A.7).
Because the sequel actions of ?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated {1,2}↓
are only emit actions !IToken.InvalidateAndSave {1,2}↓ and the sequel
action of ?ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated 3↓ is only the emit action
!ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated 3↑, the conditions of the ν-elimination are
satisfied.
Step 7: Simple cycle reduction Simple method call reductions in step 6 enables
simple cycle reductions of ITokenCallback.TokenInvalidated {1,2,3} (Fig. A.8).
Step 8: Simple method call reduction Method calls
IToken.InvalidateAndSave {1,2} can be reduced according to simple method call
reduction rule B1. Since these method calls are the only behavior remaining, the
conditions of the ν-elimination are satisfied. The result of the elimination is depicted in
Fig. A.9.
Step 9: Simple cycle reduction Behaviors ?IToken.InvalidateAndSave 1↑*
and ?IToken.InvalidateAndSave 2↑* are simple calls and can be eliminated according to
the simple cycle reduction B3. The reduction causes Arbitrator and Token to consists of
empty behavior parts (Fig. A.10).
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Arbitrator
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1*
null
null
null
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
Token
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1*
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
null
AccountDatabase
null
null
null
null
CardCenter
null
Firewall
null
null
null
null
Figure A.8: Step 7 — Simple cycle reduction
Arbitrator
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1*
null
null
null
!IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
Token
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_1*
?IToken.InvalidateAndSave_2*
null
AccountDatabase
null
null
null
null
CardCenter
null
Firewall
null
null
null
null
Figure A.9: Step 8 — Simple method call reduction
119
Arbitrator
null
null
null
null
null
Token
null
null
null
AccountDatabase
null
null
null
null
CardCenter
null
Firewall
null
null
null
null
Figure A.10: Step 9 — Simple cycle reduction
120
